John Warner

This case involved a dispute over stock ownership, loans, and financial obligations in Siegle, Inc., a Montana dairy farm corporation formed by Wilhelm Siegle, with claims by his son David Siegle and neighbor Sanford Helmuth regarding share transfers, promissory notes, and alleged wrongful actions. The district court had voided certain shares issued to Helmuth, ordered transfers back to an estate, found actual fraud supporting punitive damages, and required David Siegle to repay over $117,000 to the corporation, while denying attorney fees. The Montana Supreme Court reversed most of these rulings, holding that the district court erred in interpreting a stock transfer agreement as a mere pledge, in voiding stock issuances without proper basis, in finding fraud, and in ordering repayment of debts discharged in bankruptcy; it affirmed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings on remaining issues like share valuation and debt amounts.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing a tavern under Montana's Dram Shop Act for damages from a car accident caused by an intoxicated patron who had been served alcohol there. The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs did not provide the required notice of intent to sue within 180 days under § 27-1-710(6), MCA. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting claims that the notice provision was unconstitutional special legislation under Article V, Section 12, or a violation of equal protection under Article II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution. The court reasoned that statutes are presumed constitutional, the provision creates a reasonable classification for dram shop claims, and the plaintiffs failed to show it lacked a rational basis or applied unequally.

torts & liabilitycivil rights

Delaney & Company sued the City of Bozeman alleging constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage after the city purchased land that Delaney had been negotiating to acquire and develop into an industrial park that could include a waste transfer station. As a sanction for discovery abuse, the district court ruled the city liable to Delaney, and following a jury trial on damages the court entered a $3,000,000 judgment for lost profits. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the statutory $750,000 governmental liability cap did not apply, that the liability sanction included causation, and that the jury instructions and expert testimony regarding lost profits were not erroneous.

torts & liabilityproperty

John Talmage, owner of an aircraft maintenance and fueling business next to the Kalispell City Airport, sued the City of Kalispell and its Airport Advisory Board after the city built a security fence with a 48-foot gate that Talmage claimed restricted access to his property, which was subject to a deed restriction limiting its use to airport operations. Talmage alleged unreasonable interference with an easement, tortious interference with business prospects, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to the city, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether the gate provided reasonable access and whether the city's actions, including removal of a taxiway, tortiously interfered with Talmage's business and easement. The court applied de novo review under M. R. Civ. P. 56 and determined that evidence from Talmage's affidavits and documented incidents raised factual disputes precluding summary judgment.

propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a grandmother's petition for primary custody and parenting rights over her two grandchildren following their father's death and temporary state involvement with their mother due to health issues. The mother moved to dismiss, arguing the grandmother lacked standing under Montana law because no ongoing dependency proceeding existed, and later challenged the alternative request for grandparent visitation. The district court dismissed the custody petition but granted limited court-ordered contact with the children, and it denied the mother's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing, upheld the visitation order as consistent with statutory requirements for grandparent contact, and affirmed the denial of fees, finding no error in the lower court's handling of the proceedings despite partial dissents on the visitation and sanctions issues.

family law

This case involved the dissolution of a common-law marriage between Delia Kelly and Joseph Thompson and the division of their marital estate. The district court determined that the marriage began in February 2005 based on a letter in which Thompson referred to Kelly as his wife, rather than in 1988 as Thompson claimed, and it included only a limited portion of certain real properties in the marital estate after finding that Kelly's parents gifted them solely to her and that the parties' contributions had not significantly enhanced their value beyond market appreciation. Thompson appealed, arguing errors in the marriage start date and in the valuation and allocation of properties such as the 35th Street residence, Garfield property, and Kootenai Creek property. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's factual findings on the marriage date and property contributions were not clearly erroneous and that its distribution of the estate did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

