W. William Leaphart

The case involved Roland Tirey, convicted in 1996 of felony sexual assault and sentenced to 50 years in prison with 25 years suspended, who was released on probation in 2008 subject to conditions including job search requirements, weekly reporting, and sexual offender treatment. After Tirey missed appointments, failed to submit job logs, and did not comply with treatment, the district court revoked his probation, imposed the full 25-year suspended term at Montana State Prison, designated him a Level II sexual offender, and added new probation conditions. Tirey appealed, challenging the revocation and arguing the court exceeded statutory limits under the 1995 version of § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, by adding conditions and failing to credit probation time or state reasons for it. The Montana Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court acted outside statutory parameters in incorporating additional conditions into the sentence and addressing the offender designation and time credit. The core reasoning focused on the statutory requirement that a revocation sentence be the same as or lesser than the original, along with clarification of prior case law regarding non-punitive conditions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a divorce and child custody dispute between Carl and Heather Myrland, who had lived in multiple states with their child ANM. Carl appealed the district court's order dismissing his Montana petition for dissolution and parenting plan due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Montana Supreme Court determined that both Montana and Texas had jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding and affirmed the setting aside of the default decree, but held that the district court had not properly considered the inconvenient forum factors under § 40-7-108(2) for the custody matter, as Montana is the child's home state. The court remanded for further proceedings on the custody jurisdiction issue.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit by Peggy Stevens against Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, alleging that the company failed to adequately warn about the risk of osteonecrosis of the jaw associated with its drug Zometa, leading to her injury after dental surgery. A jury awarded Stevens $3.2 million in compensatory damages, and the district court denied Novartis's various motions challenging the verdict. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings on summary judgment, jury instructions, evidentiary matters, and post-trial motions regarding liability and damages. However, it reversed the decision to offset the award by Stevens's social security disability benefits, reasoning that the general verdict lacked the necessary breakdown to determine what portion of the damages was subject to such an offset under state law.

torts & liabilityhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Park Place Apartments, LLC (PPA), which purchased a commercial insurance policy from Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC) through agent Wilhelm for an apartment complex including a carport, believing the standard businessowners policy covered all structures on the property. After heavy snow caused the carport to collapse in 2008, FUMIC denied the claim, citing an amendatory endorsement (BOP-54) that limited coverage to buildings specifically listed on the declarations page. The district court granted summary judgment to FUMIC and Wilhelm. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy was ambiguous because a reasonable insured would expect coverage for the entire complex under standard commercial insurance and that ambiguities must be construed in favor of extending coverage.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Montana Board of Pharmacy seeking to enjoin Thomas Kennedy, operating as Canadian Connection, from assisting customers with ordering prescription drugs from out-of-state and foreign pharmacies without a license, in alleged violation of the Montana Pharmacy Act. After years of related proceedings, including a prior preliminary injunction and a contempt finding against Kennedy for continuing the business, the district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, issued a permanent injunction, and denied Kennedy's cross-motion. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kennedy's activities constituted the unlicensed practice of pharmacy under the Act, that the Board had regulatory authority over him, and that a permanent injunction was warranted because monetary damages would not adequately protect the public and to avoid repeated litigation. The court also upheld the contempt order and sanctions.

