Reuben V. Anderson

The case involved Frank Mackbee, who was indicted in Lincoln County for the capital murder of Cicero Montgomery during a robbery and as a habitual offender under Mississippi law. After a change of venue, a Covington County jury convicted him of capital murder and imposed a death sentence. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence from witness identifications, the discovery of charred bodies in the burned vehicle, and related circumstances to support the jury's verdict. The court reversed the death sentence, however, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing due to procedural errors in the sentencing phase, including the sequence of determining habitual offender status and deficiencies in the jury instructions regarding aggravating factors such as "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."

criminal law

This case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney Joe R. Odom brought by the Mississippi State Bar for mishandling proceeds from the sale of a client's estate property. Odom deposited estate funds into a personal and business account rather than a trust account, used the money for unrelated expenses, wrote checks to the estate's executrices that were initially dishonored due to insufficient funds, and failed to promptly distribute the money despite a court order. A Complaint Tribunal found violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility but no fraud or dishonesty and recommended a three-month suspension plus public reprimand; the Bar appealed seeking a harsher penalty. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Tribunal's penalty and suspended Odom from practice for three years, reasoning that his commingling and conversion of client funds constituted a serious breach of trust warranting greater discipline, even though restitution was eventually made.

criminal lawprocedure

In Evans v. State, Anthony Evans was convicted in the Circuit Court of Copiah County on two counts of manslaughter by culpable negligence after his vehicle struck a stalled pickup truck on a highway, killing two men who were attempting to move it off the road. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, including Evans' blood alcohol level of 0.20% and witness accounts of the accident, and determined that the proof did not establish the degree of negligence required for culpable negligence manslaughter but was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of negligently causing death while operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court therefore affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63-11-30(4), which at the time limited each sentence to no more than five years.

criminal law

The case involved George W. Jackson's conviction for sexual battery in the Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi, resulting in a fifteen-year prison sentence. Jackson appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict because the prosecution failed to prove venue by establishing that the crime occurred in Warren County. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly took judicial notice under Rule 201(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence that the locations referenced in testimony—such as specific streets in Vicksburg—were within Warren County, as Vicksburg lies solely in that county. The majority distinguished prior cases where judicial notice was improper and found the evidence sufficient to support venue.

criminal lawprocedure

In Tandy Electronics, Inc. v. Fletcher, the appellant sued in circuit court to recover a balance due under a computer equipment lease and obtained a jury verdict in its favor for less than the full amount claimed. Tandy filed its notice of appeal thirty-two days after entry of the judgment, one day after the thirty-day deadline set by Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 4(a). The court granted the appellee's motion to docket and dismiss the appeal, ruling that Rule 2(a)(1) requires mandatory dismissal when a notice is not timely filed in a civil case and that Rule 2(c) prohibits extending the appeal time. The decision rested on the principle that the rules, modeled after the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, must be strictly enforced like statutes of limitations, as an unenforced rule is no rule.

procedure

The case involved the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommending the removal of Justice Court Judge C.L. Quick for failing to report numerous DUI and traffic convictions to the Department of Public Safety as required by state law. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's findings that Quick had not filed abstracts for approximately 28 DUI cases within five days and 552 other traffic cases within 45 days over a three-year period. The court determined that this constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. As a result, the court ordered Quick's removal from office effective November 22, 1989.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice claim by Meda Parham against her longtime family physician, Dr. B.O. Moore, alleging failure to timely diagnose and refer her for treatment of herniated discs, which allegedly caused permanent partial paralysis in her left leg. Parham filed suit in April 1984, more than two years after her initial visits to Moore in early 1982 but within two years after her surgery and recuperative period. The trial court granted summary judgment to Moore on statute of limitations grounds, finding that Parham knew or should have known of her injury by April 1982. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when Parham could reasonably have discovered that her injury was permanent and compensable, which expert evidence indicated was no earlier than twelve to eighteen months after her April 1982 surgery.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the City of Booneville's 1987 ordinance to annex approximately 18 square miles of surrounding land in Prentiss County, Mississippi, which was challenged by local property owners and others who objected primarily due to potential negative impacts on the county school system. The Prentiss County Chancery Court confirmed the annexation after a hearing that included extensive testimony and a feasibility study showing the city's ability to extend services. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the chancellor correctly found the annexation reasonable under the applicable legal standard and that this finding was supported by substantial credible evidence regarding the city's financial capacity, need for growth, and benefits to annexed residents. The court noted that issues involving the school district were irrelevant to the annexation determination and that chancellors have authority to approve, deny, or modify annexations based on reasonableness. A dissent argued the annexation was unfair to the affected property owners.