family lawproperty

The case involved Glenn Wentworth's appeal of his misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct arising from an alleged fight with Duane Lorenz. After a trial de novo in District Court, Wentworth claimed ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that his attorney had prevented him from testifying, but the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The court applied the two-prong Strickland test and held that Wentworth's unsubstantiated assertion, first raised at sentencing, was insufficient to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify requires more particular evidence than a late, unsupported claim to establish ineffective assistance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute among owners in the Homestead Acres subdivision over the validity and scope of recorded covenants that limited further subdivision of tracts and access across them. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the covenants remained in effect and had been validly amended to restrict easements, while the defendants and intervenor argued the covenants had expired and sought to further divide land and grant rights-of-way. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings that the covenants automatically renewed for successive ten-year periods and were still binding, preventing additional subdivision, but that the proposed amendment had not received the required approval from two-thirds of the original tracts. The court reasoned that the covenants as a whole showed an intent for automatic renewal absent affirmative rejection, treating a reference to a single "period" as a typographical error, and that voting rights attached only to the original eight tracts rather than subdivided parcels.

property

Melvin Lee Gatlin was convicted of two counts of robbery in Missoula County after being arrested in Butte-Silver Bow County for a similar crime. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss, claiming that his initial appearance before a Butte justice of the peace on the Missoula charges failed to advise him of his right to counsel under § 46-7-102, MCA, and that the 163-day delay before filing the information violated § 46-10-105, MCA, by occurring without a preliminary examination. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that, although the initial appearance was inadequate, Gatlin suffered no prejudice from the delay because he eventually received proper advisement of rights in Missoula and was represented by counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joann Essig's appeal after she pled guilty to four misdemeanor counts of criminal mischief and one misdemeanor count of stalking for vandalizing property and stalking victims in Phillips County, Montana. The district court imposed five consecutive one-year deferred sentences totaling five years of probation, along with conditions requiring restitution for victims' counseling costs, prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms, and banning alcohol use or presence in bars. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed the restitution order and found some amounts improper, including expenses for a handgun, leading to remand for adjustment, while upholding the firearms prohibition based on a nexus to the offender and offenses under statutory authority for rehabilitation and victim protection. The court declined to review the alcohol condition due to lack of timely objection and absence of plain error grounds, and affirmed the consecutive deferred sentences as lawful under Montana sentencing statutes. The opinion addresses standards for reviewing probation conditions and the authority to stack deferred sentences for misdemeanors.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case involved David Reko Hernandez, who was convicted of sexual assault on a child and received a sentence including a ten-year suspended portion with conditions. At issue was a probation condition requiring him to obtain permission from his supervising officer before engaging in certain financial transactions, such as purchasing a vehicle or property or incurring debt. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the condition, holding that it was a standard condition authorized by statute under § 46-23-1002(3), MCA, and implemented by administrative rule, and thus was not subject to the nexus requirement from State v. Ashby that applies to discretionary conditions imposed directly by the sentencing court. The Court reviewed the sentencing judge's decision for abuse of discretion and found no error in adopting the standard condition.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gerstner, Michael Gerstner was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of felony sexual assault involving two 15-year-old boys, based on evidence of inappropriate touching and other conduct. He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory definition of 'sexual contact,' the jury instructions regarding the mental state of 'knowingly,' the refusal to instruct on misdemeanor assault as a lesser-included offense, an instruction on delayed victim complaints, and the denial of a mistrial motion related to other-acts evidence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the sexual contact statute was not unconstitutionally vague, that the jury instructions as a whole were proper, that misdemeanor assault instructions were not required, and that the other evidentiary and instructional rulings did not constitute reversible error. Dissenting justices would have reversed on some of the instructional issues.

criminal law

Donald Scott Doely appealed the denial of his petition to reinstate his driver's license, which had been suspended after he refused a breath test following an encounter with a deputy sheriff. The deputy had approached Doely's truck, parked in a closed bar's lot at 3 a.m. with the key in the ignition, observed signs of intoxication including slurred speech and alcohol containers, and arrested him for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the deputy had particularized suspicion under § 46-5-401, MCA, to make the initial contact based on the circumstances suggesting possible criminal activity, and that subsequent observations provided probable cause for the arrest, justifying the license suspension under § 61-8-402, MCA.

