James C. Nelson

The case concerned a challenge to Legislative Referendum No. 119 (LR-119), which proposed changing the election of Montana Supreme Court justices from statewide to a district-based system requiring justices to reside and vote in their districts, with the chief justice selected by the other justices. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order directing the Secretary of State to decertify LR-119 and remove it from the June 2012 primary ballot. The court held that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge was justiciable, that LR-119 impermissibly amended the Montana Constitution by adding qualifications for office not present in the constitution, and that the offending provisions could not be severed from the measure. No recusal of non-retiring justices was required.

electionscivil rights

The case involved Tristeana Johnson appealing her conviction for criminal possession of marijuana after a traffic stop where she was found with less than an ounce of the substance and admitted recent use, despite possessing a valid Montana medical marijuana card. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that the Medical Marijuana Act (MMA) did not shield her from prosecution because she had not obtained the marijuana from her registered caregiver. The court reasoned that the MMA's language is clear and unambiguous in requiring that protected possession come from the designated caregiver, and evidence from the caregiver confirmed he had not supplied it. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction under the applicable statutes.

criminal lawhealthcare

This case involved a dispute over an access easement on property in Lincoln County, Montana, where the Nielsens sued Hornsteiner for installing a locked gate and debris that interfered with their use of the easement. After Hornsteiner failed to timely respond to the complaint, the district court entered default against him and later denied his motion to set it aside, finding he had not presented a meritorious defense despite admitting the easement's existence and the obstructions. The court also awarded the Nielsens attorney's fees, which Hornsteiner did not timely object to under local rules. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default because Hornsteiner offered no reasonable explanation for the obstructions as required by easement law, and that he had waived any objection to the fee award by failing to raise it properly before the district court.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Melton, the defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sexual or violent offender under Montana law after prior convictions in Washington for rape of a child and bail jumping, and he received a two-year suspended sentence. The district court imposed probation conditions (14 and 15) barring Melton from unsupervised contact with minors under 18 (except his own children) or from visiting places where children typically gather, unless accompanied by an approved trained adult and with prior probation officer approval. Melton appealed, arguing the conditions were not reasonably related to rehabilitation or public safety and unduly burdened his parental rights and freedom of movement. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the restrictions were justified by Melton’s history of sexual offending, failure to complete treatment, and repeated noncompliance with registration requirements, consistent with precedents such as State v. Malloy, and noting that modification remains available if circumstances change.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute between Raleigh Kraft and used car dealer Mitchell Rider and his company High Country Motors over a verbal agreement to purchase and resell a motor coach, where Kraft alleged breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related claims after discovering Rider had concealed the lower actual purchase price. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed appeals from a default judgment entered against the defendants as a discovery sanction for failing to produce financial and tax records despite court orders, along with challenges to damages calculations and a cross-appeal on prejudgment interest. The court affirmed the default judgment sanction and denial of motions to set it aside, reversed the district court's damages calculation, and held that Kraft was entitled to statutory prejudgment interest at 10 percent because the monetary obligation was certain or calculable and vested on a particular day. It remanded for further proceedings on damages and interest calculation.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case arose from a single-vehicle accident in which Casey Stuivenga and Britni Evans were injured; each claimed the other was driving Stuivenga's insured truck and sought the $25,000 per-person liability limit under his Progressive policy. Progressive filed an interpleader action, deposited the funds with the court, and asked the district court to decide the rightful recipient. A jury determined that Evans had been the driver, after which the district court denied Evans's motion for a new trial and ordered the funds released to Stuivenga. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court first held the appeal was not moot because the underlying dispute over liability and entitlement to the proceeds remained live. It then affirmed the denial of a new trial, concluding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion when it found no improper argument or facts not in evidence during closing statements.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerns whether Clarence Grande, a long-haul propane truck driver, suffers from a compensable occupational disease due to his job duties at City Service Valcon. The Montana State Fund appealed a Workers’ Compensation Court ruling that Grande’s tasks—such as handling heavy hoses, shifting an 18-gear truck, and installing chains—were the major contributing cause of his osteoarthritis. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the evidence, including expert medical testimony, established the employment activities as the leading cause of the condition in relation to other factors like family history. As a result, Grande is entitled to temporary total disability and medical benefits. The court declined to address secondary issues on benefits and costs after affirming the threshold compensability finding.

