John Richard Goodnow

The case involved an employee who suffered two successive work-related injuries while employed by different companies, both of which contributed to his permanent partial disability, raising the question of whether compensation under New Hampshire's workers' compensation law should be paid entirely by the second employer or apportioned between them. The court decided that liability must be apportioned according to the extent each injury contributed to the disability, rather than placing full responsibility on the last employer, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the proper allocation and to consider an award based on loss of earning capacity. The core reasoning was that the statute holds each employer responsible only for disability arising out of and in the course of its own employment, so compensation must reflect each employer's proportionate statutory liability without arbitrary equal division or full shifting to one party; the court also noted that earning capacity after injury requires judicial assessment based on evidence and general knowledge rather than solely on medical findings or actual wages.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case Hull v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company concerned whether an insured could recover under a fire insurance policy for windstorm damage when notice of loss was not provided within thirty days of the loss's occurrence, but rather after its discovery, due to the premises being vacant. The court held that the policy requires notice within thirty days from the date the loss occurs, not from discovery, and the vacancy waiver does not alter the notice timing. However, because the policy permitted extended vacancy, the insured may be excused from strict compliance if he was justifiably ignorant of the loss and exercised reasonable care to discover it, making the determination of timely notice a factual question. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for that factual determination.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a New Hampshire action by plaintiff Lillian M. Sampson, Trustee, to enforce a final decree rendered by a Massachusetts court against defendant Arthur J. Conlon. The New Hampshire court held that an authenticated copy of the Massachusetts judgment was admissible without further proof of its nature or the identity of the parties, and that this evidence alone was sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion for nonsuit. The court reasoned that the clerk's certification established admissibility, matching names, titles, and service addresses created a presumption of party identity, and a valid judgment is presumed to remain unsatisfied until the defendant affirmatively proves payment. Judgment was entered on the verdict for the plaintiff.

procedure

This case concerned the validity of a will's reference to a list of personal property bequests and the interpretation of its residuary clause distributing the estate to heirs. The court held that a list prepared after the will's execution but before a codicil was not incorporated by reference into the will, because the will referred to a list the testatrix "shall leave" in the future, which did not sufficiently describe an existing document. Regarding the residue, the court decided that the testatrix intended for New Hampshire statutes to determine her heirs as well as her husband's, excluding those beyond the fourth degree of relationship, and that the heirs were to be identified at the time the residue was ready for distribution rather than at the testatrix's death.

property

This case concerned whether a defendant's prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence under a 1950 statute could be treated as a second conviction under the amended 1955 version of the law, which provided for different penalties. The court held that the prior conviction qualified, allowing the defendant to be charged as a repeat offender. The reasoning was that the 1955 amendment did not repeal the original statute but merely altered its penalty provisions through legislative drafting, as the description of the offense remained identical and the intent was to impose heavier penalties on repeat offenders to deter dangerous driving. The court also confirmed that a nolo contendere plea followed by sentencing constitutes a conviction under the statute.

