Van Kirk v. Board of Police Commissioners
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1979-09-11 · cited 13×
The case involved Marvin Van Kirk's challenge to his removal as chief of police of Kansas City by the Board of Police Commissioners after serving about a year in the role. The circuit court affirmed the board's action, and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld that judgment. The court reasoned that the governing statute provides the chief serves at the board's pleasure with no fixed term or property right in the office, permitting removal with or without cause subject only to constitutional limits that were not violated here, and that procedural and eligibility challenges were either unpreserved or without merit.
civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. McHenry
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1978-04-24 · cited 13×
The case concerned a constitutional challenge by liquor distillers and suppliers to portions of Missouri House Bill 810, which expanded franchise regulations to cover liquor wholesalers by prohibiting at-will terminations without good cause and imposing related requirements, with violations made felonies. The trial court held that the bill violated Mo. Const. Art. III, §§ 21 and 23 because Senate amendments changed the bill's original purpose from addressing pyramid sales schemes and general merchandising practices to also regulating liquor franchises, and because the final title failed to clearly express a single subject. The court declared the added provisions unconstitutional, severed them, and permanently enjoined their enforcement while leaving the remainder of the law intact. The reasoning focused on the legislative history, the original title and content of the bill and its predecessor, and the mismatch created by the amendments.
business & regulatorycriminal law
State v. Phillips
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1978-03-13 · cited 16×
In State v. Phillips, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial and sentenced to 50 years in prison, with the key evidence consisting of his oral admission during a polygraph test and a subsequent written confession to police. The defendant moved to suppress the statements, claiming they were involuntary because he had invoked but was denied his Miranda rights to silence and counsel, and because police misled him during interrogation. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding after review of the pretrial hearing record that the defendant had been adequately advised of his rights, understood and waived them, and provided the statements voluntarily without improper coercion or denial of counsel. The court found no violation of constitutional protections under Miranda or related precedents that would require exclusion of the evidence.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Abco Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Federal Insurance Co.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1977-05-10 · cited 37×
This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by insured Abco Tank and Manufacturing Co. against its insurer Federal Insurance Co. to determine coverage under a comprehensive general liability policy for defense costs and any judgment in a pending suit for property damages from an explosion and fire during installation of a liquid propane heating facility at Doane's plant. The court reversed the adverse judgment below and held that the policy afforded coverage. The core reasoning was that installation was not completed before the fire within the meaning of the policy's completed operations hazard provisions and related endorsement excluding such coverage, because the facility could not function as required until a defective vaporizer was replaced and further work performed afterward.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Scott
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1977-03-14 · cited 5×
The case involved an unlawful detainer action by Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) against Robert and Lula Mae Scott after foreclosure on a deed of trust for property they purchased and assumed the mortgage on. The Scotts counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that Missouri's power-of-sale foreclosure statutes were unconstitutional for lacking due process notice and hearing requirements. The court affirmed the judgments for Fannie Mae, holding that Fannie Mae is not a federal instrumentality and thus not subject to Fifth Amendment due process constraints, and that the foreclosure was conducted pursuant to the private contract terms rather than state action. The court modified the damages award by consent to reflect actual rental value.
propertycivil rightsfederal power
City of St. Louis v. Liberman
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1977-02-14 · cited 26×
The case involved a St. Louis pawnbroker charged with violating city ordinances by failing to photograph a customer and a pawn ticket, and by not maintaining a proper register including details like the customer's age and identification numbers when pawning a saxophone. The trial court convicted the defendant and imposed fines, which were upheld on appeal despite challenges to the ordinance's constitutionality. The court reasoned that pawnbroking is a privileged business subject to strict police regulation aimed at preventing crime, such as the handling of stolen goods, and that the requirements for photographs and records are reasonable and do not violate search and seizure protections or equal protection principles.
criminal lawbusiness & regulatory
St. Louis Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-12-30 · cited 9×
The case involved the St. Louis Teachers Association seeking a declaratory judgment and specific performance to enforce a written agreement with the Board of Education for salary increases, fringe benefits, and a grievance procedure, which was reached after teachers went on strike. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's judgment for the Association, holding the agreement void from the outset. The court reasoned that Missouri law declares public employees have no right to strike against their governmental employer, that the agreement was produced by and resulted from the illegal strike, and that courts will not enforce contracts founded on such illegal acts.