business & regulatoryhealthcarecriminal law

The case involved Dallas Reichmand's conviction on two counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs based on evidence from undercover purchases, including warrantless electronic recordings of conversations with the buyer. After the verdict but before sentencing, Reichmand moved to set aside the verdict citing the Montana Supreme Court's intervening decision in State v. Goetz, which held that such warrantless monitoring violated privacy rights. The district court denied the motion, relying on precedent that limited retroactive application of Goetz to defendants who had raised a similar objection at trial to preserve the issue. On appeal, the court considered whether Goetz applied retroactively to Reichmand's direct appeal despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection, addressing statutory preservation requirements and doctrines allowing review of unpreserved errors.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brooks, the Montana Supreme Court considered an appeal by Daniel Brooks challenging his sentence for felony DUI as a persistent felony offender (PFO) under § 46-18-502, MCA, which added ten years in prison (five suspended) based on a prior 2004 felony conviction for assault with a weapon. Brooks argued that the PFO enhancement violated the Montana Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition (Article II, section 25) and that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing under § 46-13-108(3), MCA, to verify the prior conviction. The court affirmed the sentence, holding that the PFO statute provides for enhanced punishment of repeat offenders without implicating double jeopardy and that Brooks's challenge to the predicate conviction came too late, well after his initial sentencing and appeal. The court clarified that the district court's remand was limited to sentence clarification, not a full resentencing requiring new proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Molenda, the defendant was charged with accountability for criminal endangerment after striking a man who intervened in a fight and requested a jury instruction on assault as a lesser-included offense. The district court denied the request, Molenda entered a plea agreement and was sentenced, and he appealed the denial. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that assault under § 45-5-201(1)(a), MCA, is not a lesser-included offense of criminal endangerment. The court reasoned that under § 46-1-202(9), MCA, assault requires proof of actual bodily injury while criminal endangerment requires only a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, creating a qualitative difference in elements rather than merely a difference in degree of injury, risk, or culpability. Prior cases such as Beavers and Fuqua were applied to confirm that the offenses do not satisfy the statutory criteria for lesser-included status.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Brian Hayden Allen's convictions on two counts of assault with a weapon and one count of criminal endangerment after a jury found he beat Louis Escobedo with a pistol and fired shots in a residential area. Allen appealed the District Court's rulings denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror, his motion to suppress warrantless recordings of his phone conversations with a confidential informant, and his request for an accomplice-testimony jury instruction. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. It held that the District Court erred in denying the challenge for cause and in refusing the requested jury instruction, and further concluded that the warrantless recordings violated Allen's rights to privacy and against unreasonable searches under the Montana Constitution. The court therefore suppressed the recordings and ordered a retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Seiffert, the defendant was convicted of DUI after a single-vehicle accident and appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the state's failure to preserve a casino CCTV recording of him prior to the incident constituted a Brady violation by suppressing exculpatory evidence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that Seiffert failed to show the state deliberately suppressed the recording or that its loss was material to the outcome. The court reasoned that any loss was at most negligent, comparable testimony from witnesses who viewed the recording was available and presented at the hearing, and Seiffert could have obtained the evidence with reasonable diligence before it was erased. The opinion emphasized that the state is not required to assist the defense in gathering evidence and that no due process violation occurred under the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff David Peterman sued Herbalife International and Herbalife of America for breach of contract, alleging that the company had improperly denied him royalties, bonuses, and portions of his downline distributor organization after he became a distributor in 1985. The district court dismissed the action as a sanction for discovery abuses, specifically Peterman's repeated failure to produce his tax returns and other income documents despite multiple requests and his own assurances that he would provide them. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the noncompliance was not inadvertent, deprived the defendants of relevant evidence, and caused a two-year delay that inconvenienced the parties and the court; the court further noted that an explicit warning of sanctions was not required under the rules of civil procedure.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

