Carmody v. Seventh Judicial District Court
Nevada Supreme Court · 1965-02-05 · cited 24×
This case involved petitioners who pleaded guilty to robbery and were sentenced, after which the victim died from his injuries, leading to their indictment for murder committed during the robbery. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition, claiming former jeopardy barred the murder prosecution. The court vacated the alternative writ and dismissed the proceeding, ruling that robbery and murder are separate and distinct offenses under NRS 174.390, so the prior conviction does not bar the later charge. The core reasoning was that the majority rule permits separate prosecutions for the two crimes arising from the same act, particularly when the death occurs after the robbery conviction, and neither crime is included in the other under merger principles.
criminal lawprocedure
Hanley v. Zenoff
Nevada Supreme Court · 1965-01-11 · cited 10×
The case involved a defendant charged with first-degree burglary in Clark County who challenged proceedings after the information was amended to add a manslaughter charge and delete certain language, without a new arraignment, and after denials of his motions for change of venue. The court held that the trial court improperly ordered the defendant to trial on the amended information without re-arraignment, as the changes were material and implicated statutory rights to plea, demurrer, and trial preparation time. It further ruled that an appeal from the denial of a change of venue does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed, because the appeal concerns only the fairness of the venue rather than the merits of guilt or innocence, and allowing otherwise would permit endless delays. The court annulled the order to proceed without arraignment and dismissed the petition for a writ of prohibition.
criminal lawprocedure
Morrissett v. Morrissett
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-12-14 · cited 4×
This case involved a wife suing her husband for damages from personal injuries sustained in a car collision allegedly caused by his gross negligence while driving. The trial court dismissed the action, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. The majority held that the common-law rule of interspousal immunity for personal torts, as established in Kennedy v. Kennedy, continues to apply in Nevada because statutes such as NRS 12.020 and NRS 41.170 do not authorize such suits, and any change must come from the legislature. The dissent argued that the rule should be abandoned to align with modern trends in other states and to facilitate settlements in multi-vehicle negligence cases.
family lawtorts & liability
NATIONWIDE FINANCE CORPORATION v. Wolford
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-11-16
The case concerned a creditor's efforts to collect on an uncontested judgment by levying execution on a debtor's casino wages on two separate occasions. The debtor moved to release the garnished amounts as exempt wages, but asserted the claim 48 days after the first levy (after the funds had already been delivered to the creditor) and 11 days after the second levy (before the funds were paid over). The court determined that the exemption right is a personal privilege that is waived if not timely asserted, finding the first claim untimely and thus waived while deeming the second claim timely. It therefore modified the lower court's order to require return of only the second levied sum and affirmed the order as modified.
procedurepropertylabor & employment
Nevada Transit Co. v. Harris Brothers Lumber Co.
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-11-05 · cited 8×
This case involved an action by Nevada Transit Co. against Harris Brothers Lumber Co. seeking damages for negligent repair of a motor vehicle. The defendant moved to change venue from Churchill County to Washoe County, its county of residence, without first filing a written demand as required by statute. The trial court denied the motion, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that NRS 13.050 requires a written demand for change of venue to the proper county before any such motion can be considered and that the supporting affidavit was insufficient to justify a discretionary change based on witness convenience.
proceduretorts & liability
Dudrey v. Milner
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-10-26 · cited 2×
This case involves a dispute between the surviving partner Dudrey and the estate of deceased partner Mayme Smith over the purchase of her interest in their motel business under their partnership agreement. After a prior remand to determine the market value of partnership assets, the trial court entered a money judgment for the estate that included pre-judgment interest at 4 percent from the date of death plus post-judgment interest at 7 percent on the total due. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the amount owed was not ascertainable until judgment because it required an audit under the agreement, so no interest accrued before judgment; it modified the judgment to apply 7 percent interest only from the judgment date on the amount then due and to require 4 percent interest on the remaining principal balance from the judgment date onward, while affirming the $250 monthly principal installments. The court construed the agreement to require separate monthly interest payments on the unpaid balance in addition to principal payments.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Morford v. State
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-10-21 · cited 17×
The case involved defendant Morford, who was charged with murdering Jack Foster by shooting him in the head during a robbery and kidnapping on August 22, 1962. After initially pleading not guilty and requesting continuances—one due to publicity surrounding an unrelated homicide and another due to a witness's unavailability, both of which were denied—he withdrew his plea and entered a guilty plea without specifying degree. A three-judge panel then heard evidence and determined the crime was first-degree murder, imposing the death penalty. On appeal from the denial of the continuance motions and the judgment, the court affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuances and that the panel properly weighed the evidence, including expert testimony on toluene effects.