criminal law

This case concerned whether the plaintiffs could pursue tort claims for personal injuries from a 1953 car accident against the estate of the deceased driver, despite failing to properly exhibit their demands to the administratrix within the one-year period required by RSA 556:3. The plaintiffs had filed initial actions in common counts but did not make a sufficient demand or communicate directly with the estate's representative; instead, they relied on assurances from the insurer's agent that the claims would be settled after recovery. The superior court granted relief under RSA 556:28, finding no culpable neglect and permitting the actions to proceed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that the insurer's conduct provided a reasonable basis for the delay under standards of ordinary conduct, that the petition could be amended, and that the statutory purpose of orderly estate settlement was satisfied where insurance would cover any judgment.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the City of Manchester could be held liable for property damage to an adjoining owner's land caused by concussion and vibration from municipal blasting operations to install curbing along a public street. The court held that the city was not subject to strict or absolute liability on counts alleging no negligence or on a trespass theory unless based on an intentional tort; instead, liability required proof of negligence regardless of whether the work was deemed a governmental or proprietary function. It reasoned that New Hampshire precedents limit strict liability to situations expressly provided by statute or established in common law, with no such rule applying to blasting-related property damage, while noting that municipalities can face negligence claims for highway construction that invades neighboring property rights. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this framework.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case concerned whether an insurance policy's 'use of other automobiles' coverage applied when the named insured, Capobianco, drove a government truck in an emergency while employed as a mechanic at a military reservation. The court held that the policy exclusion for use in the insured's 'business or occupation' did not apply, because obeying a superior's order to operate the truck fell within his occupation even if infrequent, and that a statutory motor vehicle liability endorsement provided coverage up to minimum statutory limits regardless. The reasoning interpreted the policy language according to how a reasonable person in the insured's position would understand 'business or occupation,' including occasional duties essential to employment, and rejected limiting it to regularly performed tasks based on prior precedent and the facts that Capobianco was on duty, paid, and acting under authorized orders.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether a surviving joint tenant of bank accounts, who was the sister-in-law of the deceased and had contributed nothing to the funds, could disclaim her statutory right to the accounts so that they would become part of the decedent's estate for legacy and succession tax purposes under RSA ch. 86. The court held that such a disclaimer was effective, causing the accounts to revert to the estate where they would be subject to authorized deductions before the tax was determined. The reasoning rested on the 1953 statute (RSA 384:28-32) that grants the survivor ownership rights upon death irrespective of contribution or intent, but treats those rights as waivable in the manner of a gift or legacy, with the disclaimer relating back to the creation of the joint accounts. No fraudulent conveyance or other avoidance factors were present.

taxesproperty

This case involved a challenge to a parking ticket under Exeter's ordinance requiring parking meters in limited time zones on certain streets, including Water Street. The defendant argued he only violated the rule if parking exceeded the one-hour maximum set in article VII, but the court held that the ordinance imposes two separate time limits: a maximum of one hour and the specific duration paid for via the meter under article IX. The court reasoned that the provisions must be read together to effectuate the purpose of regulating parking, and that the prima facie evidence of illegal parking from the meter signal refers to exceeding the paid time rather than the one-hour maximum, since the meter mechanism only tracks the deposited coins' period. Therefore, the defendant was guilty of parking overtime after his paid time expired, even though under one hour total, and the case was remanded.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case Welch v. Read concerned whether a special act of the New Hampshire Legislature authorized the Merrimack Village District to incur up to $150,000 in debt for constructing a water works system, exceeding the general statutory limit of ten percent of the municipality's tax valuation under RSA 38:11. The court held that the special legislation did intend to permit this higher fixed amount of indebtedness. The reasoning focused on the act's explicit authorization of a specific dollar amount, its exclusion only of debts under the municipal finance act rather than the water systems act, and the principle that the Legislature holds plenary power to set debt limits for local governments without conflicting with general statutes.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether the Epsom school district could receive a conditional bequest in a will for a 'proposed Central School of Epsom' that was to be paid only if the school was 'built, or in the process of being built.' The court held that the district was entitled to the legacy. The ruling rested on the testator's intent, inferred from surrounding circumstances and the will's language, that the condition need only be satisfied within a reasonable time after death rather than at the moment of death; the facts showed that construction was assured by mid-1954, about a year and a half after the 1953 death, satisfying that standard. The court also found no intent for the bequest to lapse to other beneficiaries or heirs in the event of non-fulfillment.

property

In Perry v. Faulkner, the plaintiff contended that the appearance of additional counsel for the defendant after the jury had been impaneled impaired her ability to exercise peremptory challenges under state statute, rendering the jury improperly constituted and requiring a new trial. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for mistrial and motion to set aside the verdict, upholding the judgment on the verdict. It reasoned that only facts existing at the time of jury selection can affect challenges, that post-impanelment developments raise only a factual question of injustice for the trial court to decide, and that the plaintiff's unsupported assertions of potential different challenges provided no basis to disturb the trial court's findings of fairness. The court also noted that the plaintiff had waived objection to a separate incident by failing to seek a mistrial promptly.

