Robert Eldridge Seiler

In State v. Stewart, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery and kidnapping after a jury trial in St. Louis circuit court and received concurrent fifteen-year sentences. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court erred by denying a defense challenge for cause to a prospective juror during voir dire who repeatedly indicated she would prefer or expect the defendant to testify in his defense and might view his silence as evidence of guilt. The court held that this was reversible error because the juror never unequivocally affirmed she would not draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify, violating his right to an impartial jury; it reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The decision emphasized that trial judges should err on the side of caution when excusing jurors whose impartiality is in doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved executors of an elderly nursing home resident suing the owners and operators of the facility for damages due to repeated physical abuse that caused severe injuries and eventually death. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the Omnibus Nursing Home Act authorizes such a private action. The court reasoned that the Act grants residents rights including freedom from physical and mental abuse, and provides a remedy under section 198.093 for violations of those rights, which extends to the estate of a deceased resident if proper notice is given to the attorney general.

healthcarecivil rightstorts & liability

This case involved two subsidiary companies that were part of a larger corporate group filing a consolidated federal income tax return. The subsidiaries sought to deduct on their Missouri state income tax returns the full amount of federal taxes they would have owed if they had filed separate federal returns, rather than their share of the actual lower tax paid by the group. The State Tax Commission disallowed these larger deductions and instead permitted only proportional shares based on the group's actual federal tax liability. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the state deduction is limited to the federal income tax liability actually incurred and paid by the group, as the subsidiaries did not owe or pay the hypothetical separate amounts under the relevant Missouri statutes governing federal taxable income calculations for affiliated groups.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a Missouri corporation operating grain elevators across multiple states that elected to apportion its income for state tax purposes using the single-factor sales formula under § 143.451. The Director of Revenue assessed deficiencies after including 50% of certain out-of-state sales handled through the Missouri office, and the company later sought to revoke its election and file amended returns under the three-factor formula of the Multistate Tax Compact. The Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the assessments, ruling the election irrevocable and rejecting estoppel based on a repealed regulation. The court affirmed, finding legislative intent and federal precedent supported irrevocability of the election, that the company had not shown reliance justifying estoppel, and that the prior regulation conflicted with the statute as interpreted in International Travel Advisors.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether the Missouri Department of Revenue violated a 1974 injunction by issuing a rule that taxed gross receipts from coin-operated amusement devices, such as pinball machines, when located in places of amusement. The trial court held the Department in civil contempt for disregarding the injunction, which had been affirmed in an earlier appeal and declared that the sales tax statute did not apply to such receipts. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the intervening decision in Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling permitted taxation of fees paid in places of amusement and that the new rule correctly interpreted the unchanged statute as applying to the devices in those locations, so the injunction was not violated.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved siblings who were equal income beneficiaries of a 1951 testamentary trust containing a spendthrift clause; they signed a 1969 contract agreeing that upon the death of one or more, the survivors would pay a share of the received trust income to the deceased's lineal descendants. After one brother died in 1978, his sisters refused to make the payments, leading his children to sue for enforcement of the agreement. The trial court dismissed the suit based on the precedent in Bixby v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., which had invalidated similar contracts as indirect assignments violating spendthrift provisions. The Missouri Supreme Court overruled Bixby, holding that the agreement was enforceable because it did not attempt to alienate or anticipate trust income before the beneficiaries received it, and once the funds were in their hands, they could freely contract to dispose of their own property.