labor & employment
State v. Toliver
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-12-30 · cited 23×
In State v. Toliver, the defendant was convicted of stealing over $50 worth of handguns from a Wal-Mart store and sentenced to ten years under the Second Offender Act. The Missouri Supreme Court considered challenges to the admission of the defendant's inculpatory statements to Kansas City police, made without new Miranda warnings during a homicide investigation, and to the trial court's refusal to allow adverse comment on the state's failure to produce an accomplice witness. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not preserved the Miranda objection for appellate review by failing to object at trial and that no manifest injustice occurred, while also finding no basis for an unfavorable inference from the unavailability of the witness. The opinion notes that prior Miranda warnings had been given by other officers two months earlier in connection with the same theft investigation.
criminal lawprocedure
Mallory v. Barrera
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-12-30 · cited 21×
This case was a declaratory judgment action brought by Missouri's State Commissioner of Education and State Board of Education against parents of students in parochial schools, seeking clarification on two issues involving federal Title I funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965: whether those funds are public funds subject to Missouri's constitutional spending limits, and whether state law permits or prohibits using public personnel paid with such funds to provide teaching services on private school premises during regular hours. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs on their claims and the defendants' counterclaim, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. The court reasoned that the Title I funds qualify as public funds under the Missouri Constitution, that state law and constitutional provisions (including those on public school funding and sectarian aid) bar their use for on-premises services in private schools, and that federal law does not preempt these state restrictions, though comparable programs for eligible private-school children must still be devised.
religious libertyfederal power
State v. Guelker
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-12-13 · cited 14×
In State v. Guelker, the defendant was charged and convicted by a jury under Missouri law of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's permission and sentenced to three years in prison. The trial court overruled his motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued that the state's evidence failed to prove lack of permission because the registered owner had transferred title or been reimbursed via insurance and mortgage after the vehicle was reported stolen. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the acquittal motion was not properly preserved in the motion for new trial under court rules but reviewed the claim for plain error, found sufficient evidence of ownership and lack of permission from the owner's testimony, and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
criminal lawprocedure
Groves v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-09-13 · cited 51×
This case involved an insured driver suing his auto insurer for $700 in damages to his car's engine, which he attributed to vandalism by unknown persons placing sugar in the fuel or oil system, plus statutory penalties for the insurer's alleged vexatious refusal to pay the claim. The insurer defended on the ground that the damage resulted from ordinary wear and tear rather than covered vandalism, relying on an expert chemist's tests that found no sugar residue and an adjuster's inspection reaching the same conclusion. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff that included the penalties, the court held that the vexatious-refusal issue should not have been submitted because the insurer had a reasonable factual basis to contest liability and showed no bad faith. The court therefore reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded penalties and attorney's fees, and remanded with directions to enter judgment solely for the $700 actual damages plus interest and ordinary costs.
business & regulatoryprocedure
In Re Mills
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-07-12 · cited 16×
This case is a disciplinary proceeding against attorney John E. Mills, who while in private practice served as guardian of the estate of an incompetent ward and sold the ward a lot and mobile home that Mills personally owned. The court found that Mills filed a petition in probate court seeking authorization for the purchase without disclosing his ownership interest, concealed the same facts from the Veterans Administration, and directed that the deed not be published, actions that violated DR5-104(A) on self-dealing with a client and DR1-102(A)(4) and (5) on deceit and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court rejected Mills's arguments concerning jurisdiction over incumbent judges and his claim that the ward and family had consented, holding that the fiduciary relationship and statutory prohibitions on guardian self-dealing made the transaction improper regardless of profit or consent. The court therefore suspended Mills's license to practice law indefinitely with leave to seek reinstatement after one year.
criminal lawprocedure
Chamberlin v. Missouri Elections Commission
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-06-21 · cited 23×
The case concerned the constitutionality of subsections 1(5) and 1(6) of Missouri's Campaign Finance and Disclosure Law, which required candidates to report sources of income above certain thresholds, with different rules applying to sole practitioners versus those holding interests in professional corporations. Two lawyer candidates challenged the provisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the differing disclosure burdens created an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The trial court agreed and declared the subsections unconstitutional while enjoining enforcement. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was susceptible to a construction that avoided any unconstitutional classification and therefore must be upheld. The court reasoned that, where possible, statutes should be interpreted in harmony with constitutional requirements rather than struck down.
electionscivil rights
Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-06-14 · cited 14×
This case involved property owners challenging Kansas City ordinances, state statutes under Chapter 353, and a contract with Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corporation that authorized an urban redevelopment project involving eminent domain to acquire and demolish buildings in a six-block downtown area for new parking, offices, and other structures. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, declaring the measures unconstitutional and enjoining the project, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed on appeal. The court held that the City Council’s findings on blight, the adequacy of the development plan, and the feasibility of financing were supported by evidence from hearings, appraisals, and financial documents, making the council’s approval a non-arbitrary legislative act. It further concluded that the ordinances did not unconstitutionally delegate eminent domain power. The case was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Civic Plaza.
