This case concerned whether the Montana Liquor Control Board could issue retail beer and liquor licenses for locations on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation without applicants first obtaining permits from the Blackfeet Tribe under tribal ordinance and federal law. The district court ruled that tribal permits were required, issued a writ of prohibition barring licenses to those without them, and issued a writ of mandate directing licenses for those who held tribal permits. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that the board had already complied with the writs by issuing the licenses, the recipients were operating their businesses, and no live controversy remained for review. Dissenting justices argued that the appeal should have been decided on the merits regarding state versus tribal authority over licensing.
In Reed v. Reed, the plaintiff wife sued for separate maintenance only after a turbulent marriage, explicitly stating she did not want a divorce, while the defendant husband cross-claimed for an absolute divorce; the trial court granted the wife an absolute divorce plus temporary support payments. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked authority to award an absolute divorce when the plaintiff had sought only separate maintenance and did not desire dissolution of the marriage. The court reasoned that Montana statutes, unlike those in some other states, do not grant trial courts discretion to decree a divorce in such circumstances and that the plaintiff's wishes must be respected, leading to reversal of the divorce portion of the decree while affirming other aspects with modifications such as the return of certain insurance policies. Dissenting opinions argued that the evidence supported granting a divorce and that equity courts should have discretion to provide complete relief when reconciliation is impossible.
This case involved a dispute over payment for the construction of a house under a contract between Time Construction Company and the Kohlstads. The plaintiff, as liquidating trustee, claimed a balance was due under a cost-plus contract with additional work, while the defendants asserted a fixed-price contract that had been fully paid. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding their version of the contract supported by the evidence, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed this finding but modified the judgment to eliminate attorney fees, as such fees were only authorized in lien foreclosure actions, which this was not.
This case involved a dispute over modification of child custody provisions in a 1952 Montana divorce decree that had awarded primary custody of a young daughter to the mother, with support payments from the father and limited visitation. In 1954 the father petitioned to change custody to himself, and the district court granted the modification after finding the mother's work schedule incompatible with providing a stable home. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record failed to demonstrate any material change in circumstances since the original decree sufficient to justify altering custody. The court emphasized that modifications require proof of changed conditions, that the original decree is presumed to have been based on full facts known to the issuing judge, and that no such showing was made here.
The case involved a worker who was injured on the job in 1951 but did not file a claim for workers' compensation until 1953, more than a year later. The Industrial Accident Board and district court denied the claim under the one-year filing deadline in R.C.M. 1947, sec. 92-601. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employer and insurer were equitably estopped from relying on the deadline because their representatives had told the worker and his agent that the injury was not compensable and that no claim could be filed. The court emphasized a liberal construction of the workers' compensation statute and noted that all parties initially believed the injury fell outside the Act's coverage, with no accident report filed. A dissent argued that estoppel did not apply because the worker knew the nature of his injury and there was no misrepresentation of fact.
The case involved Wymont Tractor & Equipment Co., which was organized in 1945 and initially paid unemployment compensation contributions at the standard 2.7% rate. After an experience rating system took effect, the company sought a refund of excess contributions for 1947-1950 on the theory that it qualified for a lower rate due to its detachment from a parent corporation, even though it had not requested redetermination within the 30-day period required by the statute. The unemployment compensation commission denied the refund, but the district court ruled in the company's favor. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the specific 30-day limit for challenging experience ratings under section 87-109 controlled over the more general three-year refund provision in section 87-138, and that failure to timely seek review barred the claim.
