The case involved relators seeking a writ of supervisory control to compel a district court to vacate its order striking their complaint in intervention from an underlying declaratory judgment action. In that action, a plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of state license fees on oleomargarine sellers under section 2620.45, Revised Codes. The district court had granted the relators leave to intervene ex parte but later struck their complaint on the grounds that their interest was insufficient under section 9088 and was already represented by the defendants. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's filing of a demurrer to the complaint in intervention, alongside a motion to strike, waived any objection to the propriety of the intervention itself, as the demurrer treated the pleading as properly before the court and raised only its legal sufficiency. Consequently, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion to strike, and the court directed issuance of a peremptory writ annulling the order.
The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Montana's State Highway Treasury Anticipation Debenture Act of 1945, which authorized the State Highway Commission to issue up to $12 million in debentures funded by a dedicated five-cent-per-gallon gasoline license tax to support post-war highway construction, match federal grants, and retire prior debentures. The court denied the writ sought by plaintiffs, upholding the Act in full. Core reasoning was that the measure did not violate constitutional debt limits because repayment was limited to the specified tax revenues, historical collections demonstrated sufficiency over the repayment period, the debentures created a clear and enforceable contractual obligation, and no ambiguities or diversions of funds rendered the statute invalid.
The case involved plaintiffs who purchased land under a 1929 contract and received a 1934 deed that included a 6.25% reservation of oil, gas, and minerals; they sued in 1943 to reform the deed, claiming mutual mistake or their own mistake combined with defendants' fraud, and alternatively to quiet title. The trial court ruled against them on the merits, finding they had not proven their claims, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the evidence, including a subsequent reduced-price agreement and 1935 documents signed by plaintiffs that expressly referenced the mineral reservation in the recorded deed, showed the reservation was intentional and known or available to plaintiffs, rather than the result of mistake or fraud.
The case involved a dispute over whether Montana's Store License Tax Law applied to seven stores operated by Glacier Park Company inside Glacier National Park. The State Board of Equalization sued for a declaratory judgment and $382 in unpaid license fees for 1941-1942, while the company contended the state lacked jurisdiction after ceding exclusive authority over the park area to the United States. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment for the defendant and directed judgment for the state. The court held that the tax applied because the 1911 cession statute explicitly reserved Montana's right to tax persons, corporations, franchises, and property within the park, the park lands remain part of the state, and the tax statute's terms cover all stores in the state without exception for the reserved powers.
The case concerned a dispute between former spouses over two promissory notes and accompanying mortgages on real property in Silver Bow County, Montana, with the plaintiff seeking recovery on the notes and foreclosure of the mortgages after partial payments were made over many years. The defendant denied delivery of the documents, any payments on the notes, and raised defenses including lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of the published summons, and expiration of the statute of limitations under both Montana and California law. The district court entered findings and a foreclosure decree for the plaintiff, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's determinations were supported by substantial evidence, that jurisdiction was proper, that the summons met statutory requirements, and that payments tolled the limitations period.
The case involved the estate of Fred Giebler, a Montana resident who died intestate in 1941, with a cash residue claimed by his half-brother and half-sister, both German nationals and residents. A 1942 court decree adjudged them the sole heirs entitled to the estate with no appeal taken. The State of Montana later petitioned to claim the estate by escheat under Chapter 104, Laws of 1939, citing lack of reciprocal inheritance rights with Germany, while the Alien Property Custodian intervened to assert federal authority over the heirs' interests under the Trading With The Enemy Act. The trial court ruled for the state, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior final decree of heirship was conclusive and res judicata, preventing collateral attack on the heirs' rights which vested at the time of death.
