State v. Charles
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1954-04-12 · cited 10×
The case involved Walter Charles, who was charged with carrying a concealed loaded automatic pistol in violation of Section 564.610 RSMo 1949. The state sought enhanced punishment under the Habitual Criminal Act (Section 556.280) based on three prior convictions, two of which were alleged to have been served concurrently and from which the defendant was discharged before the current offense. The jury found the defendant guilty of the charged offense and that he had been previously convicted of a felony, imposing the maximum two-year prison term. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the verdict adequately referenced the prior convictions in generic terms, the information properly alleged the necessary facts including discharge from the concurrent sentences, and claimed errors regarding jury instructions and closing arguments lacked merit.
criminal lawprocedure
Rucker v. Illinois Terminal Railroad
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1954-04-12 · cited 8×
The case involved plaintiff Rucker, a railroad lineman, who suffered a back injury in 1950 when a fellow worker dropped an 8-foot crossarm onto his safety belt while working on a pole near the McKinley Bridge, leading to a herniated lumbar disc that required surgery. Rucker sued the Illinois Terminal Railroad for damages under what appears to be a negligence or FELA claim, and after a jury verdict of $75,000 the trial court ordered a remittitur reducing it to $45,000. The appellate court affirmed the reduced judgment, reasoning that evidence supported findings of ongoing pain and likely need for further surgery despite Rucker returning to work and earning comparable wages, and that trial issues such as counsel's arguments regarding uncalled doctors and admission of certain evidence did not constitute reversible error.
torts & liabilitylabor & employment
Sellers v. Swehla
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1953-09-14 · cited 10×
This case concerned a dispute over an old curved road crossing the defendant's land, which the plaintiffs sought to keep open via injunction on the theory that it had become a public road through long-term prescriptive use by the public. The trial court granted the injunction, finding the road qualified as public under Missouri's 1887 prescription statute due to continuous adverse use and public maintenance. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence showed only permissive use rather than the required adverse, continuous, and hostile public use for the statutory period, and that the road had been abandoned after a new straight public road was established in 1903. The Supreme Court addressed related procedural issues, including mootness after the plaintiffs sold the land during the litigation without substituting parties, but upheld the core determination that no public road existed and the defendant could fence it off.
propertyprocedure
Drake v. Hicks
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1953-09-14 · cited 8×
This case involved a suit by contract purchasers Drake for specific performance of a written agreement to buy real estate in St. Louis from owner Hicks, with Parker and Matthews as purported lessees. After a first appeal reversed an initial decree, the trial court reinstated an interlocutory order requiring the Drakes to deposit funds and notes, then entered a final decree vesting title in them and canceling the leases, which the court found were fraudulently backdated by Hicks to obstruct the sale. Hicks appealed again after the trial court granted him a new trial without stating reasons. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the Drakes had complied with the prior mandate, the new trial grant was erroneous under procedural rules requiring specified grounds, and the decree should be reinstated in their favor.
propertyprocedure
Woodson v. Woodson
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1953-02-09 · cited 3×
This case involved a will contest by collateral relatives of Margaret J. Rendlen, who died in 1948, challenging her 1939 will on grounds that she later altered bequest amounts in paragraphs 2 and 3 without reattestation, potentially revoking it under Missouri statute, or alternatively that she lacked capacity or was unduly influenced. The trial court admitted the original will to probate, and after a jury found no incapacity or undue influence, upheld the pre-alteration terms. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the changes were partial and inoperative due to lack of reattestation, but under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation the original bequest amounts remained effective as the testatrix intended the will to stand with only those modifications. The court noted the alterations were evident from the document itself, including overwritten figures, but did not constitute complete revocation.
propertyfamily law
Oshins v. St. Louis Public Service Co.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1953-02-09 · cited 11×
In this 1953 Missouri case, plaintiff Oshins sued the St. Louis Public Service Company for $10,000 in damages after sustaining injuries in a collision between the car he was riding in and one of the defendant's buses at a street intersection. The plaintiff's petition alleged multiple negligent acts by the bus driver, including operating at an excessive speed of 40-50 mph under wet, downgrade conditions. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant's converse jury instruction was improper because it failed to detail all the factual circumstances rather than simply negating the claim of excessive speed. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment, holding that because the plaintiff's negligence allegations were pleaded conjunctively, the defendant was not required to restate all collateral facts in its converse instruction and could instead submit a negative finding on the speed issue alone, as the defendant did not bear the burden of proof.
torts & liabilityprocedure