criminal lawprocedure

In Riddle v. Gunsch, Sarah Elizabeth Riddle petitioned the District Court for a temporary order of protection against David John Gunsch pursuant to Montana statute, which was granted pending a hearing. After the hearing, the District Court issued a permanent order of protection effective until 2011. Gunsch appealed, asking the Montana Supreme Court to overturn the order on the grounds that it lacked factual support. The Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that it reviews district court findings only for clear error and that Gunsch had provided no legal basis to reverse the lower court's conclusions.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Laura Rashid and Dave Jolly over a right of first refusal clause in a 1999 bill of sale for a mule named Fancy, which Rashid claimed Jolly breached by selling the animal in 2004 without first notifying her. The district court ruled the clause enforceable, found a breach, and awarded Rashid compensatory damages of $7,064.30, $5,000 in punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the right of first refusal was unenforceable because it omitted essential terms such as the purchase price or a method to determine it. The court remanded with instructions to enter a reduced judgment for Rashid totaling $1,241.04 plus costs, rejecting the punitive damages and attorney fees awards for lack of legal basis.

propertyprocedure

In this case, the Harts sued the Craigs after the Craigs mined and sold sandstone from property the Craigs had purchased from the Harts' predecessors, claiming the sandstone fell under a general mineral reservation in the 1988 deed that reserved all coal, oil, gas, metals, and other minerals along with related extraction rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Craigs, holding that sandstone was not a reserved mineral, and the Harts appealed. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed, applying precedent from Farley v. Booth Bros. Land and Livestock Co. that interprets general mineral reservations to exclude common substances like sandstone unless they are rare, exceptional, or possess special value beyond ordinary uses such as landscaping or rip-rap. The court found the sandstone here lacked those qualities, as it required no refining and was comparable to sand or gravel used for building purposes under the standard from Heinatz v. Allen.

property

Adam LeDeau pled guilty to sexual assault and received a 15-year sentence to the Department of Corrections with all but five years suspended; after his parole was revoked for multiple violations, the state petitioned to revoke the suspended portion based on the same conduct before he began serving it. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of LeDeau's motion to dismiss and its revocation order. The court held that double jeopardy does not apply to revocation proceedings because they are not criminal adjudications and do not impose punishment for a new offense, and it declined to review the claim further under plain-error standards. It also held that longstanding precedent interpreting § 46-18-203(2), MCA, authorizes revocation of a suspended sentence before the defendant begins serving that portion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Michael Coluccio's conviction for felony vehicular homicide while under the influence after he turned left into an oncoming motorcyclist at an intersection, causing a fatal collision; Coluccio had consumed several beers earlier, registered a 0.07 blood alcohol level roughly two hours later, and admitted not seeing the motorcycle. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court considered whether the district court erred in instructing the jury on criminal negligence, denying a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, and imposing restitution for the victim's losses. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the instructions accurately stated the law, that sufficient evidence supported the verdict including testimony about visibility and Coluccio's impairment, and that restitution could be awarded based on evidence at sentencing even without a formal victim affidavit in the presentence report. A dissent maintained that the restitution statute required an affidavit describing the losses and that its absence invalidated the claims.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Darwin Keith Berosik's conviction in district court on two counts of incest with his stepdaughters based on evidence of sexual abuse over several years. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Berosik challenged his exclusion from individual voir dire as well as rulings on expert testimony about grooming, admission of prior acts evidence, and denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized by his wife. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that Berosik's exclusion from voir dire required reversal. The court addressed the remaining issues for guidance on retrial, finding no error in qualifying the expert, that certain prior acts were admissible under the transaction rule, and that the suppression motion was properly denied.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Campa, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of two felony counts of possession of dangerous drugs based on evidence found during a probation-related vehicle stop and search. Campa appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to attach an affidavit challenging the stop's justification and error in admitting evidence of his prior probation violations and sanctions. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the intervention hearing and sanctions without the required written notice under § 46-13-109, MCA, and that the transaction rule under § 26-1-103, MCA did not apply because the prior acts were not inextricably linked to the charged offense. The court did not reach a final resolution on the ineffective assistance claim in the excerpted opinion but concluded the evidentiary error required reversal.

criminal lawprocedure