Esther Tomljanovich

The case involved a patient's dental malpractice claim against a dentist and clinic for allegedly failing to recommend timely surgery for temporomandibular joint dysfunction (TMJD), resulting in permanent injury. The patient sued in December 1995, nearly three years after her last office visit but just under two years after the dentist authorized a prescription refill. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the claim time-barred under Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, which generally runs from the end of treatment for the condition. The court of appeals reversed, but the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the refill authorization did not extend the course of treatment or toll the limitations period on these facts, as it was not part of an ongoing physician-patient relationship involving active care. The core reasoning focused on the single-act exception to the continuing-treatment rule and the absence of any direct interaction or scheduled follow-up after the last visit.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved Jason Gilhousen, who was injured by an unidentified driver and received medical and disability benefits from his employer's ERISA-governed plan; after winning a damages award against his uninsured motorist insurer, the insurer sought to reduce the award under Minnesota's collateral source statute, which allows offsets for benefits received except where subrogation rights have been asserted. The district court applied the statute after finding the plan administrator abused discretion in interpreting the plan's subrogation clause to cover first-party insurance, but the court of appeals held ERISA preempted the statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that ERISA does not preempt the collateral source statute because the law does not "relate to" ERISA plans under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), as it affects the calculation of damages in tort litigation rather than regulating the structure or administration of benefit plans themselves. The court reasoned that the statute imposes no additional burdens on plans beyond those they voluntarily assume through subrogation provisions and leaves employers free to enforce subrogation interests against third parties or insurers. The matter was remanded for further proceedings on the plan interpretation issue.

federal powerhealthcarelabor & employmenttorts & liability

In McKenzie v. State, the appellant, convicted of first-degree murder of a police officer and serving a life sentence, sought postconviction relief claiming that Hennepin County judges improperly met in advance to decide on using an anonymous jury in his trial without his input, violating due process, confrontation rights, and judicial conduct canons. The postconviction court denied the petition and hearing request, finding the record showed no entitlement to relief. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no abuse of discretion because the files conclusively demonstrated the trial judge had not prejudged the issue, conducted a hearing before ruling, and the anonymous jury decision had already been upheld on direct appeal; the confrontation clause was not implicated as no witness testimony occurred at the judges' meeting.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Varnado, police stopped Beverly Ann Varnado for driving with a cracked windshield in a high-crime area known for drug activity, asked her to sit in the squad car after she lacked identification, and frisked her before she entered, discovering crack cocaine in her pocket. The district court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the complaint, finding no valid basis for the frisk, but the court of appeals reversed. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the suppression, holding that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment because no exception applied: there was no individualized suspicion that Varnado was armed to justify a protective frisk for weapons, and it was not a valid search incident to arrest since the officer lacked probable cause at the time. The court reasoned that while officers could reasonably request Varnado sit in the squad car for safety during the license check given the circumstances, this did not automatically permit the frisk without additional justification tied to weapons or arrest. The ruling focused on the specific facts showing Varnado was cooperative with no suspicious behavior indicating danger.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, a physically disabled plaintiff confined to a motorized wheelchair sued the transit authority, bus driver, and supervisor for disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act as well as tort claims including false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on an incident where the driver refused to secure her wheelchair, summoned a supervisor instead, and delayed her travel. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds, and the court of appeals held that official immunity did not bar the tort claims while statutory immunity was not a defense to the discrimination claims. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the discrimination, false imprisonment, and emotional distress claims were not barred by official immunity and remanding for trial. The core reasoning was that the employees' operational conduct did not involve discretionary policy decisions protected by official immunity, and statutory immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03 does not apply to MHRA claims.

