Elwood L. Thomas

This case involved a discovery dispute in a personal injury lawsuit brought by a railway worker against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The worker served interrogatories seeking information about statements, reports, and inquiries obtained from witnesses or others regarding the incident; the railway objected on work product grounds, but the trial court overruled the objections and ordered answers. The railway sought writs of prohibition and mandamus, which the Missouri Supreme Court made absolute. The court held that the work product doctrine protects both tangible materials prepared in anticipation of litigation (discoverable only upon a showing of substantial need under Rule 56.01(b)(3)) and intangible work product consisting of an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories (protected independently of the rule). Because the interrogatories sought information that would reveal protected intangible work product or required disclosure of tangible materials without the requisite showing, the railway was not required to respond.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

In State v. Silvey, Phillip E. Silvey was convicted by a jury of two counts of sodomy against a four-year-old victim and sentenced as a dangerous offender to concurrent thirty-year terms. On appeal, consolidated with a post-conviction motion, Silvey raised eleven points challenging evidentiary rulings such as the use of demonstrative evidence of a similar butterfly knife, the sufficiency of the child's testimony despite some inconsistencies, and the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, reasoning that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the demonstrative evidence, the victim's testimony was sufficient without corroboration as it did not conflict with physical facts or common experience, and the jury instruction comported with due process under prior precedent.

criminal law

In State v. Miller, the defendant was convicted of cocaine possession after police stopped a vehicle based on a tip about narcotics transport, obtained the driver's consent to search, and discovered cocaine residue on the passenger during the encounter. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered suppression of the evidence and related statements. The court held that the initial stop was unconstitutional because the state failed to show the tip's reliability or source, violating the Fourth Amendment and Missouri Constitution. It further reasoned that the driver's consent to search was not sufficiently independent of the illegal stop to purge the taint, so the evidence obtained from the passenger could not be admitted under the attenuation doctrine.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Robert Lee Jackson, who refused a breath test after arrest for driving while intoxicated and had his driver's license revoked by the Director of Revenue. Jackson filed a timely petition for review under the relevant statute but initially failed to name the Director in the petition's caption, leading the Director to move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court initially dismissed but later reinstated Jackson's license after an amended petition and the prosecuting attorney's confession of the petition. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the technical failure to name the Director in the caption did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, provided the timely petition's body clearly named the Director or Department as an adverse party and sought review of the license revocation. The court affirmed the reinstatement and overruled prior cases requiring strict caption compliance.

procedurecriminal law

The case involved a personal injury claim by plaintiff Ron Bailey, who was injured in 1986 when a co-worker accidentally discharged a nail gun; after suing the employer, Bailey amended his petition in 1991 (just before the five-year statute of limitations expired) to add the gun's manufacturer, initially naming it Bostitch Manufacturing Company before correcting it to Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. after service issues. The trial court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on statute-of-limitations grounds, but the appellate court reversed and remanded. The court held that the action was timely commenced under Missouri Rule 53.01 because filing the petition (not service) starts the action, prior precedent requiring due diligence in service no longer applies, and the name-correction amendment related back to the timely filing.

proceduretorts & liability

This case combined two disciplinary proceedings against Missouri attorney Gerald L. Warren. In the first, Warren admitted lying on his 1985 application for admission to the Illinois Bar by reciprocity, falsely stating he had never taken the Illinois bar exam despite having failed it, violating then-applicable Disciplinary Rules 1-101 and 1-102 on false statements and dishonesty. In the second, Warren had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor criminal nonsupport after stopping $600 monthly child support payments ordered in his 1986 divorce and to misdemeanor harassment after sending a death threat letter and making other threats to his ex-wife's new husband. The court, reviewing de novo, agreed with the special master's findings that these acts of dishonesty, criminal conduct, and failure to meet support obligations warranted suspension rather than reprimand or disbarment, ordering a six-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement including psychological counseling.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved Ronald Tune suing Synergy Gas Corporation for severe burns and injuries from a propane gas explosion and fire at a job site, alleging strict liability for failure to warn about risks that the added odorant in propane could become ineffective due to factors like oxidation or adsorption. The jury assigned 100% fault to Synergy and awarded over $2.8 million in damages after adjustments, which the trial court upheld. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, addressing whether Tune presented a submissible case on the failure-to-warn claim under strict liability and reviewing the propriety of arguments made during closing statements at trial.

