Edward Norman Cahn

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by inmates of Lehigh County Prison alleging that overcrowded and unsanitary conditions violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties settled via a 1990 consent decree that imposed population caps, monitoring requirements, and other operational standards at the old facility, which was later replaced by a new prison. Defendants moved to terminate the decree under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's termination provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), while plaintiffs challenged the provision's constitutionality and sought modification instead. The court rejected the constitutional challenges, held the termination provision valid, and granted the motion to end the decree because no current and ongoing constitutional violations existed. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation of the PLRA and findings that the decree's remedial purposes had been fulfilled by the new facility.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

In United States v. Rankin, defendant Kevin Rankin, proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his 1989 convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1503 for making false statements and obstructing justice, which stemmed from an affidavit filed in a prior narcotics case; he also moved to reassign the case outside the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and to disqualify the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The court denied the petition and both motions. It found no basis under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455(a) for reassignment or disqualification, as no reasonable person would question the impartiality of judges in the district or the assigned judge based on events in the earlier case. The court further held that coram nobis relief was unavailable because Rankin failed to show that the convictions were invalid or produced continuing adverse consequences not also attributable to his separate narcotics conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by a football referee against a college football player who assaulted him during a game at a state university. The plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the defendant acted under color of state law by violating his constitutional rights. The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the player was not a state actor despite being on scholarship at a public institution and participating in a state-subsidized athletic program. The reasoning centered on insufficient state involvement in the player's conduct under multiple tests for determining state action, as the assault was a private act not fairly attributable to the state.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved shoe manufacturers Hyde and Saucony suing their insurers for defense costs and indemnity related to liability in a federal CERCLA action over cleanup of a contaminated Pennsylvania landfill where the companies had disposed of hazardous waste. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the duty to defend and granted the defendant insurers' motions for summary judgment on all counts. The court held that the pollution exclusion clauses in the comprehensive general liability policies unambiguously barred coverage because the contamination resulted from gradual, not sudden and accidental, pollution. It rejected arguments that the exclusion was ambiguous or that the insurers had engaged in bad faith based on regulatory history or policy handling.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In Geiger v. AT & T Corp., plaintiff Carl Geiger sued his former employers AT & T and Devon Consulting after his work as an outsource contractor ended in 1993, claiming age discrimination under the ADEA and promissory estoppel based on statements made when he accepted an early retirement package in 1986. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. It found that Geiger failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because AT & T's policy barring former employees from contractor roles applied to all former employees regardless of age or retirement status, and there was no evidence the policy was a pretext for discrimination. The promissory estoppel claim failed because any alleged promise of continued contractor work was not sufficiently clear or enforceable to override the at-will nature of the arrangement or create indefinite employment expectations. Related state-law claims were either time-barred or preempted by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This ERISA class action was brought by retirees from Sperry, Burroughs, and Unisys corporations challenging the company's 1992 termination of pre-existing post-retirement medical benefit plans, which had provided lifetime coverage, and their replacement with a new plan requiring increasing retiree contributions. The retirees asserted claims for breach of contract (based on alleged vesting of benefits), equitable estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404(a). Prior rulings had granted Unisys summary judgment on contract and estoppel claims for most subclasses and after trial for the Sperry contract claims, while reinstating the fiduciary duty claims for all classes. In the present memorandum, the court addressed pending motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment, analyzing the statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 1113, the applicability of equitable tolling due to alleged misrepresentations, and the relief available, denying the Sperry retirees' motion while granting Unisys' motions in part and deferring in part.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

In Howell v. Sam's Club, plaintiff Robert Howell sued his former employer alleging that his termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act because of a back injury from his Navy service. The court granted Sam's Club's motion for summary judgment, holding that Howell failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA. The court reasoned that Howell's impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity such as working, that the employer did not regard him as disabled, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding discriminatory intent.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Jung v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance, homeowners George and Anne Marie Jung sued their insurer for breach of a homeowner's policy after their property was vandalized, seeking coverage for the loss and punitive damages under Pennsylvania's bad faith statute for the insurer's rescission of the policy and handling of the claim. The court granted the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment on the bad faith claim. It reasoned that the insurer had a reasonable basis to rescind because the application contained a material misrepresentation about prior lawsuits, which the insured knew was false, and that the insurer's other actions in investigating and denying the claim did not meet the clear-and-convincing standard for bad faith under Pennsylvania law as clarified in Terletsky v. Prudential.

propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Geuss v. Pfizer, Inc., plaintiff James Geuss, a laboratory technician with asthma employed by Pfizer, alleged that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to accommodate his condition after a change in supervisors increased his exposure to asthma triggers, leading to his suspension without pay. Following a trial, a jury found that Pfizer intentionally discriminated against Geuss and awarded him back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Pfizer moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that Geuss was not disabled under the ADA, was not a qualified individual, never requested a specific reasonable accommodation, and that the damages were excessive, along with claims of evidentiary and instructional errors. The court analyzed the definition of disability under the ADA, focusing on whether Geuss's asthma substantially limited the major life activity of breathing, assessed the sufficiency of evidence for the jury verdict, and evaluated the appropriateness of the punitive damages award.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The United States brought a civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) against real property at 2930 Greenleaf Street, alleging it had been used by claimant Doretta Laneon's former husband for illegal drug distribution in 1990-1991. Claimant asserted an ownership interest as an innocent owner after receiving a deed from her ex-husband in 1993, but she never filed an answer to the complaint and her verified claims were submitted after deadlines. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the claimant lacked standing because she failed to comply with the timely filing requirements of Supplemental Rule C(6) and had no valid ownership interest under Pennsylvania recording statutes and the Statute of Frauds. The government had established probable cause for forfeiture, and any lien interest held by the claimant was addressed separately through escrow of sale proceeds.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a dispute in the bankruptcy proceedings of Sugarhouse Realty, Inc. and related entities over the enforcement of agreements of sale for contaminated riverfront property as part of confirmed plans of reorganization. LHTW Corporation, the purchaser under the plan, appealed the bankruptcy court's order compelling it to close the sale, arguing that conditions precedent were unmet and warranties breached due to environmental issues like asbestos and underground storage tanks. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, reasoning that the plan confirmation satisfied the conditions, the seller's disclosures were adequate, and LHTW had not shown any breach of warranties or failure of conditions that would excuse closing.

business & regulatoryprocedureenvironmentproperty

This case involved plaintiffs suing General Motors under the Pennsylvania Lemon Law for a defective vehicle, with GM moving to disqualify the plaintiffs' law firm Kimmel & Silverman and attorney Jay London due to London's prior work at firms defending GM in similar cases. GM contended that London had access to confidential defense strategies and that his new employment created an unwaivable conflict. After designating the matter a test case and holding a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the court found that an ethics screen had been timely implemented at the firm, restricting London to non-GM work and preventing fee-sharing from such cases. The court concluded that the screen complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct and denied the disqualification motion.

procedure

In United States v. Burroughs, the defendant petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to modify his ten-year sentence for distributing and conspiring to distribute 141.9 grams of crack cocaine, claiming the federal cocaine sentencing scheme's 100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component because it was motivated by racial animus and lacks a rational basis. The court denied relief, following Third Circuit precedent in United States v. Frazier that found no evidence of discriminatory intent by Congress or the Sentencing Commission in enacting the distinction. Under rational basis review, the court concluded the scheme is constitutional because differences in crack cocaine's effects, including greater addictiveness and links to violence and distribution methods, provide a legitimate governmental interest in imposing harsher penalties.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves GE Capital Mortgage Services suing the guarantors of a bankrupt mortgage broker for default on a secured $15 million line of credit, with the guarantors asserting that an oral agreement superseded the original credit agreement and raising counterclaims for breach of that agreement, defamation, tortious interference with contract, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The court addressed GE Capital's motion to reconsider the prior denial of summary judgment on the breach of guaranty claim and its motion to dismiss the counterclaims, while also considering Rule 54(b) certification of the guaranty claim. The court applied standards requiring acceptance of the counterclaim allegations as true for the dismissal motion and evaluated whether the oral agreement could discharge the guarantors' liability under New York law. It reasoned that the guaranty claim against the Miller Defendants and the underlying claim against Pinnacle were not legally separable because they required proof of the same facts and sought the same relief, precluding separate judgment certification.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

