District Court, S.D. Florida — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
City of Hialeah v. United States Housing Authority
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1971-10-18 · cited 1×
The case involved the City of Hialeah seeking a temporary injunction to prevent the United States Housing Authority from disbursing funds for a low-income housing project, based on the city's claimed implementation of the Phillips Amendment. The court found that the Phillips Amendment originated as a temporary proviso in an appropriations act without any language extending its duration and was not renewed after 1954. Because the amendment had expired, the plaintiff lacked any legal basis to maintain the suit. The court therefore denied the petition for injunction and dismissed the entire cause with prejudice.
federal power
Tillman v. Dade County School Board
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1971-06-08 · cited 3×
The case involved Black high school students suspended from South Dade High School after riots and disruptions on May 7 and 8, 1970, under Florida Statute 232.26 and School Board Policy-Regulation #5114. Plaintiffs claimed the statute was applied discriminatorily against Black students and that the policy violated due process by allowing suspensions without adequate hearings. The court found no discriminatory application of the statute, as the disparity in suspensions resulted from the physical separation of students during the events rather than racial bias. It upheld the constitutionality of ten-day suspensions without prior hearings but ruled that students receiving additional thirty-day suspensions were entitled to relief because they were not provided the required due process, including names of witnesses and an opportunity for a hearing before the extended suspension. The court ordered the parties to submit a proposed final judgment accordingly.
civil rightsprocedure
United States v. Sklaroff
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1971-02-11 · cited 103×
This case involves pre-trial motions filed by multiple defendants indicted on 23 counts for using interstate wire communications to transmit bets, wagers, and related information on sporting events in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084 and 2. The motions challenged the legality of FBI wiretap interceptions conducted at Miami airport payphones under an order issued pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as well as the search warrants and seizures based on those interceptions. The court denied all motions to suppress the wiretap evidence and derived materials, holding that the authorization order was valid on its face, supported by probable cause, and properly executed, that any clerical deficiency was corrected nunc pro tunc, and that Title III is constitutional both facially and as applied. It adopted prior district court rulings upholding the interceptions and denied related requests for discovery, severance, transfer, and dismissal of the indictment.
criminal lawprocedure
Miami National Bank v. Pennsylvania Insurance Co.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1970-07-14 · cited 15×
This case involved Miami National Bank seeking to recover under two bankers blanket bonds issued by Pennsylvania Insurance Company and Royal Indemnity Company for losses from the dishonest and fraudulent acts of its employee, Kenneth M. Harris, who as head of the Installment Loan Department disbursed over $1.5 million in loan proceeds to Mutual Leasing Corporation through fabricated documents and improper transactions. The sureties denied coverage and asserted noncompliance with the bonds' notice provisions, while bringing a third-party indemnity claim against Harris. The court determined that Harris's conduct qualified as dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal under the bond terms, that the bank had sustained covered losses of $853,659.87, and that the sureties were obligated to pay the bank while Harris in turn indemnified the sureties. These conclusions rested on findings regarding the nature of the loans, the bank's discovery of the scheme, and satisfaction of the bonds' procedural requirements.
business & regulatory
Pritikin v. Thurman
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1970-04-22 · cited 22×
In Pritikin v. Thurman, a 74-year-old North Miami resident sued the city's police chief and attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after his arrest for violating the local disorderly conduct ordinance (Section 15-8), seeking a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, declaring the portion of the ordinance prohibiting "violent, tumultuous, or offensive conduct, or carriage or by loud or unusual noise, or by profane, obscene, or offensive language, calculated to provoke a breach of the peace" void for vagueness and enjoining its enforcement. The court reasoned that the ordinance's terms failed to provide the specificity and certainty required by due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as they left the standard of liability open to subjective interpretation and thereby chilled protected speech under the First Amendment, consistent with precedents such as Connally v. General Construction Co. and Terminiello v. City of Chicago.
criminal lawfree speechcivil rights
Lutsky v. Lutsky
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1970-03-18 · cited 5×
The case involved a plaintiff seeking a federal declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act that an Alabama state court divorce decree dissolving her marriage was null and void, based on allegations that neither party resided in Alabama, proper notice was not given, and the decree resulted from a pre-arranged agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction over divorce and related domestic relations matters under the long-standing exception to diversity jurisdiction recognized in Barber v. Barber and subsequent cases. The court further reasoned that the plaintiff had already litigated the validity of the decree in Alabama state courts, which upheld it, and that the federal action was an improper attempt to relitigate those issues or obtain a second declaration of marital status, with the Declaratory Judgment Act conferring discretion not to entertain such suits that would interfere with state judgments.
family lawfederal powerprocedure