Albert Anderson

In Walker v. Hustad, the plaintiffs sued the defendant house builder for fraud and deceit, claiming they were induced to buy a newly constructed house in Helena based on assurances of good-quality materials, workmanship, and a comfortable home. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $400 in damages after finding that serious defects, including cracks in walls and floors, separating woodwork, and inadequate heating, appeared after the plaintiffs moved in, materially reducing the house's value. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that substantial evidence supported the verdict because the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the defendant's representations and the defects were proven by witness testimony. The court found no error in the instructions and determined that the case turned on whether the plaintiffs received the good house they were led to expect.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved the criminal prosecution of Lui Salina for buying various animal pelts without possessing either a fur dealer’s license or a fur dealer’s agent’s license, in violation of Montana's fish and game laws regulating the fur dealing business. The trial court convicted the defendant, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The court reasoned that the relevant statutes require fur dealers to obtain licenses for themselves and their agents, with the dealer applying for the agent's license, but do not clearly impose a requirement on the agent to procure or possess a license themselves; moreover, the complaint failed to adequately state an offense under the law as amended.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved landlords suing a Delaware hotel corporation for unpaid rent on a leased hotel in Butte, Montana. The lease permitted assignment to a Montana corporation, which the defendant did shortly after signing, but the Montana entity was an undercapitalized shell controlled by the same officers and stockholders as the Delaware company. The court held the Delaware corporation liable for the rent despite the assignment, reasoning that the corporate form could be disregarded when used to perpetrate fraud or evade obligations, as the parent continued controlling the business.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned the State of Montana's effort to recover from the estate of Louis Kruger the costs of his care and maintenance in the State Insane Asylum after he was committed in 1931 by court order at private expense. Kruger died in 1940 without any payments having been made, and the state presented a claim to the estate administrator, which was rejected, leading to a lawsuit that the lower court dismissed on demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the complaint stated a valid cause of action because the liability was statutory rather than contractual and therefore was not subject to the nonclaim statute requiring presentation of contract-based claims against estates.

procedure

This case concerned whether a minor injured while employed in a hazardous job prohibited by child labor laws could recover under Montana's Workmen's Compensation Law or pursue a common-law action. The court held that the compensation law applies to such minors. The reasoning was that the 1925 amendment to the statute explicitly defines "employee" to include minors "whether lawfully or unlawfully employed," distinguishing it from other states' laws that require lawful employment for coverage under similar acts. Therefore, the minor is bound by the compensation law despite the illegal employment.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute over whether a Montana license tax on the production of cement and gypsum products, enacted under Chapter 213 of the Revised Codes, applied to gypsum wallboard manufactured by United States Gypsum Co. The company operated a plant mining gypsum and producing plaster and other items including wallboard, and the state sought to collect tax based on the gypsum content in the wallboard. The court held that the tax did not apply to wallboard. It reasoned that the statute's administrative provisions for measuring and collecting the tax referenced only barrels of cement or tons of plaster and had not been updated to cover other products after a 1931 amendment, leaving the tax amount indeterminate for items like wallboard sold by square foot. Tax statutes must be clear and specific, with ambiguities resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and the court declined to supply missing measurement rules by implication.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case was an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment in an action brought to recover wages claimed to be owing for labor, which the defendant had denied. The trial court advanced the case on its calendar without notice to defendant's counsel—who had been in communication with the court and was assured the case would not be called until he arrived if reached later—heard plaintiff's proof in the defendant's absence, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the denial, ruling that counsel had the right to rely on the regular order of the calendar and that advancing the case without justification or notice was arbitrary, depriving the defendant of its day in court. The court directed that the judgment be vacated and the case restored to the docket as at issue and ready for trial.