criminal lawprocedure
Smith v. Gabrielli
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-09-18 · cited 15×
In Smith v. Gabrielli, Barbara McMinn filed a paternity and child support action in Nevada district court more than two years after the birth of her child, alleging that Raymond Smith was the father and had made some support payments. Smith moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds under NRS 126.340, which bars such actions after two years unless paternity was judicially established, acknowledged in writing, or support was furnished. The Nevada Supreme Court held that payments limited to the child's birth and hospital expenses did not constitute furnishing support for the child, no written acknowledgment existed, and the action was therefore time-barred, ordering dismissal via writ of mandamus.
family lawprocedure
Dzack v. Marshall
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-06-25 · cited 41×
In Dzack v. Marshall, plaintiffs sued car dealership owners for damages from a 1960 automobile accident, alleging that the driver was their agent acting with permission; the owners denied agency in their answer and moved for summary judgment supported by affidavits and unanswered requests for admissions under NRCP 36(a), which were deemed admitted. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment despite the absence of any counter-affidavits or evidence creating a genuine issue of fact. The Nevada Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that NRCP 56(e) required the trial court to accept the admissions and affidavits and enter summary judgment rather than force petitioners to incur further litigation costs, and that mandamus was available because no appeal lies from denial of summary judgment and other remedies would not be plain and adequate.
proceduretorts & liability
Martin v. State
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-06-15 · cited 8×
The case involved defendant Martin's conviction for rape based on evidence that he had sexual intercourse with the victim in her bedroom while others were present in the home; the key factual dispute at trial was whether the act was forcible and without consent. During cross-examination and rebuttal, the prosecution introduced testimony and physical evidence suggesting Martin had molested a three-year-old child in an adjoining bedroom earlier that evening, including hearsay statements attributed to the child, despite objections. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying a new trial, holding that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible and that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing this highly prejudicial material, which included unqualified hearsay, to go to the jury and undermine the fairness of the trial on the rape charge.
criminal lawprocedure
County of Clark v. ROOSEVELT TITLE INSURANCE CO.
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-06-11 · cited 2×
The case involved Roosevelt Title Insurance Co. suing Clark County in 1963 to redeem property sold to the county for unpaid taxes in 1935. After the trial court granted Roosevelt's motion for summary judgment and ordered the county treasurer to accept redemption payments and issue a deed of reconveyance, the county appealed. Roosevelt moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the county had accepted the benefits of the judgment by complying with the order. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that acceptance of the judgment's fruits does not waive the right to appeal when the acceptance occurs involuntarily under a court order, as was the case here with the treasurer's compelled actions.
propertyproceduretaxes
Victoria v. Young
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-05-26 · cited 25×
The case involved an appellant arrested for forgery who was held 11 days before appearing before a magistrate and 47 days before his preliminary hearing, at which he lacked counsel, prompting a habeas corpus petition claiming unlawful detention from the delays. The lower court quashed the writ, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that any prior illegal confinement did not invalidate the subsequent lawful commitment after the preliminary hearing and information filing. The core reasoning was that NRS 171.300 and related statutes on prompt arraignment and hearings do not render later legal detention unlawful, habeas relief is unavailable once custody is proper, and Nevada preliminary hearings are not a critical stage requiring counsel unlike certain other jurisdictions.
criminal lawprocedure
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. Baber
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-05-18 · cited 2×
The case arose from a 1960 train derailment near Fallon, Nevada, after water overflowed from a ditch controlled by the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District and washed out Southern Pacific railroad tracks, injuring three railroad employees and damaging railroad property. The employees sued both the District and the railroad, with the railroad cross-claiming against the District; after consolidation, the jury found the District negligent, awarded damages to the plaintiffs and railroad, and found no negligence by the railroad. On appeal, the District claimed sovereign immunity as a governmental agency, but the court rejected this because irrigation districts are not political subdivisions of the state under Nevada precedent, affirmed the negligence findings and verdicts as supported by the evidence and proper instructions, and also affirmed the damage awards to two plaintiffs as not inadequate under the applicable standard.
torts & liability
State v. Plas
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-05-06 · cited 25×
This case involved a state appeal from a habeas corpus order that had discharged the respondent from custody after he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The respondent had consented to a police search of his car during a vehicle check, which turned up a pistol under the seat, and he later challenged the search as illegal. The court held that the consent to search was voluntary and freely given without coercion, even though it occurred while the respondent was in custody, and therefore the evidence was admissible. Because the consent converted the search into a lawful one, there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to bind the respondent over for trial, and the discharge order was reversed.
