Karla M. Gray

In State v. Jones, Michelle Jones was convicted of felony criminal distribution of dangerous drugs after selling marijuana to a confidential informant; she appealed the denial of her motion to suppress a warrantless recording of a telephone conversation arranging the sale and certain conditions imposed on her deferred sentence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the recording was lawful under established precedents allowing one-party consent monitoring of telephone calls without a warrant under the state constitution. On sentencing, the court upheld most probation conditions and the restitution order but reversed the alcohol-related condition, finding no sufficient nexus between it and either Jones or the underlying drug offense. The case was remanded with instructions to strike that condition from the sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

Genevieve Baker pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol after a 2006 drunk-driving crash on U.S. Highway 2 that killed her sister and another driver. The district court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 40 years in prison with 20 suspended, plus conditions including a 40-year prohibition on operating a motor vehicle. Baker appealed, claiming the sentence violated Montana's correctional policies under § 46-18-101, MCA, her constitutional rights on grounds of racial discrimination, and statutory limits on driving restrictions under §§ 46-18-201(4)(o) and -202(1)(f), MCA. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the sentence was legal, Baker failed to support her constitutional arguments with adequate briefing or evidence, and her challenge to the driving condition was an unpreserved objection that could not be reviewed for the first time on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Maki, the defendant appealed his guilty pleas to state felony charges of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and precursors, contending that the charges should have been dismissed on double jeopardy grounds because the same conduct had already resulted in a federal supervised release revocation and additional imprisonment. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The court held that the federal revocation proceeding did not amount to punishment for double jeopardy purposes under § 46-11-504, MCA, or Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution, as it involved enforcement of release conditions rather than new criminal charges or a second prosecution for the same offense. The decision rested on the distinction between revocation proceedings and ordinary criminal prosecutions, along with the absence of supporting authority equating a revocation sentence with punishment for the underlying conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

Martin Mariano Baca was convicted after a jury trial of felony partner or family member assault and felony tampering with a witness, based on an altercation with his girlfriend and a subsequent letter to her. He petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to argue the PFMA should be a misdemeanor due to insufficient prior qualifying convictions, failing to file a direct appeal, and other trial preparation and defense issues. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the felony PFMA sentence, holding that one out-of-state prior conviction did not qualify under the statute so the offense was a misdemeanor, but affirmed the district court's denial of the remaining postconviction claims after finding no prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance.

criminal law

The case involved MBNA America Bank seeking confirmation of an arbitration award against Julie Tramelli for an unpaid credit card balance of $26,956.54 after she defaulted on her account, which contained a binding arbitration clause added after she opened it in 1999. MBNA initiated arbitration proceedings following the default, Tramelli did not respond to notice of the arbitration, and an award was entered in MBNA's favor; she then opposed confirmation in district court by alleging the award was obtained through fraud and seeking sanctions. The district court treated her filings as a motion to vacate the award under Montana law, held an evidentiary hearing, and confirmed the award while denying the motion to vacate and the sanctions request. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence and that it had correctly applied settled Montana law on arbitration awards without abusing its discretion.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Richard Hay sued the City of Miles City and its officials after a 2004 misdemeanor charge against him for unlawful transactions with children was dismissed without prejudice on the prosecutor's motion citing insufficient evidence. Hay had unsuccessfully sought in the city court to have the charge dismissed with prejudice or to proceed to trial, and he later filed a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in district court requesting a declaratory judgment that his rights were violated and injunctive relief ordering dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding it lacked authority to grant the requested declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hay failed to show error because declaratory relief is not intended for factual findings on constitutional violations, no authority supported injunctive relief reopening the closed criminal case, and no basis existed for other equitable remedies.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the Montana Department of Transportation initiating a condemnation action to acquire a portion of American Bank's real property, which the district court dismissed with prejudice before awarding the bank its necessary litigation expenses including attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the fee award and remanded, holding that the district court erred by relying on general jurisprudential factors to set hourly rates instead of following the plain language of § 70-30-306(2), MCA, which requires use of customary hourly rates charged by attorneys in the county. The core reasoning was that the statute sets a specific standard for reasonable and necessary fees in condemnation cases that displaces broader common-law considerations.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Robert G. Farmer, who was convicted of allowing his motor vehicle to be operated without liability insurance under § 61-6-301, MCA, after a traffic stop where the driver, his girlfriend, could not produce proof of insurance and Farmer, as the passenger and owner, also did not. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charge. The court reasoned that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the vehicle lacked valid liability insurance, as the absence of proof from the passenger-owner did not establish that insurance did not exist. Additionally, the relevant statutes impose the duty to maintain insurance on owners and the duty to produce proof on operators, so Farmer had no obligation as a non-operator to provide such proof.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph Smietanka appealing his misdemeanor convictions for assault and negligent endangerment after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the restitution order of $765.98 to the Crime Victim Compensation Program lacked the required affidavit under § 46-18-242, MCA, documenting the victim's pecuniary loss, and that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by recommending a 12-month suspended sentence on the negligent endangerment count instead of the agreed concurrent 6-month suspended sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Longfellow, the defendant was charged with felony sexual intercourse without consent for digitally penetrating a developmentally disabled woman and was convicted by a jury after she testified at trial. On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent to testify and by denying a mistrial motion based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim met the criteria under Montana Rule of Evidence 601(b) to testify because she could express herself understandably and grasped the duty to tell the truth. The court further concluded that the prosecutor's remarks did not constitute misconduct under the rules of professional conduct or relevant precedents, as they addressed evidence and community standards without improper vouching or inflammatory appeals.

