Horace S. Davis

The case involved the conviction of Wiley F. Blakeslee for statutory rape of his eleven-year-old stepdaughter, for which a jury imposed a forty-five-year prison sentence. Blakeslee appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a postponement after new counsel was appointed only three days before trial and by admitting a blood-stained undergarment into evidence. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and the order denying a new trial, holding that the abrupt appointment of new counsel without adequate preparation time violated the defendant's constitutional right under the Montana Constitution to appear and defend by counsel. The court reasoned that this right, implemented by statute, required sufficient opportunity for appointed counsel to prepare a defense in a serious criminal case, regardless of prior counsel's involvement.

criminal lawprocedure

In Bryant v. Board of Examiners, a Montana taxpayer sued to block the State Board of Examiners from issuing bonds under a 1955 law to reconstruct and renovate the state capitol building, including installing roll call voting machines, arguing the plan was invalid because it pledged income from federal land grants for purposes outside the grants' scope. The trial court ruled for the defendants, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that sections 12 and 17 of the federal Enabling Act, which granted lands to Montana for erecting public buildings at the capital, permitted the bond issue because the power to erect such buildings includes the implied authority to reconstruct, renovate, and equip them for their intended use, and the pledged land-grant income could therefore be used for those purposes without violating the grants.

federal powerproperty

The case involved Victor Chemical Works challenging its 1952 property tax assessment in Silver Bow County, Montana, after the county and state boards of equalization denied reclassification of its newly built industrial plant for manufacturing elemental phosphorus. The company paid part of the tax under protest and sued to recover the difference, arguing that a 1951 statutory amendment placed the plant in a lower-tax Class Five category at 7% of value rather than the 30% Class Four rate. The district court ruled against the company on demurrer, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the amendment violated constitutional requirements for uniform assessment and taxation of property under Article XII. The court reasoned that the statute's distinction for new plants lacked a sufficient basis to avoid arbitrariness and failed to satisfy uniformity mandates, despite legislative intent to encourage industry.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Alan R. Bain, who was charged with practicing medicine without the required certificate under Montana law by using the title "Dr." in connection with his name in advertisements and signs, where he described himself as a physiotherapist, heart specialist, and general practitioner. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the conviction, holding that there was substantial evidence that Bain used the title "Dr." in a medical sense and that the practice of physiotherapy falls within the practice of medicine as defined by statute. The court's reasoning centered on the evidence from directories, letters, and office signs showing Bain's self-identification, combined with the statutory interpretation that practicing any branch of the healing arts constitutes practicing medicine.

criminal lawhealthcare

In Richland County v. Anderson, the county sued S.A. Anderson and Florence V. Anderson for damages after a dam and reservoir on their ranch broke in 1951, causing flooding and harm to county property; a jury awarded the county $27,473.33. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against Florence V. Anderson but directed dismissal as to S.A. Anderson. The court held that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim, that evidence supported a finding of negligence by Florence Anderson because she had possession and control of the structures, failed to inspect them despite their known dangerous condition after enlargement, and continued using them, and that the trial court's jury instructions on negligence, knowledge, and liability for impounded water correctly stated the law when read as a whole. The court found insufficient evidence linking S.A. Anderson to the dam's maintenance or control.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved James R. Zumwalt, who pleaded guilty in 1952 to passing a false and worthless check and was sentenced to seven years in prison. After the district court denied his petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate the conviction based on alleged errors and constitutional violations, Zumwalt petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for an original writ to set aside the judgment. The court granted the state's motion to quash, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the proper remedy was a direct appeal under state statutes, either from the final judgment in a civil proceeding within six months or from a post-conviction order in the criminal case within sixty days. The majority reasoned that appellate jurisdiction is limited by constitutional and statutory requirements, and the extraordinary writ could not substitute for the adequate and available appeal process that Zumwalt had not pursued.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved R.J. Hale, convicted under Montana statute of obtaining money by false pretenses after submitting a claim to Missoula County for payment on airport designs and plans. Following an initial reversal and remand, Hale demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to state a public offense, but the trial court overruled the demurrer and a second conviction followed. The Montana Supreme Court held the information fatally defective, as it alleged only that the claim was "false and fraudulent" without specifying any particular representations or facts establishing their falsity. The court reasoned that criminal pleadings, like civil ones, require concrete factual averments rather than mere conclusions to sufficiently charge an offense. The judgment and order denying a new trial were therefore reversed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an original habeas corpus proceeding in the Montana Supreme Court brought by a father seeking custody of his two minor children from their mother, who had relocated with them to Montana after a 1944 California divorce. The California court had originally awarded sole custody to the mother but later modified the decree in 1954 to grant the father physical custody during July each year; the mother had appeared through counsel in the modification proceedings but neither she nor the children were physically present in California at that time. The court held that the California orders, including the modification, were entitled to full faith and credit under the U.S. Constitution because the California court had acquired jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in the original divorce action and the modification was valid on its face. The decision rested on precedents establishing that a court with initial jurisdiction in a divorce retains authority to modify custody provisions, which other states must recognize.