procedurelabor & employment

This case is a quo warranto action to decide who holds the office of Montana Attorney General. The elected incumbent entered active military service in 1942, prompting the Governor to appoint temporary replacements under a 1941 war-emergency statute; relator Niewoehner claimed the office after receiving all 124 write-in votes cast for it in the 1942 general election. The court ruled for the appointed respondent, holding that military service did not vacate the office, that the statute authorized continued appointments without an intervening election, and that no election for the position occurred in 1942. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed.

elections

The case concerned competing claims to water from Dempsey Creek, a stream used for irrigation by multiple landowners whose rights were established in an 1892 decree. Appellants sued respondent Perkins to stop him from diverting more water than allowed under his decreed right, while Perkins claimed an additional right based on capturing water in natural depressions on his land during high-flow periods and then collecting and measuring the resulting seepage back into the stream. The trial court ruled for Perkins, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the seepage was part of the creek's natural flow and not new water created by Perkins, so it remained subject to the existing decreed rights. The court further rejected Perkins's prescription claim because his use was not shown to be adverse to other users and he was estopped by the prior decree. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants.

property

This case concerns the validity of an alias summons issued after the original summons was returned unserved in a civil action against Montgomery Ward & Co. The dissenting opinion interprets Section 9108 of the Revised Codes to allow the clerk to issue an alias summons based solely on the plaintiff's demand and a written statement that the summons has not been served on the defendants. The justice reasons that the statute refers only to the physical return of the summons without service and does not require a formal certificate or legal return from the sheriff, nor any additional justification. Based on the plain language of the provision, the dissent concludes that the alias summons constitutes valid process and that the relator's challenge should be denied.

procedure

This case involved an action under Montana's nuisance statute (section 11124) to abate a keno game operated by the Dokey Social Club in a Butte building owned by the O'Rourke defendants, with Hannifin as manager. The trial court found the game constituted a gambling nuisance and entered judgment abating it by closing the premises for a year. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that keno is a lottery and thus gambling prohibited by statute, which the nuisance law reaches regardless of the operator's fraternal organization status. The court also ruled that a private citizen may properly bring such an action under the statute, even if compensated for doing so, and that the evidence supported the findings of gambling activity.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over title to 1,720 acres of land sold by Yellowstone County to defendant John Wight under a 1934 installment contract that the county later canceled for nonpayment of installments and taxes. The trial court quieted title in the county after finding the contract forfeited. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the buyer was entitled to relief from forfeiture under the state statute allowing equitable relief upon tender of full performance, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the buyer if he deposited the full purchase price, interest, and unpaid taxes within 30 days, otherwise affirming the judgment. The court reasoned that the statutory limits on contract length and automatic cancellation provisions for tax defaults did not deprive equity courts of the power to grant relief where full compensation is tendered, and that the buyer's offer at trial satisfied the conditions for such relief.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a relator who was subpoenaed and fined $100 for contempt during a justice court proceeding under the Fire Prevention Act; he refused to pay and petitioned the district court for a writ of review, which was denied after a full hearing. The Montana Supreme Court addressed whether the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the writ. The court concluded that certiorari does not lie because the district court acted within its jurisdiction under the state constitution and statutes, and an appeal was available as the proper means to challenge the order. Therefore, the application for a writ of review was denied.

procedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership and possession of horses purchased in Canada and brought into Montana, where McDonald claimed title based on an agency arrangement with horse buyers Galbreath and Low using drafts drawn on him, while Jackson acquired the remaining mixed herd in a separate transaction to facilitate currency transfer. McDonald had previously obtained possession of the horses through a claim and delivery action against Low and Galbreath, leading Jackson to sue for return of the horses and damages. The court held that Jackson held superior title and was entitled to possession plus damages from McDonald, reasoning from the evidence that McDonald had not paid for or accepted the mixed horses and that the initial purchase arrangements did not cover them. However, the court ruled that the sheriff Armstrong could not be held liable for damages because Jackson failed to make the required third-party claim under the claim and delivery statutes before the horses were delivered to McDonald. The judgment was affirmed with modification to exclude damages against the sheriff.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff suing the City of Billings for personal injuries sustained when she fell into an excavation in a parking strip between the sidewalk and curb while attempting to reach the sidewalk from the street. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint and entered judgment for the defendant, which the Montana Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. The court held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the excavation was located in an area where pedestrians do not ordinarily travel, the loose boards covering it and the surrounding muddy, unfinished conditions were plainly visible in daylight, and the plaintiff voluntarily chose to walk across the boards instead of using a proper crossing. Under these facts, the city owed no duty to provide additional coverings, barriers, or warnings, and the plaintiff's own lack of care was the proximate cause of her injury.

