John E. Simonett

This case involved the civil commitment of Peter Rickmyer as a psychopathic personality under Minnesota statutes following his guilty plea to second-degree criminal sexual conduct for spanking an 8-year-old boy. The trial court found Rickmyer met the criteria based on his history of sexual contact with children, lack of impulse control, and likelihood of reoffending, leading to his commitment to the Minnesota Security Hospital. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the commitment, concluding that the evidence failed to show Rickmyer was likely to inflict serious physical or mental harm. The court reasoned that the psychopathic personality statute, as interpreted in Pearson, requires a showing of habitual misconduct, uncontrollable impulses, and potential for injury of the type that meets the statutory threshold, which nonviolent touching and spanking incidents did not satisfy.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over farmland subject to Minnesota's family farm foreclosure statute, Minn. Stat. § 500.24, and a former owner's statutory right of first refusal. Metropolitan Life Insurance sold the property to plaintiff Noel Kjesbo under a contract that was subject to defendant Valerie Ricks' right of first refusal; Ricks exercised that right with financing from defendant Douglas Daniels, then conveyed portions of the land to her son and to Daniels in a series of transactions. The trial court granted summary judgment to Kjesbo on his claims for tortious interference with contract and violation of the statute, but the court of appeals reversed, finding factual issues about the parties' intent. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the manner in which the right of first refusal was exercised did not constitute unjustified interference with Kjesbo's contract and remanded the case. The core reasoning focused on whether the defendants' actions satisfied the elements of tortious interference, particularly the lack of justification, and on the statute's family exception to its anti-flipping provisions.

propertytorts & liabilityfamily law

In State v. Trong Kim Huynh, the defendant was convicted of racketeering under Minnesota's RICO statute after he and associates repeatedly threatened to kill a Vietnamese restaurant owner and his family unless the owner paid $1,000-$1,500 monthly, with payments made via checks and money orders routed through Texas entities in a manner consistent with money laundering. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the trial court's assignment of severity level VIII for sentencing. The court held that an "enterprise" under Minn. Stat. § 609.903 requires an ascertainable structure distinct from the predicate acts of coercion, and the evidence here established such an organized pattern of activity involving multiple participants, coordinated threats, and systematic collection and transfer of payments. The opinion clarified that sporadic crimes alone do not suffice and that the enterprise element must remain separate from the pattern of criminal activity requirement.

criminal law

The case involved a bar owner who challenged two city ordinances banning nudity in establishments with liquor licenses, claiming they violated free expression rights under the Minnesota Constitution. The ordinances were enacted after complaints about nude dancing at the bar, and the city denied license renewal based on violations of them. Lower courts ruled the ordinances unconstitutional, finding they targeted protected speech without legitimate governmental interests. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Twenty-first Amendment grants states broad authority to regulate liquor sales and prohibit nudity in bars, which does not infringe on the state constitution's free speech protections even for non-obscene expressive conduct.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In State v. Kelly, the defendant was convicted of multiple prostitution-related offenses, including soliciting, promoting, and receiving profits from the prostitution of juveniles, as well as one count of racketeering under Minnesota's RICO statute. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed only the racketeering conviction. The court held that the evidence failed to establish the defendant's association with an "enterprise" as defined by the statute, because the prostitution activities involved a loose group of individuals primarily supporting the defendant's personal heroin habit rather than constituting organized crime with the required structure and continuity. The court distinguished this from the type of racketeering the RICO law was intended to address and noted that the other convictions and sentences remained in place.

criminal law

This case involves an employee, Albert, who obtained a verdict against a third-party tortfeasor, Paper Calmenson & Co. (PaCal), for workplace injuries, while also receiving workers' compensation benefits from his employer, MAK Oil. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted limited further review to address allocation of the verdict proceeds under the Lambertson contribution framework. The court directed that PaCal pay Albert the full verdict amount of $1,962,108; MAK Oil then contribute to PaCal its proportionate share of negligence (capped at the $654,036 in benefits paid or payable); and Albert reimburse MAK Oil $362,121 under Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 6(c), leaving MAK Oil a $334,216 credit against future benefits. The allocation follows precedents such as Johnson v. Raske Building Systems and Kempa v. E.W. Coons Co. All other aspects of the petitions for review were denied.

labor & employmenttorts & liability