After a 2003 car accident in which Eleanor and Hugh Monroe were injured while passengers in their vehicle driven by their daughter-in-law, Monroe sued Safeco Insurance and the Cogswell Agency seeking additional underinsured motorist benefits beyond the $480,000 already paid under the policies and alleging negligence by the agency in failing to secure higher coverage limits. The district court granted summary judgment to both defendants. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Safeco on the ground that the policies did not provide additional UIM coverage, but reversed summary judgment for Cogswell, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the agency's potential negligence and its relationship to Safeco, and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Stephen Haffey, convicted in 2007 of felony assault with a weapon and DUI, petitioned for postconviction DNA testing of a blood-stained envelope from the car involved in the incident, arguing that results showing his blood would prove he was the passenger and not the driver. The district court denied the petition under Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-110, finding it failed to meet statutory requirements. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that even if testing were conducted, it would not establish whether Haffey was the perpetrator, as required by the statute, and that the petition was facially unmeritorious. The court also clarified that the district court had not improperly converted the DNA petition into a general postconviction relief action and remanded for any remaining matters under §§ 46-21-101 to -104, MCA.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brownback, the defendant pled guilty to theft by common scheme after receiving forged checks from his mother, who had embezzled $739,312 from the State of Montana and funneled the funds to him to support his gambling addiction; he specifically denied knowledge of the embezzlement from the State. The district court ordered Brownback to pay full restitution to the State, and he appealed, contending that the State was not a victim of his crime, that his ability to pay should have been considered, and that the late filing of the State's sentencing memorandum violated his rights to assert civil defenses and fundamental fairness. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order, holding that the State qualified as a victim entitled to restitution under the applicable statutes, that the specific restitution mandates controlled over general sentencing principles and required full payment without regard to ability to pay at the initial sentencing stage, and that no due process violation occurred because Brownback had declined the district court's offer of a continuance. The court rejected arguments that the hearing procedures were unfair or that civil defenses needed further accommodation in this criminal proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between ex-spouses Amber and John Szafryk over two divorce settlement agreements that divided ownership of dealership property (awarded to Amber) and the car dealership itself (awarded to John), while granting John a limited, non-assignable right to use the property rent-free until 2008. Amber initiated proceedings claiming John violated anti-assignment clauses by transferring an interest in the dealership to a third party, and the district court ruled that this forfeiture terminated John's use rights, requiring him to pay $2,500 monthly rent from June 2006 onward plus attorney's fees. John appealed the rulings on forfeiture, rent liability, the rent amount, and fees. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the agreements' terms were breached, that John retained sufficient interest in the dealership to remain liable, that substantial evidence supported the reasonable rent figure, and that fees were due because Amber prevailed on all issues.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over child custody jurisdiction between Idaho and Montana. After their 1998 divorce in Idaho, the parties' parenting plan for their child was later modified when the mother moved to Montana in 2007. In 2009, the mother petitioned a Montana district court to assume jurisdiction over the custody matter from Idaho and modify the existing plan. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that under the UCCJEA as adopted in Montana, Idaho retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction because it had made the initial custody determination and the father still resided there, so Montana could not modify the plan absent relinquishment by Idaho.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Guill, Douglas Guill was convicted by a jury of five felony counts of sexual misconduct against his adult daughter Sarah, based on allegations of abuse that began when she was a child and continued until she left home at age 22. Guill appealed, claiming the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct, including acts of violence, religious control, and abuse involving other family members. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the disputed evidence was properly admitted either under exceptions to the rule against prior bad acts or as transaction evidence under Montana Code § 26-1-103 because it was inextricably linked to the charged offenses and necessary to provide context for the victim's isolation and the defendant's methods of control. The court concluded that any potential prejudice was mitigated by the trial court's limiting instruction and that the evidence did not render the trial unfair.

criminal lawprocedure

BNSF Railway Company sued the Montana Department of Environmental Quality in Flathead County to challenge the agency's Record of Decision setting a remediation plan for a contaminated site (the KRY site) under the state's Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act. DEQ moved to change venue to Lewis and Clark County, arguing that Flathead County was improper under venue statutes for actions against state agencies and that Lewis and Clark County was more convenient. The district court granted the motion, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the proper venue for such challenges is the county where the state agency decision was made rather than where its effects would be felt. The core reasoning relied on statutory interpretation of §§ 25-2-201 and 2-4-702, MCA, distinguishing between the location of agency action and the site of its operational impact.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Donald Zimmerman, who was convicted in Teton County District Court of maintaining a public nuisance, a misdemeanor, after feeding a large number of feral cats in and around Dutton, Montana, which led to complaints about odor, waste, noise, and property damage from residents. Zimmerman, who also kept indoor pets at the property, received a deferred imposition of sentence that included a condition requiring him to remove those indoor pets from Teton County. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Zimmerman challenged the pet-removal condition as improper. The Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the condition was legal, had a sufficient nexus to the nuisance offense involving cats, was not arbitrary, and satisfied applicable standards of review for sentencing conditions in cases not eligible for Sentence Review Division scrutiny.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether the Montana Child and Family Services Division (CFSD) had authority to issue a substantiated report of child abuse and neglect against Jewel Hanna, a tribal member living on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, after an Indian child placed in her foster care under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children was removed following abuse allegations. The District Court upheld CFSD's jurisdiction, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that a Memorandum of Agreement among the Fort Peck Tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the state granted the licensing agency (CFSD) explicit responsibility to investigate abuse referrals, issue reports, and decide licensing status for homes it had licensed, without assigning that authority to tribal courts. The opinion emphasized that the MOA's plain language controlled over general tribal sovereignty claims in this licensing context and that no criminal conviction barred the administrative process.

family lawfederal powerprocedure