The case concerned a contract dispute over a grant-back clause in a November 1954 patent license agreement, under which plaintiff Deering Milliken Research Corp. licensed defendant Leesona Corp. to use inventions related to processing thermo-plastic yarns and required the defendant to assign back any improvements or resulting patents acquired during the license term. Plaintiff sought enforcement of the clause to obtain assignment of U.S. Patent #2,864,229 and a related pending process application. An intervenor, The Permatwist Company, asserted competing rights under its own agreements with the defendant. The court directed judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff on the grant-back claims, while retaining jurisdiction over the intervenor's unresolved issues for potential further proceedings.
This case was a Federal Tort Claims Act suit arising from a rear-end collision on September 7, 1958, in Clarkstown, New York, in which a U.S. Army pickup truck struck the rear of the plaintiff's stopped 1953 Buick on wet pavement as the plaintiff prepared to merge onto Route 9W. The court found the government driver negligent for failing to pass or stop safely despite having adequate road width and visibility from roughly 100 feet away, while ruling the plaintiff not contributorily negligent for stopping under dark and rainy conditions. Damages were awarded for property repair ($218.78), a lower-back sprain, and certain medical and related expenses, but lost wages were disallowed under New York precedent requiring proof of actual out-of-pocket loss, and some medical items were excluded as unconnected to the accident, resulting in a total judgment of $5,593.78 plus costs.
The case concerns whether a $20,000 payment voted to plaintiff Alden D. Stanton by the directors of Trinity Operating Company upon his 1942 resignation was a nontaxable gift or taxable income for federal income tax purposes in 1943. On remand from the Supreme Court for more detailed findings, the district court holds that the payment qualifies as an excludable gift. The court reasons that the Vestry's action reflected dominant intentions of good will, esteem, and appreciation for Stanton's service in enabling their fiduciary duties, rather than compensation for past work or severance, given the unique nonprofit church-related context of the corporation.
This case concerns the priority of claims in distributing a bankrupt estate's assets under the Bankruptcy Act, specifically involving a federal tax lien, a chattel mortgage lien held by Otarion Listener Corp., administration expenses, and wage claims. The referee had ordered that administration expenses and wages be paid before the chattel mortgage due to the intervening tax lien. The court granted the petition for review and revised the distribution order to first allocate an amount equal to the tax lien ($6,007.30) to administration expenses and wages before the tax lien itself, pay the chattel mortgage its full amount next from the remaining funds, and apply any balance back to unpaid priorities and the tax lien. The core reasoning was that Section 67(c) subordinates only the tax lien (not the chattel mortgage) to administration expenses and wages under Section 64, and the statute cannot be read by implication to postpone the mortgage based solely on the tax lien's presence.
This case involves a dispute between a former distributor, George W. Warner & Co., and Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. over the termination of a distributorship agreement. The plaintiff alleged that Black & Decker, through its manager Fischer, engaged in a vertical price-fixing scheme under the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts by setting minimum prices for government bids and retaliating against non-compliant distributors, including by terminating the plaintiff's distributorship after it submitted a lower bid. The court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint or for summary judgment. It granted dismissal of the first and second causes of action for failure to adequately plead triable issues of conspiracy or restraint of trade, and granted summary judgment on the third cause involving minor post-termination transactions, finding no material factual disputes and no violation of law in refusing further sales or the small repair and parts claims.
This case involves a former wholesale distributor of portable electric power tools suing the manufacturer and one of its managers, alleging violations of the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts based on claims that the defendants conspired with other distributors to fix minimum resale prices, engaged in economic coercion, and implemented discriminatory pricing schemes. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction after its oral distributorship agreement was terminated for selling below suggested prices, while the defendants moved for a more definite statement on the conspiracy claims and to dismiss the other causes for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion for a more definite statement, requiring the plaintiff to name specific co-conspirator distributors and provide details on their involvement, and denied the request for a temporary injunction, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm and that the antitrust issues could not be resolved without a full trial on the merits.