civil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Daniel Martinson, who was charged with multiple drug possession and trafficking offenses after narcotics officers at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport detained him for a drug-sniffing dog examination based on observations of his travel from a source city, nervous behavior, cash one-way tickets on different airlines, lack of photo ID, and refusal to consent to a luggage search. Martinson moved to suppress the resulting evidence, claiming the detention violated the Fourth Amendment, but the trial court denied the motion; he was convicted on stipulated facts and sentenced to 54 months. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated it, concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances to justify the brief Terry stop even though the individual facts were consistent with innocent conduct. The court emphasized that the officers' training and experience, combined with the specific articulated facts, supported the detention until the dog arrived.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Robert Scott Larson was personally liable for unpaid sales and withholding taxes owed by D & B Cleaners, Inc. for 1990-1992. The Minnesota Tax Court had ruled that Larson qualified as an “employer” with control over wage payments and as a “person” responsible for sales tax under state statutes, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed this liability. The court examined the substance of a joint venture agreement under which Larson’s company, SLC, received and controlled D & B’s daily receipts, decided which bills to pay, prepared tax returns, and handled payroll, giving Larson effective authority over tax payments despite not signing checks or returns on D & B’s account. It applied a functional test focusing on power and responsibility for taxes rather than formal titles or direct authority.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a subrogation action by Employers Mutual Casualty Co. against contractor A.C.C.T., Inc., seeking to recover payments made to Miller-Dwan Medical Center for fire damage allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence during asbestos abatement work. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a waiver clause in the standard AIA construction contract barred the insurer's subrogation claim. The court reasoned that because the owner had relied on its existing broad all-risk property insurance policy, which covered both work and non-work property and exceeded the contract's requirements, the waiver applied to damages covered by that insurance, preventing the suit against the contractor.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In State v. Sirvio, the defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and related offenses after the trial court denied his motion to suppress statements he made to police while at a detoxification center, where he had voluntarily admitted himself and confessed to killing the victim, burning the house, and stealing the car. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the police interrogations were non-custodial under an objective reasonable-person test and thus did not require Miranda warnings. The court further concluded that the statements were voluntary because there was no evidence of coercive police conduct that overbore the defendant's will, noting that he had already confessed to others before speaking with police. The ruling emphasized that the circumstances at the detox center did not involve restraint equivalent to formal arrest.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dunn v. State, appellant Lillian Virginia Dunn filed her third petition for postconviction relief asserting claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to her 1989 convictions for first-degree felony murder and kidnapping in the shooting death of Marlizza McIntyre. The postconviction court summarily denied the petition, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that Dunn knew or should have known of the basis for these claims at the time of her trial or her first postconviction petition, given that the related trial of Gary Roby occurred before hers and her counsel had reviewed its transcript, and that the seven-and-a-half-year delay weighed against granting relief. The claims were not novel, and fairness did not require substantive review, as Dunn had been represented by counsel in prior proceedings who could have raised them.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Kulinski, who sued his former employer Medtronic Bio-Medicus for severance benefits first under an ERISA claim in federal court, where he obtained a favorable judgment that was later vacated on appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the agreements did not qualify as ERISA plans. After the dismissal, Kulinski filed a second action alleging breach of contract under diversity jurisdiction, but the district court dismissed it as barred by Minnesota's statute of limitations for wage claims, finding the savings statute inapplicable to a new legal theory. The Minnesota Supreme Court, answering a certified question from the Eighth Circuit, held that Minn. Stat. § 541.18 saves the second action because the original judgment was reversed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction rather than on the merits, and the statute does not require the new claim to rest on the same legal theory as the first. The court reasoned from the plain language of the savings statute, which allows a new action within one year of reversal without limiting it to identical claims, while rejecting arguments for narrower interpretations based on common law or policy concerns.

procedurelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over whether a fee-splitting agreement between attorneys from different firms in a medical malpractice matter was enforceable. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that such agreements must comply with all requirements of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e) to be consistent with public policy and reversed the court of appeals, finding the agreement unenforceable. The court's reasoning centered on the rule's mandate that fee division not proportional to services requires the client's written consent to joint responsibility, which was absent here, along with the fact that one attorney performed no work on the case after the referral.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether a liquidating agent appointed under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan could pursue a legal malpractice claim belonging to the debtor partnership against its former law firm. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the claim was properly retained by the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) and that no invalid assignment had occurred. The court reasoned that the agent acted solely in a representative capacity, with any recovery distributed to creditors rather than retained personally, distinguishing it from an assignment prohibited by state public policy. The underlying malpractice allegation stemmed from the firm's late service of process in an asbestos property damage suit, resulting in dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned landlords who sued their former tenant for lost rents after the tenant's admitted negligence caused a fire that rendered the leased home uninhabitable, along with related claims for attorney fees incurred in pursuing insurance coverage. The district court found the tenant liable for twelve months of rent and associated expenses, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the tenant qualified as a co-insured under the landlords' homeowners policy loss-of-use coverage and thus could not be sued for the covered losses. The supreme court opinion analyzes whether a negligent tenant is impliedly a co-insured absent an express lease agreement shifting risk, reviews competing approaches from other jurisdictions that generally require explicit intent to hold the tenant liable, and addresses the separate issue of recoverability of attorney fees under third-party litigation principles.

propertytorts & liability

This case concerned whether the attorney-client privilege protects preliminary drafts of a university letter denying tenure to an assistant professor when those drafts were exchanged with university counsel for legal review, even though the final version was sent to the professor. The professor sought the drafts under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act after his tenure denial, but the university claimed privilege. The district court found the first draft privileged but not the second, and the court of appeals reversed as to the first draft while affirming as to the second. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that both drafts were protected by the privilege and exempt from disclosure. The court reasoned that the drafts were confidential communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and the privilege was not waived merely because the final letter was disclosed to a third party.

procedure

The case concerned Alexander Juarez's convictions for attempted criminal sexual conduct, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and soliciting minors for prostitution based on allegations involving residents of a children's facility where he worked. Juarez challenged the admission at trial of a portion of his police interrogation in which he referenced needing to get a lawyer, arguing it invoked his right to counsel. The district court ruled the reference was not an invocation and admitted the preceding statements, while the court of appeals held the admission was error but harmless. On review, the supreme court examined whether the statement constituted an invocation of counsel under applicable precedents and analyzed whether any error was harmless in light of the remaining evidence, including multiple victim testimonies and medical testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a disciplinary petition against attorney William Starr for unprofessional conduct in a courtroom setting. Starr admitted to referring to opposing counsel with a derogatory expression and instructing her to "shut up" in the presence of others, despite court not being in session. He waived his rights to a hearing and admitted the allegations, jointly recommending a public reprimand and payment of costs with the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. The court, after independent review, agreed that the conduct warranted this discipline and ordered a public reprimand along with $900 in costs and disbursements.

procedure

The case involved Kevin Holmes being charged with transporting a pistol in a motor vehicle without a permit after University of Minnesota police discovered the weapon in the locked glove compartment of a car he had parked on campus. The trial court suppressed the pistol and Holmes' statements, finding that police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk, conducted an unreasonable search of the vehicle, and failed to properly administer Miranda warnings, leading to dismissal of the charge. The court of appeals reversed the suppression and reinstated the charge, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the dismissal. The core reasoning was that the initial police encounter escalated into an unlawful seizure when the officer took Holmes' identification and conducted a pat-down without adequate justification, tainting all subsequent evidence obtained from the car and statements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Leonard Allen Grecinger, Sr., who was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and third-degree assault against his on-and-off partner after an alleged beating that caused serious injuries. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and addressed whether expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court held that the testimony was properly admitted under Minn. R. Evid. 608(a) and 702 after the defense attacked the victim's credibility in opening statements and cross-examination, because it assisted the jury in understanding the victim's behavior, and was limited to describing the syndrome and its characteristics without opining on the ultimate issue of whether the victim suffered from it, consistent with State v. Hennum.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Carter, a police officer observed the defendant, an out-of-state visitor, and two others packaging a white powdery substance inside an apartment by peering through gaps in the closed window blinds from a position on the grass outside. The district court and court of appeals denied Carter's motion to suppress the resulting evidence, finding either a lack of standing or no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that Carter presented sufficient evidence of standing to challenge the observation and that the officer's conduct constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution. The court further concluded that the search was unreasonable because it was conducted without probable cause or a warrant.

criminal lawprocedure