Lee Metcalf

In State v. Simon, the defendant was charged under Montana law with assault by shooting toward Harry Moore with shotguns and rifles during a nighttime incident at Moore's farm, after Moore had confronted a group of boys throwing rocks. A jury convicted the defendant based on ballistic evidence linking shells to guns from the group, Moore's testimony about the shooting, and an officer's account of the defendant's oral admissions that he had been present and fired a gun. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the state failed to prove essential elements including that the weapons were likely to cause grievous bodily harm at the distance fired and that the defendant's connection to the specific weapons was adequately established. The court further reasoned that the conviction could not stand on the uncorroborated testimony regarding the defendant's admissions, given the absence of supporting witnesses who were present and the availability of stronger evidence that was not produced.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over possession of the Western Star Bar in St. Regis, Montana, and associated retail beer and liquor licenses after the Barkers obtained a 1950 judgment against the Monacos confirming their ownership. Because the Barkers could not hold the licenses under Montana law due to their residency, the parties executed multiple instruments on July 14, 1950, including an assignment of the licenses to mortgagee Sears, authorizations for transfer to him, and a lease of the bar premises to Sears for $50 per month; the Barkers later sought to revoke these and lease to defendant Delaney instead. Sears sued for quiet title to the licenses, specific performance of the lease, possession, and damages. The trial court ruled for Sears, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the documents executed together formed a valid, enforceable lease and transfer supported by consideration, with Delaney's later lease giving him no superior rights.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether the City of Helena was bound by a 1950 cooperation agreement with the Helena Housing Authority, a public corporation created under state law, to support a federally funded low-rent housing project of about 60 units. The city council had passed a resolution approving the Authority's preliminary loan application and later signed the agreement, but in 1952 it enacted ordinances attempting to cancel the agreement and revoke the building permit after the Authority had spent funds and incurred liabilities. The court held that the city was required to honor the agreement and issue the permit, ruling the canceling ordinance unconstitutional and void from inception. The reasoning centered on the principle that public officials cannot disclaim knowledge of resolutions they passed, that delay in challenging the contract forfeited any right to rescind, and that reliance by the Authority and federal agency prevented later repudiation.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a defendant charged with corruptly attempting to influence a grand juror through private oral communications, including persuasion and promises of payment, regarding matters under investigation. After conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing among other issues that the trial court had improperly denied a challenge to the jury panel, which had been reduced to 21-23 members through excusals, with several subject to challenge for cause, leaving too few jurors even after peremptory challenges. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury selection process failed to substantially comply with statutes requiring jurors to be drawn from the full qualified pool in the county (jury box No. 1), and that resort to jury box No. 3 was not justified by the statutory emergency of great delay or expense; this deviation denied the defendant's right to an impartial jury selected according to law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a 12-year-old boy injured while playing on a manually operated passenger elevator inside the defendant's grain elevator building; the elevator, used by employees to access grain bins, rose unexpectedly due to counterweights and then fell after a rope broke. The plaintiff's guardian ad litem sued on theories of attractive nuisance (two counts) and premises liability as an invitee or licensee (third count). The trial court sustained the defendant's general demurrer and dismissed the case, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed as to the first two counts and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the complaint's allegations—that the defendant knew or should have known the elevator was attractive and dangerous to children, that children had played on it, and that it posed an unreasonable risk—were sufficient to state a claim under the attractive nuisance doctrine as defined by prior Montana cases and the Restatement of Torts. The third count was properly dismissed because it failed to allege facts showing the boy was an invitee acting for the defendant's benefit rather than a licensee.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned whether Montana real property purchased with California community property funds was subject to Montana inheritance tax upon the death of a California resident who willed his entire estate to his wife. The wife, as executrix, argued that under California community property law she held a vested one-half interest in the Montana assets prior to her husband's death, so that portion did not pass by succession and was not taxable. The Montana Supreme Court held that the law of the situs controls the incidence of inheritance tax and that the wife's interest under California law was not a vested ownership interest that removed the property from Montana's tax statutes; therefore the entire value of the Montana estate was taxable. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for calculation of the tax due on the full amount.

taxesfamily lawproperty

This case involved an appeal by the State of Montana from a district court order fixing inheritance tax on the estate of C.H. Marsh, specifically regarding 15 Series E and G U.S. Savings Bonds valued at $45,842 that were held in co-ownership by the decedent and his surviving wife. The district court ruled that only half the value of the bonds was subject to tax, reasoning that the long marriage and joint accumulation of the property created a tenancy by the entirety. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Married Women's Act eliminated common-law tenancies by the entirety, that the bonds were not jointly held property under R.C.M. 1947 sec. 91-4405, and that the transfer was instead taxable under sec. 91-4402 as one intended to take effect at or after death. The court remanded for further evidence on whether the bonds were transferred in contemplation of death or retained by the decedent until then. The opinion also addressed related bonds held with the couple's children but focused primarily on the spousal co-ownership issue.