property

This case concerned whether original mortgagors who conveyed mortgaged real estate to a third party (who assumed the debt but later defaulted) retained the statutory right to redeem the property after foreclosure sale. The mortgagee and trustee sought a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit judge from approving a redemption bond tendered by the original mortgagors. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the original grantors had conveyed away their redemption rights upon transfer of the property, leaving only the current grantee eligible under § 443.410, and that the circuit judge would exceed his jurisdiction by approving the bond. The court also found the one-day notice of the bond application substantially complied with the statute but ruled that did not overcome the eligibility defect. It therefore made the writ of prohibition absolute.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the direct appeal of a defendant's conviction for sodomy under Missouri Revised Statutes § 566.060, based on evidence that he inserted his fingers into the vagina of his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that the legislative use of the term "sodomy" did not match the commonly understood meaning of the word and thus failed to give adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute's explicit definition of "deviate sexual intercourse" provided sufficient specificity to satisfy due process requirements for a person of common intelligence. The court further reasoned that the legislature has authority to define statutory terms as it chooses, superseding dictionary definitions, and that prosecutors have discretion to select among overlapping offenses under Chapter 566.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the Missouri attorney general could bring parens patriae damage actions under section 4C of the Clayton Antitrust Act on behalf of state residents. The circuit court ruled that Missouri law granted the attorney general no such power. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the attorney general possesses authority to maintain these suits. The core reasoning was that section 27.060 RSMo empowers the attorney general to institute civil actions to protect state interests, federal law permits states to opt out of parens patriae authority but Missouri has not done so, and Missouri statutes and common law contain no prohibition on these actions.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In State v. Edwards, defendant David Edwards was convicted of capital murder after evidence showed he shot the victim during an argument over a dice game and disposed of the body with accomplices. He appealed, claiming the trial court erred by denying a mistrial after a detective's statement implying hearsay, by limiting testimony about a witness's bias and anti-social behavior, and by excluding evidence of threats made by another participant. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the detective's interrupted remark created no improper inference given prior testimony from the relevant witnesses and was cured by the trial court's instruction to disregard it. The court further ruled that limiting the bias testimony was within the trial judge's discretion to avoid collateral issues and that the threat evidence was inadmissible hearsay when offered through the defendant's own testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute among the Schultz brothers (Abe, Jack, and Sol) over ownership of shares in Chemical Dynamics Co., d/b/a the Schultz Company, a family business that produces liquid fertilizer. The litigation arose after Sol attempted to sell shares to third parties, prompting claims about prior transfers, loans, and whether certain shares (including ten Fixman shares acquired via a bank loan guaranteed by Jack and four shares transferred by Jack to Sol) were intended to benefit the family collectively. The trial court imposed constructive trusts on some shares and addressed voting rights on others, but the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it upheld a constructive trust on the Fixman shares for the benefit of the Schultz family (Abe, Jack, Sol, Harry, and Marvin Saks) while reversing holdings on the Newfeld share, Wolff/Kopolow shares, and Sol's conveyance of equitable title to the Molaskys. The core reasoning centered on evidence of family agreements, loan guarantees, stock reissuances by Sol as company secretary, and the absence of repayment or formal sales, leading to equitable remedies to restore shares to family control rather than individual ownership.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Barber, the defendant was convicted of possession of controlled substances after police found large quantities of Schedule II pills in a bedroom during a warrantless raid on a rented residence where he was present with several other adults. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the state failed to make a submissible case, as there was no direct or circumstantial evidence establishing the defendant's actual or constructive possession and knowledge of the drugs. The court explained that mere presence in a room containing controlled substances does not suffice for conviction when the premises are under joint control and no facts connect the accused to the substances or show exclusive use. Because the reversal rested solely on evidentiary insufficiency, the court ordered entry of a judgment of acquittal rather than remand, citing double jeopardy protections.

criminal law

This case concerns the dissolution of a remarriage between the same parties after a prior Connecticut divorce, addressing child support for four minor children (including educational expenses), maintenance for the wife, and division of assets like the family home and pension. The trial court ordered the husband to pay $150 monthly per child plus all private school or college costs (with a $665 monthly minimum paid directly to institutions), $350 monthly maintenance for five years, and equal division of home sale proceeds. The Supreme Court of Missouri examined whether the educational support award was too indefinite to enforce by execution and whether the parties' prior marriage was relevant to maintenance determinations. The court reasoned that trial courts possess broad discretion to fashion child support accommodating children's needs and parents' abilities, while maintenance stems solely from the current marriage rather than prior circumstances.

