John W. Bonner

This case concerns the probate of the estate of John Precup Giurgiu, whose will directed distribution through a trust to beneficiaries who were residents and nationals of Romania. The State of Montana appealed a district court order authorizing distribution, arguing that federal court rulings had not resolved whether reciprocity of inheritance existed under Montana statute section 91-520. The Montana Supreme Court held that the federal decisions addressed only the statute's constitutionality and the need for state courts to develop appropriate procedures, without deciding the factual reciprocity issue. It reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings, placing the burden of proof on the foreign heirs under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Warren Rogers suing Hilger Chevrolet Company for personal injuries sustained when he fell out the door of a used car during a test drive, claiming the dealer breached its duty by allowing him to ride in a vehicle with an allegedly defective door latch. A jury awarded Rogers $25,000, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment and directed a verdict for the defendant. The court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, failed to show substantial credible proof of any defect or breach of the dealer's duty to discover and repair patent or discoverable defects; instead, the case rested on speculation about possible dirt in the latch mechanism, which was insufficient to establish a prima facie negligence claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a survivorship action brought by the administrator of Nancy Putman's estate against William Pollei after she was killed in a car accident as a passenger. The jury awarded only $445.95 for her destroyed personal property and nothing for loss of earning capacity, despite evidence on her potential future earnings. The district court set aside the verdict on damages and ordered a new trial limited to that issue, finding insufficient evidence to support zero damages for earning capacity. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because there was no substantial evidence justifying the jury's award of no damages on that claim, and jury instructions did not prevent review of evidentiary sufficiency.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Jensen, Dr. Leland Jensen was convicted by a jury in Missoula County district court of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a female under age 16 and sentenced to 20 years at hard labor; he appealed, raising claims of prejudicial comments by the judge and prosecutor, improper order of proof, insufficient evidence, and inadmissible testimony from other women about similar acts. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to object timely to the judge's comments, the prosecutor's remark was cured by the court's admonition to the jury, the order of proof was within the trial court's discretion, and the similar-acts evidence was properly admitted because it tended to establish the defendant's intent and a common scheme or plan under recognized exceptions to the general rule excluding other-crimes evidence. The court found the acts sufficiently similar and not too remote in time, and it overruled contrary precedent to the extent it barred such evidence outright.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Americana Homes, Inc. sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien on real property in Yellowstone County, Montana, after furnishing labor and materials on an open account from June to November 3, 1965, with the lien filed on February 2, 1966. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that credits for returned merchandise and a payment in late December 1965 did not qualify as “items” under section 45-502, R.C.M. 1947, so they did not extend the 90-day filing deadline from the date the last labor or materials were furnished. The decision rested on the principle that mechanic’s lien statutes must be strictly followed, and the legislature did not intend to permit indefinite extensions of the filing period through account credits.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from two related automobile accidents on an icy Montana highway in 1967, where Mabel Page lost control of her car and left it partially obstructing the road without lights, leading to a collision with Clara Lamb's vehicle; the Lambs sued the Pages for personal injury and property damages, and the Pages counterclaimed for their own losses. Following a jury trial that awarded the plaintiffs $6,080, the district court denied the defendants' post-trial motions, and they appealed on issues including the exclusion of expert testimony, photographic evidence, and refusal of a last clear chance jury instruction. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the defendants failed to establish the required elements for a last clear chance doctrine instruction under Montana precedent and that the trial court had fully and fairly instructed the jury while properly managing evidentiary rulings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, tenant Eddy Joseph sued his landlord, Hustad Corporation, for breach of a lease covenant requiring the landlord to maintain a parking area for the joint use of lessees in a shopping center; Joseph alleged that new buildings constructed on the lot reduced available parking spaces from 42 to 6 and interfered with his restaurant business. A jury awarded Joseph $18,500 in damages for lost future profits. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the case, holding that Joseph failed to present substantial evidence showing a breach of the parking covenant or that any parking shortages were attributable to the landlord's actions rather than other customers. The court emphasized that verdicts cannot rest on conjecture or speculation and found the evidence insufficient under Montana standards requiring proof that convinces reasonable minds.

propertyprocedure

This case is an appeal by Kenneth Eugene Zachmeier from a manslaughter conviction in Yellowstone County district court following a retrial. After an initial second-degree murder conviction was reversed, the defendant was retried under Montana's new Code of Criminal Procedure and convicted of manslaughter, with the court addressing two main issues: credit for time served and the admissibility of prior sworn testimony from an unavailable witness. The court held that under sections 95-2214 and 95-2215, the defendant was entitled to credit for 157 days of pre-conviction incarceration on a bailable offense as well as time served under the reversed conviction, to be applied against the new 10-year sentence. It further ruled that the transcript of the absent prosecution witness's testimony from the first trial was properly admitted because the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine her and the prosecution showed due diligence in attempting to locate her after she left the jurisdiction. The case was remanded to modify the judgment to reflect the proper credit for time served.

criminal lawprocedure

In Keller v. Turner, attorneys who represented a client in a divorce action that also involved claims for partition, resulting trust, and partnership accounting sued to enforce an alleged contingent fee agreement entitling them to one-third of any property recovered. The district court dismissed the suit, holding the agreement illegal and void, and awarded the attorneys only the $1,500 in fees granted in the divorce proceeding; the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that contingent fee contracts tied to divorce and property claims are contrary to public policy because they give attorneys a financial stake in preventing reconciliation between spouses, a result the law seeks to encourage, as established in Coleman v. Sisson and similar precedents. The ruling applies whether the agreement is made before or after the divorce action begins.

family law

This case is a personal injury action in which plaintiff Lila N. Dean sued the First National Bank of Great Falls for damages after tripping on a torn carpet seam in office space the bank leased to her employer, alleging the bank negligently failed to repair the defect despite knowing about it. The district court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Dean had assumed the risk and was contributorily negligent as a matter of law based on her knowledge of the hazard, appreciation of its danger, and continued use of the area. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because the evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether Dean's exposure to the risk was voluntary, given her allegations that she was compelled to walk over the torn carpet daily in the course of her employment. The majority reasoned that the voluntariness element of assumption of risk must be decided by a jury when the hazard is encountered as a necessary part of maintaining employment, while the dissent would have affirmed on the ground that Dean's own testimony established all elements of assumption of risk and contributory negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Magelssen v. Atwell, the plaintiff sought to quiet title to a section of land in Rosebud County, Montana, claiming ownership through adverse possession after receiving a tax assignment certificate, enclosing part of the land in a larger pasture, and grazing livestock there for over fifteen years without paying rent. The defendants, as heirs to prior purchasers from the Northern Pacific Railway Company who had not recorded their deed, maintained ownership and had paid taxes until the plaintiff took over the delinquencies. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment for the defendants, holding that the tax certificate provided only a lien rather than color of title under section 93-2509 and that the plaintiff's actions failed to satisfy the cultivation, improvement, or enclosure requirements of section 93-2511 for adverse possession, particularly given a letter showing he lacked the necessary intent. The court also found no error in admitting the letter as evidence.

property

In Suhr v. Sears Roebuck and Company, a self-employed trucker sued Sears for damages after stepping on a protruding nail in a dimly lit storeroom while removing old appliances at the store manager's request, resulting in a foot injury and subsequent callus issues. The jury awarded the plaintiff $3,500, and the trial court denied Sears' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff was a business invitee owed a duty of ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably safe and that the evidence on contributory negligence was susceptible to multiple interpretations, properly leaving that question to the jury rather than deciding it as a matter of law. The court also found that the trial judge correctly refused certain proposed instructions as either duplicative or improper comments on the evidence.

torts & liability