John C. Sheehy

In Spencer v. Ukra, plaintiff Shirley Spencer sued defendants B.J. Ukra and associates, a California-based business management and tax consulting firm, in Montana state court, and the defendants were served in California. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction under Montana's long-arm statute, finding exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendants had made a general appearance by filing a motion to set aside a default judgment and a notice of appearance without raising or preserving any objection to personal jurisdiction. Because this initial general appearance submitted the defendants to the court's jurisdiction and waived defects in service, the dismissal was improper.

procedure

The case involved a dispute between property owner Richard Sharon and holders of an irrigation ditch easement across his land, where Sharon sought to enjoin the defendants from using heavy equipment, constructing a roadway along the ditch, and installing gates, claiming unreasonable burden on his servient tenement, while also requesting attorney fees under Montana Code § 70-17-112. The defendants counterclaimed for adjudication of their secondary easement rights under the same statute and for attorney fees. The district court ruled entirely in favor of the defendants, recognizing their secondary easement along the east bank for maintenance and access, denying the injunction and damages, and ordering each party to bear their own costs. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the defendants, as the prevailing party who successfully enforced their easement rights against impairment, were entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees under § 70-17-112(5), MCA, including on appeal, reversing the district court's denial of fees. The core reasoning was that the defendants enforced subsections (1) and (2) of the statute by obtaining judicial confirmation of their pre-existing secondary easement rights to inspect, repair, and maintain the ditch.

property

The case involved Barbara Martin, an employee terminated by Special Resource Management, Inc. (a subsidiary of Entech and Montana Power Company) as part of a workforce reduction, though her position was later filled by another employee. Martin sued for wrongful discharge, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on the covenant claim, holding that it was preempted by the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, which took effect on July 1, 1987, because Martin's termination became effective after that date. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the cause of action accrued upon Martin's receipt of notice of termination on June 16, 1987—before the Act's effective date—because that is when the alleged breach occurred and all elements of the claim were present, allowing the claim to proceed under prior law.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Leon Cline sued Leo Durden for negligence after a head-on snowmobile collision on a trail in the Little Belt Mountains, and Durden counterclaimed; the central factual dispute was which driver had crossed into the other's right-of-way. The jury found Cline solely at fault and awarded Durden $737,223 in damages. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in admitting the investigating deputy's opinion testimony on causation, related exhibits from Forest Service employees, Durden's medical records, or in refusing several of Cline's proposed jury instructions and special verdict form. The court reasoned that the deputy had sufficient training in accident reconstruction, that other evidence and instructions adequately covered the issues, and that any procedural omissions did not prejudice Cline. The judgment for Durden was therefore upheld.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves the dissolution of a 25-year marriage between Edgar and Charlotte Scott, focusing on the equitable distribution of marital assets including real estate, retirement plans, and personal property, as well as a request for maintenance. The Montana Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court failed to properly determine the net worth of the marital estate, particularly regarding the valuation of Edgar's pension plan and other assets. The court reasoned that under Montana law, an equitable property division must precede any maintenance award, and without accurate net worth calculations, such decisions cannot be properly made. Issues like the disposition of the family home and Charlotte's inheritance were also raised but tied back to the need for proper valuation.

family lawproperty

The case involved the Montana Department of Revenue's attempt to revise assessments of mine net proceeds taxes owed by Kaiser Cement Corporation for tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985, following an audit that increased the reported values from negative or zero amounts to several hundred thousand dollars each year. Kaiser had sold its cement plant and quarry operations before the revised assessments were issued, and the State Tax Appeal Board granted Kaiser summary judgment on the ground that §15-8-601, MCA, limits reassessments to property still under the ownership or control of the same person. The District Court reversed that ruling and remanded for a decision on the merits, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's order.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

This case was an election contest over the Democratic primary nomination for Carbon County Attorney in Montana, where a recount after the June 5, 1990 election resulted in a tie between Gary Spaeth and Tony Kendall, who then won by lot drawing. Spaeth petitioned for judicial review, arguing that one disputed ballot marked in the County Attorney race should have been counted for him. The district court dismissed the petition and declared Kendall the nominee, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the ballot's markings did not clearly indicate the voter's intent under state law, as the instructions required completely blackening an oval and the partial marks were ambiguous without speculation, consistent with precedents requiring plain expression of voter choice for a ballot or portion to be counted.