criminal law

The case involved Chester Shaffer appealing a temporary order of protection issued by the Justice Court against him on behalf of his wife Fiona and their children. The District Court dismissed the appeal because it was filed nearly eleven months after the order was extended, exceeding the 30-day limit for appeals from justice court under Montana law. Chester argued that the order was an injunction without a specified appeal timeframe and that no judgment had been rendered, but the court clarified that such appeals are governed by Title 25, Chapter 33, MCA. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, noting that Chester failed to provide cognizable legal authority supporting his claims of error regarding the timeliness and nature of the order.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Kelsch, the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested for drug possession, leading to charges of felony and misdemeanor criminal possession of dangerous drugs. After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence based on lack of particularized suspicion for the stop, Kelsch pleaded guilty without reserving appeal rights. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that a voluntary guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional issues such as pretrial suppression rulings unless a conditional plea is properly entered under state law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by James and Dorothy Bowyer against Shane Loftus and his employer Elenburg Exploration, Inc., seeking damages from a head-on car collision. The Bowyers claimed Elenburg was vicariously liable under respondeat superior because Loftus, a well driller, was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred after his shift. The district court granted summary judgment to Elenburg, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the undisputed facts showed the collision happened more than five hours after Loftus's shift ended during a personal 90-mile roundtrip involving dinner, drinks, and sightseeing, with no compensation, work duties, or employer direction involved at the time. Although Loftus sometimes drove crew members, this trip was unrelated to those duties, and the company's safety policy did not extend employer control to such off-duty personal activities.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case arose from a 2002 two-vehicle collision at a traffic-light-controlled intersection in Lolo, Montana, in which plaintiff Christina Sweeney Fish was driving an SUV and defendant Everett Harris was driving a Peterbilt truck; Fish sued Harris and his employers for negligence and obtained a jury verdict awarding her damages but apportioning 40% liability to her. Fish moved for a new trial, arguing both that the evidence was insufficient to support the liability allocation and that alleged statements by a juror about matters outside the record constituted misconduct. The district court denied the motions, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. On the insufficiency claim, the court conducted de novo review and held that substantial evidence supported the verdict when measured against the unchallenged jury instruction requiring motorists to look laterally and see what is in plain view. On the misconduct claim, the court concluded that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion because the juror's comments were not shown to be "extraneous" information under M. R. Evid. 606(b).

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Torgerson, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor offenses of unlawful possession of game animals (four whitetail deer bucks allegedly taken outside legal seasons or with spotlights) and unlawful possession of bird parts (including an eagle skull and feathers), based on evidence from searches of his home and business prompted by information from his then-estranged wife. A jury convicted him after trial, and Torgerson appealed, raising issues including the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from the searches, admission of his ex-wife's testimony and hearsay, alleged prosecutorial misconduct warranting a mistrial, and the sufficiency of the evidence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the searches were supported by warrants, the challenged testimony and evidence were properly admitted, no misconduct occurred that required a mistrial, and the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each count.

criminal law

In State v. Krueger, the defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to felony sexual assault pursuant to a plea agreement, challenging one probation condition that barred alcohol possession or consumption, entry into bars, and required alcohol testing. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's imposition of that condition. The court held that, under its Ashby precedent, a probation condition is invalid unless it has a nexus to the offense or to the offender's recent and significant history of the restricted conduct; here the record showed no connection between alcohol and the sexual assault or any pattern of alcohol abuse by Krueger.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1999 condominium purchase in Montana where Crail Creek Associates sued buyer Robert Olson for breach of contract and foreclosure of a construction lien after a dispute over incomplete construction and $69,000 in holdback funds held by a title company; Olson counterclaimed. Following a 2004 jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Crail Creek awarding damages, costs, interest, and attorney fees, and allowed execution on the holdback funds. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Olson's challenges for cause to two jurors, erred by submitting a second supplemental verdict form after the jury was polled, and improperly allowed Crail Creek to retain executed funds in a lawyer trust account rather than returning them to neutral control pending final resolution. The court directed the funds be placed with the district court clerk in an interest-bearing account.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Johnson, a jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault after he entered the victim's home and inflicted injuries including facial lacerations, a nasal fracture, and dislocated shoulders. The defendant appealed the district court's evidentiary rulings allowing photographs of the victim's injuries while excluding evidence of pornography found in the victim's home, as well as the refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary decisions and that the evidence established serious bodily injury, which precluded a lesser included offense instruction. The court reasoned that the victim's injuries, supported by medical testimony and the victim's own demonstration of lasting impairment, exceeded the threshold for misdemeanor assault.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. VanWinkle, the defendant appealed his felony burglary conviction after the District Court imposed a three-year deferred sentence that included a condition requiring payment of an $85 fee to the local community service program. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the sentence as illegal and remanded the case. The court reasoned that sentencing conditions must be authorized by statute and that no provision, including § 46-18-201(4)(o), MCA, permits imposition of this fee; local judicial district rules cannot supply the missing authority, and the fee could not be treated as the fine referenced in the plea agreement because fees do not qualify for statutory incarceration credit. The court rejected arguments that the defendant had waived the challenge or that the condition was permissible as a rehabilitation-related cost.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rahn, the defendant pled guilty to sexual intercourse without consent and tampering with witnesses pursuant to a plea agreement under which the State agreed to recommend specific prison sentences depending on whether an evaluator designated him a Level 2 or Level 3 sex offender. At sentencing, after the defense presented a Level 2 evaluation, the State introduced testimony from another expert attacking that assessment and arguing for a Level 3 designation, which the district court accepted before imposing the corresponding sentence. The Montana Supreme Court held that this conduct breached the plea agreement because the State had not reserved the right to challenge the evaluation or present counter-testimony. The court reversed the sentence on that basis and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, rejecting the State's request to introduce the same evidence to argue against specific performance.

criminal lawprocedure