family law

The case involved Percy Kent Bag Company appealing an order from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights finding that the company had engaged in racial discrimination by terminating a black employee and requiring it to cease such practices while paying back wages to the employee. The company challenged the constitutionality of chapter 296 as an improper delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency and argued that the Commission's findings lacked substantial evidence. The court affirmed the order, holding that the Commission's enforcement powers, including cease-and-desist orders and back pay, are incidental to the statutory policy against employment discrimination and that the procedures provide due process, with the findings supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a libel lawsuit filed in St. Louis County against the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri and several individuals, where the plaintiff relied on a general venue statute allowing suit in the county of any defendant when multiple parties reside in different counties. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it qualified as a municipal corporation under a special venue rule requiring suits against such entities only in the county where they are located (Boone County, home to the university's main campus). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the Board, prompting the plaintiff to seek a writ of mandamus from the Missouri Supreme Court. The court held that the Board is not a municipal corporation for venue purposes because it functions as a statewide agency of the state rather than a local governmental entity with subordinate powers, and the legislature had not restricted its suability to Boone County alone; accordingly, the alternative writ was made peremptory to reinstate the Board as a defendant.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is an original proceeding in prohibition brought by relator Kemp, a state prisoner, to prevent a circuit judge from trying him on charges of first-degree murder and robbery. Kemp invoked the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law, which requires trial within 180 days after the state receives a prisoner's request for final disposition of pending charges; the request here was received on August 20, 1979, but trial was not scheduled until after that period had expired and various post-expiration continuances had occurred. The court held that the 180-day deadline is mandatory and that failure to meet it causes the trial court to lose subject-matter jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the information with prejudice. The opinion explains that the statute aims to eliminate the harmful effects of unresolved detainers on prisoners' rehabilitation and to compel prompt action by prosecutors. Because more than 180 days had passed without a timely trial, the preliminary writ was made absolute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether sales tax applied to the printing of advertising supplements by a commercial printer for later insertion and distribution as part of newspapers. The Director of Revenue assessed tax on the full printing charges, while the printer argued the supplements qualified for the newspaper exemption under §§ 144.020.1 and 144.030.3(7). The Administrative Hearing Commission found two transactions and held that the supplements were integral to newspapers, exempting only the newsprint component from tax. The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the Commission's decision on statutory construction grounds to determine if the supplements constituted a taxable sale of tangible personal property or fell under the nontaxable newspaper service exemption.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether Missouri taxpayers could challenge the Jackson County assessor's use of a 54% equalization factor applied only to improvements on newer properties—allegedly violating uniformity requirements and equal protection—by paying taxes under protest pursuant to § 139.031 and suing for a refund, without first exhausting administrative remedies. The taxpayers, who owned multiple parcels, argued the assessor's method of valuation was unconstitutional and sought judicial relief directly. The trial court dismissed the suits, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that challenges to assessment methods and valuations must proceed through the county board of equalization, state tax commission, and administrative review under Chapter 536, as that scheme is complete and adequate. The court reasoned that § 139.031 is not a substitute for those statutory procedures and cannot be used to bypass their time limits when the dispute centers on valuation methodology rather than overreaching by taxing authorities.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over whether a settlement and covenant not to sue between the plaintiff and one defendant (an ophthalmologist sued for medical malpractice aggravating a child's eye injury) barred a remaining defendant's cross-claim for contribution or indemnity. The underlying suit arose from a 1969 school bus incident where one defendant negligently caused an initial injury, followed by alleged malpractice by relator Tarrasch that led to further blindness; after settling with the plaintiff for policy limits, Tarrasch moved for summary judgment on the cross-claim. The trial court indicated it would deny the motion, prompting relator to seek a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court analyzed the issue under its prior adoption of comparative fault in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales, distinguishing concurrent tortfeasors from true joint tortfeasors and noting common liability to the plaintiff, with the settlement's effect on the non-settling party's rights to be determined based on pleadings showing potential shared responsibility for damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the estate of Joseph B. Bloomer, who executed a will in 1952 leaving his property to Ruth Hays, married her in 1954, divorced later that year, and died in 1969; the dispute was whether Missouri statute § 474.420 revoked the bequest to the ex-spouse. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statute revoked all provisions favoring the divorced spouse, so the heirs at law were entitled to the estate proceeds rather than the respondent. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language applies to any will made before a divorce and treats the divorce as causing a constructive death of the spouse for purposes of the will, without distinguishing between pre-marriage and post-marriage wills.

family lawproperty