GE Capital brought this action against Pinnacle Mortgage Investment Corp. and its guarantors, alleging breach of a warehouse credit agreement and related guaranties after Pinnacle allegedly misrepresented collateral and failed to remit mortgage proceeds, entitling GE Capital to immediate repayment of the outstanding line of credit. The defendants countered that GE Capital had full knowledge of the issues and that the parties had reached an oral restructuring agreement that modified the obligations. The court considered GE Capital's motion for summary judgment on the breach of guaranty claim, analyzing choice-of-law issues between the original New Jersey-governed Credit Agreement and a subsequent Pennsylvania-governed restructuring agreement, as well as the applicability of Pennsylvania's statute of frauds under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 8319 to any oral modification involving securities. The court noted that differing state laws could apply to the original contract and a later accord if the parties clearly intended that result, and it discussed how the original agreement's terms could have been drafted to preclude oral changes.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns an insurance company's declaratory judgment action to determine whether its comprehensive general liability policies cover remediation costs for environmental contamination at a Pennsylvania metal reclamation site, stemming from EPA claims under CERCLA against the insured companies and related entities. The insureds and an additional party filed counterclaims alleging breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, and conspiracy. The court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss the counterclaims, dismissing several for insufficient pleading while permitting a conspiracy-to-defraud claim to proceed based on allegations of industry coordination regarding a pollution exclusion clause. The core reasoning applied Pennsylvania law and the liberal standards for motions to dismiss, requiring factual allegations of an agreement and intent to defraud but cautioning about the evidentiary burdens and scope of industry-wide claims.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiffs, a class of retirees from Unisys and its predecessor companies Sperry and Burroughs, sued under ERISA claiming that the company's unilateral changes to retiree medical benefits plans breached contractual promises of lifetime benefits in the summary plan descriptions, violated fiduciary duties through misleading assurances, and supported equitable estoppel. After multi-district consolidation, class certification, partial summary judgment disposing of some claims, and a trial on the rest, the court approved a partial settlement covering Sperry and Burroughs incentive retirees. In this opinion, the court rules on plaintiffs' counsel petitions for attorneys' fees and expenses, assessing the reasonableness of time spent and rates charged in light of the litigation's procedural history, settlement value, and remaining unresolved claims.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a workers' compensation dispute in which Patricia Winterberg, injured at her retail job when a clothing rack fell on her foot, developed Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy and related complications; she and her husband sued the employer's insurer, CNA/Transportation Insurance Company, for refusing to cover prescribed ancillary medical treatments, improperly petitioning to terminate benefits, and conducting an allegedly abusive medical examination that contributed to her suicide attempt. The plaintiffs asserted claims under Pennsylvania's bad faith insurance statute (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371), the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and common-law theories including intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud. The court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss, holding that the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act barred the statutory bad faith and related claims because those provisions were irreconcilable with allowing separate judicial remedies outside the workers' compensation system. It permitted amendment of the complaint to correct the defendant’s name and to incorporate a request for punitive damages into a surviving cause of action.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In this products liability case, nurse Janet Kenepp and her husband sued manufacturers of glutaraldehyde-based disinfectant solutions, alleging that workplace exposure caused her respiratory illness and related conditions under theories of strict liability (including failure to warn), negligence, and breach of warranty. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims. It found no evidence supporting manufacturing or design defect allegations and held that FIFRA's labeling requirements expressly preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims, applying the Supreme Court's Cipollone preemption analysis to the EPA-approved labels at issue.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved Ronald Panzella suing Hills Department Store for back injuries from a display chair that broke in May 1990, alleging strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. HDS moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations had expired, noting that it had been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1990 until the automatic stay was lifted in September 1993. The court denied the motion, holding that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5535(b) excludes the duration of any statutory stay from the limitations period, making the November 1993 filing timely.

proceduretorts & liability