torts & liability

In Ivy v. Hawk, plaintiffs sued a doctor and his practice for medical malpractice, alleging injury from negligent treatment of a skin condition, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial court had wrongly barred them from asking prospective jurors during voir dire whether they or their families had any connection to the defendants' malpractice insurer, Medical Defense Associates. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that a party who lays a proper foundation on the record has an absolute right to pose this preliminary insurance question, that denial of the right is prejudicial as a matter of law, and that plaintiffs need not prove actual bias to obtain relief.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiffs Drucilla and Jack Nugent sued defendant Kevin Shelton for negligence arising from a 1992 car accident and joined their underinsured motorist insurer, American Family, as a defendant to establish venue in the City of St. Louis, where the insurer had an office; the accident occurred and Shelton resided in Miller County. Shelton sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from proceeding, arguing that the joinder was pretensive because the plaintiffs had no present cause of action against the insurer. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the insurer's policy required exhaustion of all applicable liability limits by judgment or settlement before any underinsured motorist claim could be asserted, a condition that had not occurred, and that the joinder was therefore pretensive under the objective standard that the available information would not support a reasonable belief in a valid claim. Because venue was improper as to Shelton, the court quashed the preliminary writ of prohibition and directed issuance of a writ of mandamus transferring the case to Miller County.

proceduretorts & liability

Anita Egelhoff sued Linda Jo Holt for negligence and Kero Metal Products for strict liability (defective product and failure to warn) after injuring her thumb on an exposed pool support post and then her back while swimming, claiming the missing plastic cap created an unsafe condition. The jury awarded her $250,000 in damages while assigning her 80% fault, Holt 5%, and Kero 15%. Egelhoff appealed the denial of her motion for a new trial, arguing errors in the comparative fault instruction and admission of video evidence, while Kero cross-appealed the denial of its JNOV motion, claiming insufficient evidence and post-sale modification of the pool. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in full, holding that a single comparative fault instruction was proper for multiple defendants even under different liability theories, that a statute authorized comparative fault in product liability cases, and that Egelhoff presented a submissible case on the defective product claim despite the modification.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree assault, who was sentenced to death and sought post-conviction relief under Missouri Rule 29.15. The court examined whether the defendant's pro se motion was properly verified, whether amended motions were timely filed, and whether appointed counsel abandoned the defendant through delays and changes in representation. It determined that the pro se motion satisfied verification requirements via the defendant's signature, that both amended motions were untimely and subject to dismissal, and that counsel's conduct amounted to abandonment as to timeliness but not as to the motion's content. The court therefore revived the first amended motion and remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law on its merits.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Nolan, Ervin Nolan was charged as a persistent offender with attempted second-degree burglary after he was seen attempting to open a transom window between his apartment and a neighbor's, and a jury convicted him of the class D felony, resulting in a seven-year sentence. Nolan appealed his conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief, raising issues with the verdict director for attempted burglary that omitted the specific intended crime, related ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the trial court's refusal to instruct on first-degree trespass as a lesser-included offense. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and denial of relief, holding that the instruction omission did not create manifest injustice or prejudice under Strickland because the jury was not affected, that counsel's performance was not deficient in a way that undermined the outcome, and that first-degree trespass is not a lesser-included offense of attempted burglary since it requires proof of unlawful entry or remaining, which was not part of the charged conduct of merely opening the transom.