procedure

The case involved a legislative investigation into subversive activities in New Hampshire, authorized by joint resolution, in which the Attorney General acting as the committee questioned Sweezy about the content of a university lecture on socialism, his views on Marxism and dialectical materialism, and related affiliations. Sweezy declined to answer, asserting the questions were irrelevant and infringed on constitutional liberties. The court ruled the questions relevant under the standards applicable to legislative inquiries, which are broader than those in judicial trials, and ordered him to answer, with the Superior Court authorized to hold him in contempt if he refused. The core reasoning was that relevancy is guided by the investigation's authorizing resolution and supporting context known to the committee, such as the defendant's writings and associations, and that any resulting limits on free expression or association were justified within the targeted area of potential advocacy of overthrowing government by force.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether an unemancipated minor child, Geraldine, retained a legal settlement in Manchester, New Hampshire, making the city responsible for her support as a pauper under state law, after her father moved with the rest of the family to California and left her in a local foster home. The court held that Geraldine continued to have a settlement in Manchester, which would not shift to the county until her father had abandoned his former domicile there for five consecutive years. The reasoning relied on RSA 164:1 and related statutes providing that legitimate minor children take and follow their father's settlement, that such derivative settlements change or are lost only when the father's does, and that loss of settlement by abandonment of domicile requires five consecutive years regardless of whether the move is out of state.

family law

The case concerned whether a New Hampshire court could properly exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant whose real estate in the state had been attached, when the plaintiff served process by registered mail to the defendant's last known address under RSA 510:8 after a sheriff's return of non est inventus. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust all alternative service methods listed in RSA 510:4 before seeking court-ordered notice. The court held that RSA 510:8 does not require exhaustion of every mode in section 4 and that the facts recited in the writ and the sheriff's return were sufficient to authorize the order of notice. It further ruled that delivery of the registered letter to an agent at the Harvard Club address constituted valid service that satisfied due process under the circumstances. The defendant's motion was therefore denied.

procedure

This case was a paternity proceeding brought by the State against Samuel Sargent concerning a child born to a married woman. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the mother's testimony about non-access by her husband was inadmissible under the longstanding common-law rule barring such evidence to avoid bastardizing a child conceived during marriage, necessitating a new trial. It further held that the Uniform Act on Blood Tests requires concurrence of multiple experts for conclusive effect, so a single expert's results could not automatically overcome the presumption of legitimacy but could be submitted to the jury if they amounted to clear and convincing proof. The court also noted that evidence of the defendant's possible paternity via blood typing could be admitted in the trial court's discretion based on the infrequency of the blood type.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether a new property owner could evict a tenant for nonpayment of January 1954 rent that became due before the property was transferred from the prior owner, Ledoux. The trial court returned a verdict for the tenant, and the Supreme Court upheld it, finding that the plaintiff had not shown a right to collect any part of that rent. The core reasoning was that rent accrues to the landlord on the date it is due under the lease, a subsequent deed conveying the property does not automatically transfer rights to already-accrued unpaid rent without an explicit assignment, and the evidence did not establish that such an assignment occurred here.

property

The case involved a water utility company seeking a rate increase for its New Hampshire customers after developing a new water source to ensure adequate supply for its Maine customers in an interconnected system. The New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission denied the increase, reasoning that the new investment primarily benefited Maine consumers and provided no material benefit to those in New Hampshire. The court held that the Commission erred by failing to treat the entire system as a single unit for rate-making purposes, as is standard even for utilities operating across state lines. It reasoned that rates must be just and reasonable across similar consumers in the system without unreasonable preferences based on location, and that costs of improvements needed for adequate service to all should be considered in setting New Hampshire rates to the extent the new source is used and useful there. The court vacated the Commission's order and remanded for further consideration consistent with these principles.

business & regulatory

The case involved a contract dispute over the sale of real and personal property known as the Bedford Cabins, where the buyers paid initial deposits totaling $10,000 but did not complete the purchase by paying the $29,700 balance after an extension tied to selling their Vermont property. The sellers sold the property to third parties after the buyers failed to respond to a deadline and the trial court found the buyers had delayed more than a reasonable time. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the extension clause provided only a reasonable time beyond June 1, 1950, which the buyers exceeded, constituting a breach, and that the proper measure of recovery was the net benefit to the sellers from the deposits and resale minus their actual damages of $2,000, resulting in judgment for the plaintiffs for $1,700. The court rejected equating the extension period with the time needed to sell the Vermont property and upheld the trial court's finding of unreasonable delay based on circumstances including the seasonal nature of the property.

propertybusiness & regulatory