labor & employment

The case involved the City of Cut Bank appealing the dismissal of criminal charges against Rhonda Joyce Hall for obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and assault with a bodily fluid. After a jury trial in city court, Hall appealed to district court for a de novo trial, where the court dismissed the case for insufficient evidence at the close of the City's case. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed the City's appeal with prejudice, holding that the dismissal constituted an acquittal under double jeopardy principles from precedents like State v. Cool, preventing retrial or appeal by the prosecution regardless of whether the dismissal was correct.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Cameron, the defendant was convicted of DUI after a deputy sheriff stopped his vehicle for repeatedly drifting toward and touching the centerline on a Friday night near bar closing time, leading to a breath test showing a blood alcohol content of 0.155. Cameron moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop lacked particularized suspicion under Montana law and constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures. The Justice Court denied the motion, the District Court affirmed, and the Montana Supreme Court upheld those rulings. The court reasoned that under the totality of circumstances, the officer's observations of the vehicle's movements, combined with the time of day and the officer's experience with DUIs, provided objective facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of impairment, even without observing a specific traffic violation. The decision relied on precedents emphasizing that particularized suspicion is evaluated objectively and does not require ruling out all innocent explanations beforehand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Miles Kingman, who was convicted of assault after a late-night altercation outside a Bozeman bar in which he repeatedly punched an unarmed man, causing life-threatening facial injuries. Kingman appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that pretrial publicity created presumed prejudice requiring a change of venue and that the prosecutor's sentencing arguments violated his right to dignity under the Montana Constitution. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings on both issues. It held that the publicity did not meet the threshold for presumed prejudice and that the prosecutor's remarks, even if intemperate, did not affect the sentencing decision, which rested on permissible factors such as the offense's severity, the defendant's history, and community safety. The court declined to adopt a rule requiring resentencing whenever improper prosecutorial arguments occur without influencing the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

Ray Williams sued Plum Creek Timber Company for wrongful discharge after being reassigned to another mill based on a pre-transfer evaluation form and then terminated during a probationary period for not meeting performance standards in a new role. The district court granted summary judgment to Plum Creek, finding good cause for the termination. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether the evaluation form was part of the company's written personnel policy, whether it was applied consistently, and whether any violation was linked to the discharge. The court reasoned that summary judgment is inappropriate when reasonable persons could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence about policy compliance and the connection between the demotion and termination.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a dispute between neighboring landowners in Montana over whether Yellowstone River, LLC holds an easement by necessity across Meriwether's property to access its own landlocked parcel. The properties trace their origins to 19th-century federal land grants to railroads, which separated the parcels and left Yellowstone River's section without direct public road access. The district court granted summary judgment to Meriwether, ruling that no easement by necessity existed. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the result, concluding that although unity of title was present at the time of severance, the strict necessity requirement failed because the United States retained eminent domain power, and Congress's specific reservations in the grants showed no intent to imply an access easement. The court further noted that implied easements are disfavored and creating one here would conflict with federal precedent while affecting many other titles.

propertyfederal power

In State v. Chesterfield, the defendant was convicted of felony DUI as a fourth offense and appealed, collaterally attacking his three prior DUI convictions from the 1980s and 1990s on the ground that they were constitutionally infirm due to denial of the right to counsel. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Chesterfield failed to meet his burden of production and persuasion to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to the prior convictions. The court reasoned that the defendant's self-serving affidavits, which did not clearly show a lack of knowing waiver of counsel, were insufficient, and that he had not made the required prima facie showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that the legislature had eliminated remoteness as a consideration for fourth or subsequent DUI offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