torts & liability

The case involved a petition for a supervisory writ to determine the type and amount of supersedeas bond required for relator Joseph M. Gabel to stay execution of a district court judgment pending appeal in a chattel mortgage foreclosure action concerning mining machinery, including a Hardinge Ball Mill, where Gabel asserted a superior lien interest. The district court had ordered Gabel to post a bond under section 9735 in double the amount of the judgment if he wished to appeal. The Montana Supreme Court denied the requested relief, holding that the district court's order was purely advisory with no statutory authority to adjudicate the bond type in advance, that the judgment did not fall under provisions for delivery of personal property or perishable goods, and that the choice of bond was for the relator to make without court pre-approval. The court further noted that no mechanism exists for an order declaring a standard $300 appeal bond sufficient to effect a stay.

procedureproperty

The case concerned whether a city could recover payments made on contracts involving city officers who had unlawful personal interests in the transactions, after the goods had been fully delivered, paid for, and used. The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover. The core reasoning was that relevant statutes prohibit such officer interests and allow contracts to be avoided but provide no authority for recovery once transactions are fully completed. Prior decisions established that a municipality accepting and retaining the benefits of such transactions must still pay their value and cannot avoid its obligations solely due to the officers' violations.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the Montana Trade Commission's order directing Sawyers' Stores, a grocery chain, to cease selling certain merchandise below cost in violation of the state's Unfair Practices Act, which prohibits such sales when done to injure competitors or destroy competition. The district court reviewed and set aside the order after the commission's own hearing, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court held that the commission failed to prove either element of a violation, as its cost calculations improperly relied on general surveys instead of actual invoice prices plus the defendant's overhead, and no evidence showed the required anticompetitive purpose. The opinion also confirmed that the district court's review of the full record complied with the Act's procedures for challenging commission orders.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an original proceeding challenging the state superintendent of public instruction's reversal of a county superintendent's order, concerning the dismissal of L. C. Howard as superintendent of schools for District No. 34 in Carbon County, Montana. The board of trustees voted to dismiss Howard effective June 30, 1942, after an informal public meeting but without formal charges or a hearing before the board. The court held that the board lacked jurisdiction to dismiss because Montana law requires charges to be preferred and a hearing held before the board prior to removal of a superintendent, and that neither the informal meeting nor the subsequent appeals to the county and state superintendents could satisfy this prerequisite. The core reasoning was that the board holds the removal power and must conduct the hearing to ensure cause exists before acting, with appeals serving only as review rather than a substitute for the initial process, rendering the dismissal and state superintendent's order null and void.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved competing claims to foreclose liens on a building constructed as an improvement to a tourist camp property sold under an installment contract: plaintiff Downing, as assignee of a mechanic's lien for labor and materials, sought to enforce it against the building and as superior to a mortgage lien held by defendant Dr. Knierim, while Knierim cross-complained to foreclose his mortgage as the superior interest. The trial court found that the purchasers (Crippens) had surrendered the property back to Downing, who then took possession and agreed to pay the outstanding improvement debts including the mortgage, and that the building was now owned by Downing. The court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that Downing's ownership and agreement to pay the mortgage defeated his attempt to enforce the mechanic's lien as superior, that the mortgagee was not in default under the tri-party loan agreement at the time of surrender, and that Downing's cross-examination regarding the surrender and lien assignment was proper because his right to maintain the action was at issue.

propertyprocedure