property

This case involved a dispute over credit life insurance coverage on loans taken out by George Washington from First National Bank of Pontotoc, with policies issued by Malta Life Insurance Company through the bank as its agent. Washington obtained two loans, the second of which carried insurance exceeding the master policy's stated $50,000 per-debtor limit, and he died shortly after the second policy's effective date; Malta paid only up to the $50,000 cap and refused the remainder. The estate sued Malta and the bank, and the trial court ruled for the estate on the cross-claim against Malta, ordering payment of the remaining loan balance. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the master policy's provision allowing cancellation of excess coverage within thirty days after notice meant such coverage became effective upon issuance, that the bank's agent had authority to issue it, and that Malta was bound by the agent's actions.

business & regulatory

The case involved Willie Ray Conerly, who was convicted of armed robbery in Pearl River County after a retrial and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Conerly raised several issues, but the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed only his claim under Batson v. Kentucky that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude black venire members. The court found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection and that the state's explanation for striking one black juror, Jean Swain, was insufficient because the trial court had determined her jury information card was adequately completed. As a result, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded. The decision centered on ensuring that peremptory challenges comply with constitutional requirements for race-neutral justifications.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved Noah Wheeler, who was convicted in Rankin County Circuit Court of capital murder for fatally shooting Hattiesburg police officer Jackie Dole Sherrill while she was executing an arrest warrant, and sentenced to death by the jury. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wheeler knew Sherrill was a police officer when he fired the fatal shot, as required under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(a) for capital murder of a peace officer. The majority noted that Wheeler consistently denied seeing her prior to the shooting, that she had approached from the rear of the house, and that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence on this element was not overwhelming enough to support the jury's findings on the knowledge requirement or the related aggravating circumstances. A dissent argued that the evidence, including Wheeler's awareness of multiple officers present and Sherrill's visible badge and weapon, was sufficient for the jury to find the knowledge element and uphold the sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Democratic primary candidate Velvelyn B. Foster to the residency qualifications of Alice Harden and Earl S. Banks for a Mississippi Senate seat under Article 4, Section 42 of the state constitution. Foster petitioned the Hinds County Democratic Executive Committee and later the circuit court to contest the primary results, alleging the candidates did not meet the two-year residency requirement. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that Article 4, Section 38 vests each legislative house with exclusive authority to judge the qualifications, returns, and elections of its own members, placing the matter beyond judicial review.