propertybusiness & regulatory
State Ex Rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-04-14 · cited 24×
This case arose from a suit by Nathaniel Gunn seeking to enjoin Empire Bank from paying its $150,000 cashier's check issued to Kin Tak Hong, based on allegations that Hong had fraudulently induced Gunn into a fertilizer sales contract that was later cancelled. Intervenor Chan Siew Lai, the check holder, petitioned for a writ of prohibition against the trial judge's temporary injunction. The Missouri Supreme Court made the provisional rule absolute, holding that under UCC § 400.4-303 the bank's obligation to pay its cashier's check could not be suspended by stop-order or injunction once the check had been issued, and that any fraud by Hong gave Gunn no standing to interfere with the bank's duty. The court reasoned that Gunn's remedy was an action against Hong rather than enjoining the bank, and that the petition stated no claim for injunctive relief.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Department of Revenue
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1976-01-12 · cited 19×
The case involved Wilson & Co. challenging a sales and use tax assessment by the Missouri Department of Revenue on machinery and equipment valued at over $2.5 million purchased for a new hog slaughtering and packing plant. The dispute centered on whether the process of converting live hogs into marketable portions of fresh meat and other products qualified as "manufacturing" under § 144.030.3(4), which exempts machinery used to establish or expand manufacturing plants from the tax. The court held that the process constituted manufacturing and that the disputed equipment was therefore exempt. The core reasoning was that the operation transformed raw materials practically unsuitable for common use into new and different salable articles suitable for new uses, aligning with precedents involving rock processing and job printing.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Seven Palms Motor Inn, Inc.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1975-12-18 · cited 29×
This case concerns a claim by Sears for a mechanic's lien on a motel property for materials including drapes and bedspreads supplied during construction. The trial court granted the lien, but the court of appeals reversed the lien portion while upholding the money judgment, finding the bedspreads nonlienable and their inclusion fatal to the lien. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the drapes qualified as lienable fixtures because they were adapted to the motel's use and attached via rods with intent to be permanent, while the bedspreads did not meet the annexation requirement and were nonlienable. However, the court reasoned that the good-faith inclusion of the debatable nonlienable item in the lien statement did not vitiate the entire lien, as the items were separable and there was no intent to defraud. It affirmed the money judgment, reversed the full lien, and remanded to adjust the lien amount by deducting the cost of the bedspreads.
property
Ex Parte Brown
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1975-12-08 · cited 19×
This case was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by attorney David W. Brown after he was summarily found guilty of direct criminal contempt by a Jackson County circuit court and sentenced to 30 days in jail for refusing to represent an appointed client in a felony trial despite a court order to proceed. The Missouri Supreme Court, on transfer from the court of appeals, decided to discharge the petitioner from custody. The core reasoning was that Missouri Rule 35.01(a) and longstanding case law require the judgment of contempt to recite with particularity the facts and circumstances constituting the offense; because the judgment here contained only a legal conclusion without those details, it provided no valid basis for the commitment order regardless of whether the order itself was sufficient.
criminal lawprocedure
STATE EX INF. DANFORTH v. Merrell
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1975-11-25 · cited 28×
This case was an original quo warranto action brought by the Missouri Attorney General challenging whether the State Fiscal Affairs Committee and Commissioner of Administration could authorize transfers of funds between different purposes in legislative appropriations. The court held that these officials lacked authority to alter appropriation purposes, ruling that provisions in the 1974 Omnibus State Reorganization Act and related appropriation laws permitting such changes were invalid. The core reasoning was that the Missouri Constitution (Article IV, Sections 23 and 28) requires the General Assembly to distinctly specify the amount and purpose of each appropriation, and any change to that purpose constitutes an improper delegation or executive amendment of legislative authority rather than mere administrative adjustment.
procedure
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Cahill
Supreme Court of Missouri · 1975-09-08 · cited 24×
This case involved a four-year-old child who was injured after falling into a deep excavation at a church construction site in Independence, Missouri, while trespassing on the property with his sisters. The plaintiff sued the construction company under a theory based on Restatement of Torts §339, alleging the company negligently failed to protect foreseeable child trespassers from an unreasonable risk. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant after a jury verdict, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the defendant's converse jury instruction was improper because it was not a true converse, combined multiple elements without proper connecting language, and deviated from approved instructions, creating a roving commission for the jury. The opinion also addressed related evidentiary issues but focused on the instructional error as grounds for reversal.
torts & liabilityprocedure