In Myers v. Dee, Gary Myers sought to exercise eminent domain under Montana Code Annotated § 70-30-102(36) to condemn a private road across the Dees' property for access to his own landlocked parcel, which contained old, uninhabited buildings. The district court granted summary judgment to the Dees, finding no qualifying residence on Myers' land. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undefined statutory term "residence" must be given its plain meaning as a habitable dwelling where people live, based on dictionary definitions and prior precedent. Because it was undisputed that the buildings had been uninhabitable for decades with no one living there, the court concluded Myers could not invoke eminent domain, and the factual questions of residence and necessity did not require jury resolution in the absence of any genuine dispute.

property

The Steadeles sued their home builder MCHC for negligence and contract breaches in constructing a modular home, obtained a default judgment after MCHC failed to respond, and then filed suit against Colony Insurance to collect on that judgment under MCHC's commercial general liability policy. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Colony, ruling that Colony had no obligation to pay because MCHC never notified Colony of the Steadeles' claim as required by the policy. The court reasoned that the policy expressly conditioned any right to sue the insurer on full compliance with all terms, including notice provisions, and that MCHC's complete failure to notify Colony for months after being served deprived the insurer of any opportunity to defend or investigate. The decision emphasized that the policy language applied to third-party claimants seeking to recover on a judgment against the insured.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Spaulding, the defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor DUI per se but reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop. A deputy observed her vehicle abruptly pull over on a remote dirt road at 1:25 a.m. in cold weather and stopped behind it to conduct a welfare check, citing possible car trouble, a lost driver, or mechanical issues, though he had no suspicion of any crime. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, ruling that the community caretaker doctrine applied because the deputy's observations provided objective, specific, and articulable facts suggesting the occupants might need help.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Chaussee, the defendant was charged with felony DUI based on three prior convictions and moved to dismiss, claiming two of those convictions (from 1997 and 1999) were invalid because he had not knowingly waived his right to counsel. The district court denied the motion, Chaussee pleaded guilty while reserving the right to appeal, and the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the ruling de novo. The Court held that Chaussee failed to meet his burden of producing affirmative evidence showing the prior convictions were constitutionally infirm, as the mere absence of records documenting a valid waiver does not overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments. It therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and clarified that any request for an evidentiary hearing requires a prima facie showing of invalidity.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the Larsens filed a quiet title action in Montana district court seeking ownership of a 26.96-acre parcel of land, while the Richardsons counterclaimed that they owned the northern 9.74 acres outright or, alternatively, held a prescriptive easement over part of the property based on historical use and boundary interpretations from deeds and surveys. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the Larsens owned the entire parcel and that no prescriptive easement existed, though it partially denied the Larsens' request for attorney fees and certain costs. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the rulings on ownership and the absence of an easement, finding that the district court's conclusions were supported by the evidence from conflicting surveys and deed descriptions. The court reversed only on the denial of costs under state statute for reasonable expenses of supplemental maps and surveys prepared for trial, remanding for further determination of those amounts.

property

This case involved a dispute between Colstrip Energy Limited Partnership (CELP) and Northwestern Corporation over the calculation of rates for electricity sales under a 1984 power purchase agreement as amended in 1988, which incorporated specific variables from Montana Public Service Commission orders implementing the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). After Northwestern claimed overpayments for contract years 16 and 17 and sought to offset more than $1 million, CELP sued for breach of contract and other claims, seeking about $22 million in damages. The district court compelled arbitration, where the panel ruled for Northwestern, and then denied CELP's motion to vacate the award. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers or manifestly disregard Montana law, as there was no record evidence they ignored a clearly governing legal principle, and the district court thus properly confirmed the award under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-312.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

In Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, neighbors and a neighborhood association challenged the Missoula City Council's approval of zoning and a preliminary plat for a 37-lot subdivision called Sonata Park in the Rattlesnake Valley, arguing the decisions violated the city's growth policy. The district court ruled that the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to substantially comply with the growth policy and set the approvals aside. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city's actions did not meet the statutory requirements under §§ 76-1-605(1) and 76-2-304(1)(a), MCA, because the record did not demonstrate consideration of all relevant factors in the Rattlesnake Valley plan, such as density, neighborhood compatibility, and environmental impacts. The court also rejected arguments that a 1989 agreement superseded the growth policy and confirmed that neighbors had standing to sue.

environmentpropertybusiness & regulatory