Albert H. Angstman

In Hurly v. Tymofichuk, the plaintiff brought suit for the death of Maggie Lonethunder, who was struck and killed by the defendant's car while she and others pushed a stalled pickup truck on a Montana highway shortly after sunset. A jury returned a $5,000 verdict for the plaintiff on claims of negligence and last clear chance; the trial court denied the defendant's motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, and new trial. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the negligence claims and that contributory negligence or imputed negligence from a joint enterprise was not shown as a matter of law. The court also held that evidentiary rulings and jury instructions did not constitute reversible error.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether the widow of a city street department foreman who died from poliomyelitis could recover workers' compensation benefits after the Industrial Accident Board denied her claim. The trial court reversed the Board's denial, finding that the employee's work conditions—exposure to heat, fatigue, sewage, flies, and garbage—made contraction of the disease a compensable industrial accident under a liberal construction of the statute, even without proof of a specific fortuitous event. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the Board's order, holding that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proving a causal connection between the employment and the disease, as medical testimony established only a possibility of work-related exposure rather than a probable link, with the virus more likely contracted through person-to-person contact elsewhere.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Ralph Merritt, who was convicted of forgery for allegedly uttering and passing a false chattel mortgage on a 1959 Chevrolet sold to Mrs. Walter J. Powers. The information alleged that Merritt knowingly passed the forged document with intent to defraud the buyer and a finance company. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from a witness who opined that another transaction was similar to the charged offense. The court reasoned that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible but may be allowed to show scheme or intent if factual similarity is established, yet a witness may not testify to the legal conclusion of similarity, and the jury could have been influenced by that improper testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over title to land in Lewis and Clark County, Montana, where plaintiff Johnstone had leased the property from defendant Sanborn in 1933 amid existing tax delinquencies; after the county issued a tax deed that was later invalidated, Johnstone purchased the land from the county and claimed ownership through adverse possession. The trial court ruled in Johnstone's favor, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Johnstone acquired title by adverse possession. The court reasoned that the lease's terms, which acknowledged the risk of Sanborn losing the property for unpaid taxes and disclaimed responsibility for improvements, effectively waived the protections of the statute (section 93-2512) that would otherwise deem the tenant's possession as the landlord's for ten years after tenancy ends. The opinion also noted doubts about the statute's constitutionality but upheld the result on the lease waiver and related procedural history from prior actions.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case involved a dispute over possession of a cabin on land in Missoula County, Montana. Plaintiff, as executor of tenant Hartney's estate, sought restitution of the premises and damages after defendant Clay retook the cabin following Hartney's death; the complaint described a different parcel under an unpaid land-sale contract, but the proof focused on the cabin, which Hartney had occupied with Clay's permission as a tenant at will. The jury found for defendant, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a tenancy at will ended upon the tenant's death, allowing the owner to peaceably re-enter and regain possession without resort to legal process so long as no unnecessary force was used. The court rejected arguments that title could not be considered or that forcible-entry remedies were exclusive, and found no error in the instructions or denial of an amendment for exemplary damages.

property

The case involved a widow's claim for $5,000 in double indemnity benefits under her husband's life insurance policy after he died from injuries sustained in a brief fistfight during a card game. The insurer had paid the base policy amount but denied the additional benefit, arguing the death was not accidental and fell under an exclusion for injuries intentionally inflicted by another person. The trial court instructed the jury in line with the plaintiff's theory that the death qualified as accidental because the insured engaged in a minor altercation using only fists with no intent to cause serious harm, and the jury returned a special verdict finding no intent by the other participant to inflict the actual injuries suffered. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the death resulted from accidental means within the policy and was not excluded, as the intent requirement for the exclusion clause was not met. A dissent argued that the majority improperly disregarded the policy's plain language excluding intentional injuries.

business & regulatorytorts & liability