electionsprocedure

In State of Arizona v. Sasse, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a paternity action transferred from Arizona under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, seeking to establish that Alan Sasse was the natural father of a child born in 1975 to a mother then married to another man. The District Court rejected Sasse's statute of limitations defense under § 40-6-108(1)(b), MCA, and entered judgment declaring him the father. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that the five-year limitations period for rebutting a presumption of paternity was unconstitutional, as it created an impermissible classification between children with statutorily presumed fathers and those without presumed fathers. The court found this distinction violated equal protection because it was not substantially related to important state interests such as preventing stale claims or promoting family stability.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns a property dispute in which Dan Rasmussen sought continued access across Phillip Fowler's land via the McFadgeon Road to reach his farm and a state agricultural leasehold. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment that Rasmussen and his predecessors had acquired prescriptive easements, including a commercial easement in gross for farming purposes, an easement appurtenant benefiting agricultural lessees, and a public easement, based on more than forty years of open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use. The court applied the five-year statutory period under Section 70-19-401, MCA, and found the record showed adverse rather than permissive use, while upholding the lower court's denial of punitive damages and attorney fees as not clearly erroneous.

property

In Armstrong v. State, Dept. of Justice, the petitioner appealed the denial of his request to reinstate his driver's license after it was suspended for refusing a breathalyzer test following an arrest for driving under the influence. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the implied consent suspension requires the arresting officer to have had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was under the influence, which was lacking here due to the conceded absence of basis for the initial vehicle stop. The court reasoned that under Montana statutes, the review of license suspension is limited to whether reasonable grounds existed for the belief of DUI, arrest, and refusal, and without reasonable grounds for the stop, the suspension could not stand, though it clarified this does not affect lawful stops.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a legal malpractice suit brought by All West Equipment and the Stotts against their former attorney Raymond Fox. The plaintiffs alleged that Fox negligently stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of a bank's deficiency judgment action without explaining how it would bar their separate lender liability claims against the bank for fraud, bad faith, and improper collateral sale. After the Montana Supreme Court had previously dismissed those claims against the bank as barred by the stipulation, the plaintiffs sued Fox; the district court granted summary judgment to Fox. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the bank had acted reasonably and in good faith under the UCC and the parties' agreements when it called the loans after default and repossessed collateral, so the plaintiffs could not have prevailed on their underlying claims even without the stipulation.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a real estate brokerage firm suing property owners for a commission allegedly due under a listing agreement after the owners rejected a purchase offer that the broker claimed met the contract terms. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of prosecution due to delays in service and inactivity. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reasoning that the delays did not justify involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), as the case was ready for trial on a legal issue, no prior warning had been given, and less severe measures like issuing a scheduling order were available.

procedureproperty

Karyn Ann Bain sued Larry Williams, Brian Cloutier, and State Medical Services to collect the unpaid balance on a $370,000 promissory note the defendants had executed in 1983. The note arose from Bain's agreement to transfer her security interest in half the stock of Montana Medical Oxygen and Supply, Inc., which she had received in a divorce settlement; the defendants later halted payments, claiming the note was conditioned on their purchase of the company from Bain's ex-husband, which never occurred. The district court consolidated the case with the defendants' declaratory judgment action, found the purpose of the note frustrated, and rescinded the contract. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the note contained no such contingency on its face, that Bain had provided consideration by surrendering her security interest, and that the defendants therefore remained obligated to pay the balance due. The court remanded for calculation of damages and attorney fees.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a class action by 152 former employees of Decker Coal Company who were discharged after an alleged strike misconduct, following the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement; they sued under Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act after filing charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding the state Act inapplicable due to an exemption for disputes subject to other state or federal statutes providing remedies. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exemption under § 39-2-912, MCA, does not yet apply because the NLRB has not filed a complaint or initiated proceedings, and the expired collective bargaining agreement does not trigger the exemption; it stayed the state proceedings pending NLRB action. The court also ruled that the notice of appeal using "Larry Deeds, et al." was sufficient to perfect the appeal for all plaintiffs under Montana appellate rules.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned the Montana Department of Revenue's use of stratified sales assessment ratio studies to adjust property valuations for tax year 1990, particularly as applied to respondent Patricia Barron's property in Great Falls, after the State Tax Appeal Board ruled the method unconstitutional under the state constitution's requirements for uniform appraisal and equalization. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the DOR's implementation of the studies violated constitutional mandates for proper valuation and equalization of property taxes. The court issued a declaratory judgment invalidating the studies but stayed the ruling's effect until December 31, 1990, for all affected properties except those already under appeal, to prevent disruption of tax collections and government functions while allowing the legislature time to address the issues. The decision emphasized the state's duty under Article VIII of the Montana Constitution to appraise and equalize property values in a manner provided by law, and it treated the proceeding as one for declaratory relief due to impending tax deadlines.