taxespropertyfamily law

This case concerned whether inheritance taxes were due on the transfer of real property, promissory notes, and other assets held in joint tenancy by Ethel L. Hanson and her surviving husband at the time of her death in 1949. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling that no tax was owed, holding that taxes applied to the decedent's one-half interest in the jointly owned real estate and notes under R.C.M. 1947, section 91-4405. The court reasoned that the statutory exception from taxation applies only when the survivor can show the property originally belonged to them prior to creation of the joint tenancy, which was not established here even though the husband supplied the purchase funds. It affirmed the lower court as to the nontaxability of the joint bank account and remanded for further proceedings on the furniture.

taxesproperty

This case involves an original proceeding in which the state sought to vacate a district court order suppressing evidence in a criminal prosecution of John P. Phillips for receiving stolen property. The Montana Supreme Court held that Judge George W. Padbury, Jr. lacked authority to hear and decide the defendant's motion to suppress, because the case had been properly assigned to Department No. 1 under Judge A. J. Horsky and no formal transfer order had been entered. The court reasoned that R.C.M. 1947 section 93-321 and the district court's own rules for apportioning business between departments are binding, that the case number and initial filing placed the matter in Department No. 1, and that local custom or informal agreement could not override those rules when a party insisted on their observance. All proceedings before Judge Padbury were therefore declared void.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Montana Meat Company, which held a chattel mortgage on cattle sold by a rancher through Missoula Livestock Auction Company without the mortgagee's consent. Montana Meat sued the auction company for conversion of two calves after the rancher received the proceeds, arguing that county recording of the mortgage or a mailed letter provided sufficient notice. The trial court ruled for the auction company on both causes of action, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The core reasoning was that a 1949 statutory amendment required specific filing of livestock mortgage notices with the state recorder of marks and brands to hold markets liable, and neither county filing nor actual notice could substitute for that requirement under the legislature's intent to protect regulated livestock markets. The court held that markets could rely solely on the statutory notice system due to their volume of sales and public utility status.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over real property in Missoula County that plaintiff Nick Campanello had occupied and improved for years; he paid defendant Sam Mercer $200 to purchase the land at a 1937 tax sale on his behalf, but Mercer arranged for title to be taken in the names of others, including his wife, while Campanello continued to live on and farm the land and make payments toward taxes. The trial court found that a resulting trust arose in Campanello's favor under Montana statute because he had advanced the purchase money, and it quieted title in his favor for the portion of the property he claimed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a resulting trust is created by operation of law, is not subject to the Statute of Frauds, and cannot be defeated by placing title in intermediaries when the defendant exercised control and notice could be imputed. The court rejected defenses based on the Statute of Limitations and lack of direct title in Mercer, and it upheld the trial court's factual findings on the specific land description after reviewing conflicting evidence.

property

The case involved a dispute between the administrators of the estates of John J. Scullin and Genevieve Taylor Scullin over 100 shares of American Power & Light Company stock that Mrs. Scullin had owned prior to her marriage. Mrs. Scullin had executed a separate written assignment purporting to transfer the shares to her husband, but the unendorsed certificate was found after their deaths in a jointly accessible safety deposit box, with no evidence that it had ever been delivered to Mr. Scullin. The administrator of Mr. Scullin's estate sued to recover the certificate under the assignment. The court held that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which governs such transfers, requires both delivery of the separate assignment and delivery of the stock certificate itself to effect a valid transfer of legal title, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove any such delivery of the certificate or relinquishment of dominion by Mrs. Scullin. The judgment in favor of Mr. Scullin's estate was therefore reversed with instructions to dismiss the action.