criminal lawprocedureguns
Cheek v. Bell
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-04-29 · cited 3×
In Cheek v. Bell, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for maintaining a nuisance on their premises, seeking an injunction to remove a partially completed structure, rubbish, and second-hand building materials and to prevent completion of the structure. The defendants, appearing without counsel, filed answers that omitted their addresses and, in one case, an acknowledgment as required by NRCP 11; the trial court struck both answers on ex parte motions without notice to the defendants, entered their defaults, and granted judgment to the plaintiffs. The defendants moved to set aside the judgment, providing proposed answers and explaining their reliance on out-of-state advice, but the motion was denied. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the defects were non-jurisdictional irregularities that did not nullify the answers, that the ex parte striking orders violated notice requirements under NRCP 5(a) and 7(b)(1), and that the defendants should have been given an opportunity to cure the defects before default judgment.
procedureproperty
Sierra Pacific Power Company v. Day
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-04-24 · cited 4×
This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit by the family of a driver killed when his northbound vehicle collided with two parked trucks belonging to the defendant power company, which employees had positioned on or near a rural road while repairing wind-damaged electrical equipment at dusk. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, apparently finding contributory negligence by the decedent, but the trial court granted a new trial on grounds that the jury had manifestly disregarded instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict, that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a retrial, and that any perceived disregard of instructions could not be separated from the sufficiency issue; the court directed reinstatement of the original verdict and judgment. A dissent argued that the evidence of contributory negligence was not substantial and that the trial court's order should stand under the rules applicable at the time of trial.
proceduretorts & liability
Odd Karlsen, Ball Sign Co. v. Jack
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-04-15 · cited 14×
The case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by Mrs. Jack and her husband against Ball Sign Co. and one of its employees after she lost control of her car and crashed while trying to avoid a collision on a California freeway. The company's truck had been parked illegally on the shoulder near a bridge, and another driver swerved into her lane, prompting her evasive maneuvers around the truck. A jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, and the trial court denied the defendants' post-verdict motions. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that under California law the questions of proximate cause and foreseeability were factual issues for the jury and that substantial evidence supported the finding that the illegal parking was a concurrent proximate cause of the accident despite the other driver's conduct.
torts & liability
Mau v. Woodburn, Forman, Wedge, Blakey, Folsom & Hug
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-04-06 · cited 6×
This case involved a dispute between two attorneys appointed by a will's codicil to represent the executors in Nevada probate proceedings: appellant Chuck Mau, a Hawaii-licensed attorney, and respondent, a Nevada law firm. After the estate sold a major asset, the attorneys petitioned for an interim fee allowance but could not agree on division, leading the lower court to award four-fifths of the fees to the respondent and one-fifth to Mau based on the services each performed. The court affirmed, holding that NRS 150.060 governs compensation for services rendered in probate matters and empowers the court to determine and apportion reasonable fees between co-counsel, rather than requiring equal division as in joint-venture cases. The statute's focus on court-approved compensation for actual services rendered overrides any private agreement or default equal-sharing rule, and the evidence supported the apportionment here.
procedure
Levine v. Remolif
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-03-30 · cited 22×
This case was a wrongful death action brought by the children of Charles Levine, who died in a car collision at an intersection in Las Vegas. The deceased was driving eastbound on Canosa and entered the intersection past a yield sign without stopping at high speed, colliding with the respondent's southbound Thunderbird on Sixth Street. After striking the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness on vehicle speeds as incompetent and based on insufficient foundational evidence such as an inaccurate diagram and photographs, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the respondent on the ground that no evidence remained to support a finding of negligence by the respondent. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and that the remaining evidence, including skid marks and photos, was insufficient to create a jury question on the respondent's negligence.
proceduretorts & liability
Worthington Motors v. Crouse
Nevada Supreme Court · 1964-03-17 · cited 5×
The case involved a dispute over alleged waste on the Upper Hot Creek Ranch, where respondents held remainder interests following a life estate originally devised to Elizabeth Barndt; that life estate had passed to appellant Worthington Motors through foreclosure. The trial court found appellants had committed willful waste causing $5,000 in damage, awarded compensatory damages, and ordered forfeiture of the life estate with immediate possession to respondents. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the damage award under NRS 40.150 but reversed the forfeiture, holding that the Statute of Gloucester (which provided for forfeiture) was never adopted as part of Nevada common law and that no Nevada statute authorizes forfeiture as a remedy for waste by a life tenant.
property