family lawfederal power

In State v. Kitchens, the defendant was convicted by a jury in Yellowstone County of forging and passing a $20 traveler's check and sentenced to five years in prison. The defense raised insanity through documentary evidence only, without the defendant testifying. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred by not halting proceedings to conduct a sanity inquiry under R.C.M. 1947 sections 94-9301 and 94-9302, because the record showed prior judicial determinations of the defendant's insanity by state and federal courts, with no subsequent restoration to sanity or discharge certificate. The court reasoned that these facts created a legal doubt about the defendant's mental competence to stand trial or assist in his defense, requiring the trial judge to act sua sponte regardless of whether counsel raised the issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute in which plaintiff Bennett alleged he sold and delivered a one-half interest in a sawmill and related personal property to defendants Dodgson and Johnson for $3,500 payable in cash by April 5, 1951, but the defendants took possession without paying. The trial court entered a $3,500 judgment for Bennett after a jury verdict. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that two jury instructions on the contract terms were irreconcilably conflicting—one requiring proof of the specific payment deadline and the other allowing recovery without it—and that the evidence did not support the verdict on the precise terms of any agreement or its maturity. The court directed that new instructions clarify whether any contract required payment by the stated date or within a reasonable time, along with whether that time had elapsed before suit.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In this 1955 Montana Supreme Court case, plaintiffs sought to quiet title to mineral rights in certain lands against a Minnesota corporation and unknown claimants, obtaining a default judgment after proper service. The respondents, heirs of the corporation's deceased sole stockholder, moved to set aside the judgment under a statute allowing relief for excusable neglect and sought to file an answer defending the corporation's claimed mineral ownership. The court held that stockholders generally may not appear in their own names to vacate a judgment against their corporation or prosecute its defenses, as corporate causes of action belong to the entity itself rather than individual shareholders. This rule applies here because the respondents were not yet stockholders, no applicable exceptions existed, and they had not followed required procedures such as demanding action from corporate officers. The order setting aside the default was therefore reversed.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this 1955 Montana case, relator Jack C. Estes, after pleading guilty in justice court to driving under the influence and later facing a one-year license revocation, moved to withdraw his plea on grounds that it was involuntary and based on ignorance or misleading advice; the justice court denied the motion, the district court affirmed on appeal, and Estes then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of coram nobis to vacate the conviction and order rearraignment. The court held that it lacked authority to grant the requested relief or review the justice court's order. Its core reasoning was that the state constitution limits the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to decisions of district courts, with no direct appellate power over justice courts, and statutes provide appeals only from district courts; any review here would improperly assume jurisdiction not granted by law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State of Montana bringing a claim and delivery action to recover possession of a road roller that it had received as federal surplus property through its park commission, after a state employee sold the equipment to a private buyer without authorization. The trial court directed a verdict for the buyer and entered judgment declaring him the owner entitled to possession. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state had established its right to possession as the recipient of the federal property and that no valid sale or ratification had occurred because the employee acted as principal rather than agent. The court directed entry of judgment for the state without awarding damages or fixing the item's value.

propertyprocedure