criminal lawprocedure

Steven Fuente was convicted after a bench trial of possessing more than 35 grams of marijuana and sentenced to four years in prison. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in a vehicle search and statements made to officers, including at the jail after invoking his right to remain silent following Miranda warnings; the court of appeals had reversed on Fifth Amendment grounds, but the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that even assuming error in admitting the jail statements obtained without re-Mirandizing, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the 45 pounds of marijuana discovered during a lawful search, combined with the co-defendant's stipulated testimony establishing knowledge and possession, was independently sufficient to support the conviction and rendered the statements cumulative.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether a part-time teacher, Ms. Dial, who had worked for the Lathrop R-II School District since 1977, became a permanent teacher entitled to an indefinite contract under the 1990 amendments to Missouri’s Teacher Tenure Act, and whether the district properly placed her at Step 1 on the salary schedule when offering her a full-time position for 1991-92. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Dial was a permanent teacher, holding that the amendments’ prorated credit for part-time service applied without violating the state constitution’s ban on retrospective laws, as the statute did not impair vested rights. The court reversed on the salary issue, reasoning that Dial’s indefinite contract could be modified only as allowed by statute and that the district’s placement at Step 1 violated the salary schedule custom under which all teachers, including part-time ones, advanced steps uniformly each year; it remanded with instructions to place her at Step 20 with adjusted compensation.

labor & employment

William Cooper and Carl Fletcher, inmates serving life sentences, filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole's denial of their parole requests under the state's Administrative Procedure Act, claiming they were entitled to parole under a prior statute and that their constitutional rights were violated. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board, which the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed after transfer. The court reasoned that parole board decisions are subject to limited review under section 217.670.3 rather than the Administrative Procedure Act, that the inmates failed to demonstrate equal protection or due process violations, and that the Board's specific reasons for denial based on the seriousness of their offenses were adequate and not mere boilerplate generalities.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit by the parents of infant Danny Callahan against Cardinal Glennon Hospital and St. Louis University after Danny became permanently paralyzed (triplegic) following treatment for a perirectal abscess that developed shortly after he received a live polio vaccine. A jury awarded $16 million in damages, finding the defendants negligent for failing to incise and drain the abscess or prescribe an effective antibiotic on December 2, 1978, which allowed gram-negative bacteria to release endotoxins that suppressed his immune system and permitted the vaccine virus to cause poliomyelitis. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that expert testimony established causation under the facts and that statutory remittitur provisions did not apply retroactively or to health care tort actions.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Terrance Jones, previously convicted of robbery, who was stopped for traffic violations, had his car impounded, and was convicted of unlawful possession of a concealable firearm after an inventory search uncovered a revolver in the trunk. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the gun, finding the inventory search valid under police procedures, but reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The core reasoning was that the jury instruction omitted the required element of a culpable mental state, specifically that Jones knowingly possessed the firearm as a voluntary act under section 562.011, and prior conflicting cases were overruled.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

This case arose from a work-related vehicle accident in which plaintiff Otis Baker, a Holloway Construction employee, was injured when defendant Earl DePew, a fellow Holloway employee driving a company pickup, stopped suddenly, causing Baker's back to strike a toolbox. Baker obtained a default judgment against DePew for negligence and then sought to garnish the $2 million business auto liability policy issued by Aetna to Holloway, which named DePew as an additional insured under the omnibus clause. Aetna denied coverage based on the fellow-employee exclusion, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Aetna; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer to address the interaction between the fellow-employee exclusion, the employee-indemnification exclusion, and the policy's severability clause, which requires that exclusions be applied separately to each insured. The court held that, because of severability, neither exclusion barred coverage for DePew's liability to his co-employee Baker.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a motion to modify an existing child support order for the parties' minor daughter Anna after their 1976 divorce, based on her upcoming college expenses at Boston University and the father's increased income from his business. The trial court found a substantial change in circumstances, applied Form 14 guidelines to set support at $1,000 per month plus $1,259 for college costs, required the father to respond to discovery, and ordered him to pay $1,500 in attorney's fees related to discovery enforcement. The father appealed, raising claims including improper ex parte judicial communications and constitutional violations of equal protection and due process under Form 14 because it did not account for his five other children from a subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, ruling that the constitutional and procedural issues were not timely preserved and that Form 14's treatment of children from dissolved versus intact marriages was rationally related to legitimate state interests in supporting children of divorce.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned grandparents who sued their daughter and son-in-law for court-ordered visitation with their ten-year-old grandson after a physical altercation and resulting family rift ended all contact. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 452.402, which authorizes grandparent visitation when it serves the child's best interests. The majority applied an undue-burden standard to the parents' liberty interest in family autonomy, concluding that limited, occasional visitation imposed by the statute did not substantially infringe that interest. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's award of visitation to the grandparents.

family lawcivil rights