taxesproperty

The case involved condominium unit owners at Deer Lodge Condominiums suing Big Sky of Montana, Inc., Boyne USA, Inc., Realty entities, shareholders like Montana Power Company and General Electric Pension Trust, and the State of Montana for damages from two 1981 fires allegedly caused by construction defects such as fireplace deficiencies. The District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the owners' claims were barred by the statute of limitations, as they knew or should have known of the defects by 1976 based on notifications and a related prior lawsuit, with collateral estoppel applying to most plaintiffs and the discovery rule not extending the time period further; the four plaintiffs not in the prior case were similarly time-barred with no other viable liability theories.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Montana Code Annotated section 13-10-503, which bars a candidate defeated in a party primary from running as an independent in the general election, is constitutional. After losing the Democratic primary for Dawson County Attorney, Richard Simonton filed to run as an independent; the county election administrator rejected the filing under the statute, but the district court granted declaratory relief, held the statute unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Montana Constitution, and ordered Simonton's name placed on the November ballot. The Montana Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction via supervisory control, reversed the district court, and directed that Simonton's name be removed. The Court concluded that the statutory deadline and prohibition are valid exercises of legislative authority over ballot access that do not violate equal protection or associational rights.

electionsfree speechcivil rights

In Tigart v. Thompson, plaintiffs sued defendant Thompson for negligence after a 1985 truck accident on icy Montana roads, claiming his actions forced their vehicle into a ditch. After trial revealed that Thompson's insurer Safeco had withheld a recorded statement inconsistent with the defense theory, the district court granted plaintiffs a new trial and awarded them attorney fees and costs under MCA § 37-61-421 for unreasonably multiplying proceedings. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Safeco's nondisclosure despite discovery requests was unreasonable and vexatious, justifying sanctions against the insurer because it controlled the litigation. The court held that statutory liability for excess fees and costs arises directly from the multiplication of proceedings, independent of any contingency fee agreements between plaintiffs and their attorneys.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the distribution of Montana workers' compensation death benefits following the on-the-job death of Richard Gaither, who was survived by his widow Laurie from a second marriage and two children from his first marriage who had been adopted by their mother's new husband. The Workers' Compensation Court initially ruled that the widow could not waive benefits as a matter of public policy and that the children qualified only as stepchildren entitled to shares vesting upon the widow's death or remarriage, but later modified its order to divide benefits equally among the three. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the widow could legally waive or abandon her entitlement, that the children qualified as the widow's stepchildren and thus as beneficiaries under the statute, and that the benefits must be divided equally among the surviving spouse and stepchildren so each receives one-third. The court reasoned that the relevant statutes define beneficiaries to include a surviving spouse and an unmarried child under 18 (including stepchildren under common meaning), require equal division among them, and vest personal rights in each beneficiary upon the proper filing of a claim, such that one beneficiary's waiver does not alter the shares of the others.

labor & employmentfamily law

In State v. Hall, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felony sexual assault against a six-year-old girl in a public library. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after reviewing four issues raised on appeal, including denial of a speedy trial motion, admission of the defendant's statement, refusal of a jury instruction on eyewitness identification, and allowance of expert testimony regarding the victim's identification ability. The court determined that the trial court did not err in any of these rulings, particularly finding the expert testimony admissible under Montana Rules of Evidence Rule 702 as it assisted the jury on the issue of identity without the experts identifying the perpetrator themselves.

criminal lawprocedure