property

This case involved a taxpayer's petition seeking to enjoin Lewis and Clark County from further spending public funds on a grand jury convened in July 1949, on the grounds that the jury's authority expired at the end of the court term. The Montana Supreme Court held that the grand jury was discharged by operation of law upon the final adjournment of the June 1949 term on September 11, 1949, when the September term began, rendering any continued proceedings invalid under state statute. The court reasoned that Montana law, consistent with common-law principles, requires a grand jury to be discharged at the end of the term for which it was called whether or not its business is complete, and that the district court's order purporting to keep the court perpetually in session did not alter this mandatory rule. It therefore issued a peremptory writ halting further expenditures related to the expired grand jury.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by defendant Roger Porter to 16 indictments returned by a grand jury in Lewis and Clark County, Montana. Porter sought a writ of prohibition after a special prosecutor appeared before the grand jury, arguing that the indictments were invalid under state statutes limiting participation to the county attorney or authorized assistants. The Montana Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the unauthorized presence of the special prosecutor violated mandatory procedural requirements in section 94-6601, R.C.M. 1947, and that such a violation requires setting aside the indictments without a showing of prejudice. The court reasoned that penal statutes must be strictly construed and that the grand jury process demands exclusive adherence to legislative rules on who may participate. The decision allows the cases to be resubmitted to the county attorney or another grand jury for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the validity of an order by the Montana liquor control board prohibiting most outdoor electric, illuminated, or billboard advertising of beer starting in 1950. The plaintiff, a beer wholesaler, obtained a declaratory judgment from the trial court striking down the order, but the Supreme Court of Montana reversed. The court held that the State Liquor Control Act and Montana Beer Act must be read together; the original 1933 statutes treated beer as liquor and banned its billboard advertising except on brewery premises, and the 1949 amendment separating beer from the definition of liquor did not repeal that prohibition. Applying the principle that a statute authorizing an act in one manner implies it may not be done otherwise, the court concluded the board had statutory authority to issue the order and directed dismissal of the complaint.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether proceeds from three matured endowment insurance policies, which the decedent Catherine Harper had left with the insurer under an optional settlement paying monthly interest with the principal going to contingent beneficiaries at her death, were exempt from Montana inheritance tax as insurance under R.C.M. 1947 section 91-4406. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the trial court's ruling that exempted the proceeds, holding instead that they must be included in the estate and taxed. The court reasoned that the contracts were not annuities (distinguishing In re Fligman's Estate) but rather equivalent to an investment at interest once the endowment matured and the option was exercised, making the transfer one intended to take effect at or after death.

taxesproperty

The case involved a taxpayer suing to enjoin the City of Deer Lodge from issuing $40,000 in general obligation bonds to cover its share of costs for widening and paving Main Street under a federal-aid highway project. The Montana Supreme Court ruled that the city lacked authority to issue such bonds for street improvements. The court reasoned that municipalities hold only powers expressly granted by statute, the bonding authority listed in the relevant code sections does not include street paving or widening, and the legislature instead provided an exclusive financing method through special improvement districts that can assess benefited properties.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved an action for specific performance of a contract to sell real property, where plaintiffs sought to purchase both corporate lands from the Willow Creek Sheep Company and adjacent private lands owned by the individual Elliot defendants. The defendants had executed a power of attorney authorizing W.B. Elliot to sell their lands at $5 per acre contingent on the corporate sale, and they later signed a consent to the overall transaction terms; however, some defendants attempted to revoke the power of attorney before a formal contract was executed. The court affirmed the decree ordering specific performance, reasoning that the power of attorney combined with the related agreements satisfied the statute of frauds by identifying the parties, terms, and consideration; the corporate lands were sold as required to trigger the obligation; and the revocation was ineffective because it occurred after the contract was formed on May 29, 1947.

property

This case concerned a collateral attack on a 1940 probate court order confirming the private sale of real estate from the estate of John J. Sontag to satisfy debts and administration costs. The minor heirs (appellants) argued that the notice of sale was not published in compliance with statutory timing requirements and that no attorney had been appointed to represent them, rendering the administrator's deed and subsequent conveyances void. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the decree quieting title in the plaintiffs, holding that jurisdiction had attached upon proper service of the order to show cause and that any defects in the subsequent notice of sale constituted mere irregularities that could not be challenged collaterally. The court further reasoned that the statute governing appointment of counsel for minor heirs vested discretion in the probate court and expressly provided that non-appointment did not invalidate the proceedings.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case concerned an application for a writ of certiorari to review a district court's adjudication holding Roger Porter and his attorney Stanley M. Doyle in contempt of court. The contempt finding arose after Porter, represented by Doyle, filed a civil complaint against a special prosecutor and members of a grand jury investigating Porter; the complaint included numerous defamatory and irrelevant allegations about the grand jurors and prosecutor, which the county attorney alleged were intended to interfere with the grand jury's duties. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the certified record, including motions to quash and evidence of Porter's reliance on counsel, and ultimately dismissed the contempt proceedings as to both relators. The core reasoning was that while the complaint's scandalous content could constitute interference with the administration of justice, Porter's lack of legal knowledge and reliance on attorney advice warranted dismissal, with the matter treated as one in mitigation.

criminal lawprocedure