electionsprocedure

The case was an appeal by Larry R. Fisher from his conviction in Smith County Circuit Court for the 1983 rape of a woman in Lauderdale County, for which he received a life sentence after a change of venue. The court reviewed claims that the 790-day delay between indictment and trial violated Fisher's speedy trial rights under the U.S. and Mississippi Constitutions and state statute, applying the four-factor Barker v. Wingo test that weighs delay length, reasons for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and resulting prejudice. The opinion also considered the denial of Fisher's request for a free transcript from a related prior trial in which he had been acquitted of murder. The court found the assignments of error without sufficient merit and affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. v. Fortenberry, a patient sued the flu vaccine manufacturer after developing transverse myelitis (closely related to Guillain-Barre syndrome) following a non-swine influenza shot, claiming the product warning was inadequate. The jury awarded the patient $200,000 against Wyeth while finding in favor of the administering physician. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Wyeth, ruling that the package insert's warnings about GBS and related risks were adequate as a matter of law. The court applied the learned intermediary doctrine, concluding that the informed physician bore responsibility for deciding whether to convey the risks to the patient.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved a dispute over disability insurance benefits where Henry Edward Bristow, after receiving 24 months of payments following an arm injury under his policy from Life & Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee, had benefits discontinued when the insurer determined he could perform other suitable work based on his doctor's reports. Bristow counterclaimed for bad faith refusal to pay, seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages, after the insurer filed for a declaratory judgment on its obligations. A jury awarded Bristow $50,000 in compensatory damages and $6,000,000 in punitive damages, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the insurer. The court held that while the insurer's decision to deny further benefits had an arguable basis under the policy terms, there was no evidence of willful or malicious conduct to support punitive damages, and the compensatory award lacked proof of an independent intentional tort causing emotional distress.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Rickey Livingston's conviction for rape in Hinds County Circuit Court, where he was sentenced to 40 years in prison consecutive to prior sentences. On appeal, Livingston challenged the admission of identification testimony from lineups conducted without counsel present and comments by the prosecutor regarding his failure to testify. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the pre-indictment lineups and that any improper prosecutorial remarks were harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an election contest appeal from a special tribunal's decree disqualifying Jack Gadd as a candidate for the Mississippi House of Representatives in District 13. Thompson, a rival candidate, challenged Gadd's residency after Gadd purchased a home in Oxford (Lafayette County, outside the district), claimed a homestead exemption there, and received tax benefits, despite Gadd's prior ties and voting registration in Benton County. The tribunal concluded that the homestead filing and benefits established Gadd's domicile in Oxford under Article 4, Section 41 of the Mississippi Constitution, which requires two years' county residency before election, rendering him ineligible. The Supreme Court opinion examined whether the homestead exemption was conclusive evidence of intent to remain in the county and addressed related questions of domicile, jurisdiction over legislative contests, and procedural aspects of the challenge.

electionspropertyproceduretaxes

The case concerned Mississippi Publishers Corporation's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a circuit court's orders closing the case file, docket, pretrial hearings, and jury selection in a capital murder retrial to the press and public. The trial judge had found a substantial probability that unrestricted media access would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial, that less restrictive alternatives had failed, and that closure was necessary to protect that right amid massive prior publicity. The Supreme Court of Mississippi acknowledged the media's standing to challenge such closures and noted the constitutional tension between First Amendment press access and Sixth Amendment fair trial rights under both federal and state constitutions, while observing that the defendant had declined a venue change that might have accommodated both interests.

free speechcriminal lawprocedure

Davis v. State involved the appeal of a capital murder conviction and death sentence from the Circuit Court of Tate County, where Danny Ray Davis was found guilty of killing Ralph May during a robbery and other aggravating factors were cited by the jury. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, holding that the inclusion of a juror who had previously testified as a prosecution witness at the pretrial change-of-venue hearing violated the defendant's right to a fair trial by creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also ruled that the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of the sentence from Davis's prior assault conviction during the penalty phase, as the U.S. Constitution requires broad latitude for defendants to present mitigating circumstances. The majority emphasized that even strong evidence of guilt does not excuse procedural unfairness in a death penalty case, while a dissent argued that the juror's prior role did not demonstrate actual bias.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case arose from a 1983 multi-vehicle accident on a Mississippi highway, in which plaintiff Mary Sue Gill was injured after encountering wreckage from a prior collision involving defendant W.C. Fore Trucking's truck and another driver; Gill sued both for negligence in causing the initial crash and failing to warn oncoming traffic. The first trial produced an improper jury verdict apportioning damages separately against each defendant ($5,000 against Fore and $45,000 against the other driver), prompting the trial judge to order a new trial on all issues after the jury was dismissed. At the second trial the jury found for Fore Trucking, but the judge later entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict reinstating the $5,000 award from the first trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the new-trial order was within the trial court's discretion and that the jnov was improper because it relied on the first verdict rather than evidence from the second trial; it therefore reversed the reinstatement of the $5,000 judgment and rendered judgment for Fore Trucking in accordance with the second jury's verdict.

proceduretorts & liability