Richard E. Galway

The case concerned whether several New Hampshire statutes increasing counties' financial responsibilities for long-term care of the indigent elderly and disabled violated Part I, Article 28-a of the state constitution, which bars unfunded mandates. The statutes included extensions of a sunset provision from SB 409, an increase in the counties' share of nursing home and home-based care costs under chapter 263, and a 2005 rise in Local Medical Assistance Contribution payments. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the obligations either predated the constitutional amendment, had been approved by the counties, produced no net increase in county expenditures due to offsetting provisions, or were not yet ripe for review. The court reviewed the statutes de novo, presumed their constitutionality, and found no clear and substantial conflict with Article 28-a.

healthcaretaxes

This case arose when the Libertarian Party of New Hampshire challenged RSA 654:46, a statute requiring the Secretary of State to provide certain voter lists to qualifying political parties, arguing that it was unconstitutional. The trial court agreed, declared the statute unconstitutional, and later issued an equitable remedy that barred further distribution of the lists but did not require the New Hampshire Democratic Party to return profits from prior sales. The New Hampshire Republican State Committee, which had not participated in the earlier proceedings, intervened and appealed the remedy, contending that the Democratic Party should be required to disgorge any funds obtained from selling the lists. The New Hampshire Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Republican committee lacked standing because it had not demonstrated any legal injury from the remedy and the relief it sought primarily benefited another party that had chosen not to pursue it.

electionsprocedure

The case involved property owners who constructed a garage on their land near Canobie Lake in Windham after obtaining a building permit, only to face challenges when abutters argued it violated the town's Wetlands and Watershed Protection overlay district (WWPD) ordinance prohibiting such structures. The Zoning Board of Adjustment initially granted an equitable waiver under RSA 674:33-a allowing the garage to remain despite the infringement, but the superior court reversed that decision, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the reversal. The court held that the WWPD provision creates a use restriction rather than a dimensional or physical layout requirement, as it establishes an autonomous overlay district barring permanent buildings within its boundaries to protect wetlands, and the statute explicitly prohibits waivers from use restrictions. The analysis distinguished the WWPD from incidental setbacks by noting its independent purpose and the ordinance's separate setback rules from the district itself.

propertyenvironment

The case involved a juvenile, Kirsten P., who appealed the denial of her motion to dismiss a delinquency petition after a prior petition was dismissed without prejudice due to improper service on her legal custodian. The juvenile argued that the statutory 30-day limit for holding an adjudicatory hearing under RSA 169-B:14, II began running from her first arraignment and had expired by the time of the scheduled hearing on the refiled petition. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the time limit restarts upon arraignment on a second petition when the original petition is dismissed at the juvenile's request. The reasoning drew on the statute's purpose of protecting juveniles' rights to expeditious resolution while distinguishing this scenario from cases where the state seeks to circumvent time limits, analogizing to speedy trial principles that allow restart after a defendant-initiated dismissal.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In State v. Formella, the defendant, a high school student, was convicted after a bench trial of criminal liability for the conduct of another under RSA 626:8 for agreeing to serve as a lookout while others stole math exams from a school, even though he later left the scene without completing that role or alerting authorities. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant did not terminate his accomplice liability. The court interpreted the statute to require that, to avoid liability, an accomplice must not only end his complicity before the offense but also wholly deprive it of effectiveness, which generally necessitates communicating the withdrawal to the principals so they know their aid has been withdrawn. Because the defendant merely abandoned his post without informing the thieves, a rational factfinder could conclude his actions did not meet this standard.

criminal law

The case involved plaintiff Jose Hilario's legal malpractice suit against his former criminal defense attorney, Neil Reardon, alleging that the attorney filed an unauthorized motion to withdraw Hilario's guilty pleas, which caused the State to oppose and the court to deny his later motion to suspend part of his sentence under the plea agreement. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Mahoney v. Shaheen, which requires a showing of actual innocence for certain criminal malpractice claims. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mahoney does not bar the claim because the alleged malpractice occurred after the plea and sentencing, was unrelated to any strategic decisions about the convictions or the plaintiff's guilt, and did not assert that a different criminal outcome would have resulted. The court reasoned that the actual-innocence requirement applies only to malpractice claims tied to challenging a conviction or averting indictment, not to post-plea conduct that merely disrupts a separate sentencing agreement. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawtorts & liability