William Alvan Grimes

In Burrows v. City of Keene, the plaintiffs purchased 124 acres of land intending to develop it for residential subdivision, but the city denied their plans and later amended its zoning ordinance to place most of the property in a conservation district that severely restricted its uses. The plaintiffs amended their lawsuit to claim this zoning change constituted inverse condemnation, entitling them to compensation under the New Hampshire Constitution. The trial court agreed that the conservation zoning deprived the owners of all reasonable economic use of the land and ordered damages to be determined, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the regulation's purpose was to preserve the land as open space for public benefit rather than to prevent an injurious use, thereby placing the entire burden on the plaintiffs without just compensation. The matter was remanded for calculation of damages, attorney fees, and costs.

propertybusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case involved the Town of Croydon's challenge to the Current Use Advisory Board's valuation range of twenty to thirty-five dollars per acre for forest land under New Hampshire's current use taxation statute, RSA ch. 79-A, which aims to preserve open space by taxing qualifying land at its current use value rather than its highest and best use. The town sought a declaratory judgment that the board's values were inconsistent with the statute and unreasonable, proposing instead a higher range of fifty to seventy dollars per acre based on local characteristics. After reviewing the board's methodology, which started with a ten-dollar base value for all land and added averaged productive capacity values from university data while accounting for inflation, the master found the values reasonable and consistent with the law. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the use of average-based ranges was administratively practical, permitted assessors to adjust within the range for parcel specifics, and aligned with the statute's goal of a uniform statewide system; the board's values were therefore mandatory and binding on towns.

taxespropertyenvironment

This case involved a lumber company suing to set aside a transfer of a husband's interest in jointly owned real estate to his wife, claiming it was a fraudulent conveyance to avoid business creditors under New Hampshire's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding fair consideration for the transfer and applying collateral estoppel from a prior case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the wife's promise to obtain a second mortgage and use the proceeds to pay the husband's debts constituted fair consideration, as she performed on the promise, and there was no clear evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage in an auto insurance policy that insured multiple vehicles and charged separate premiums for each. After an arbitration panel awarded the defendant $60,000 by stacking the per-vehicle limits, the insurer sought court review, and the superior court confirmed the award. While the appeal was pending, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided Grimes v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Co., which held that intra-policy stacking of uninsured motorist benefits is not permitted under identical policy language. The court held that the arbitration award was subject to modification under RSA 542:8 for plain mistake of law because the arbitrators would not have reached the same result had they known the law as declared in Grimes, and therefore reduced the award to the $20,000 per-person limit.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a probate court order appointing Mildred DeLucca as permanent guardian of her husband Louis under New Hampshire's guardianship statute, RSA ch. 464-A. The proposed ward's counsel argued that the petition failed to meet the requirements of RSA 464-A:4 II(e), which mandates specific factual allegations about the ward's financial transactions, personal actions, or occurrences demonstrating incapacity. The court held that the petition was defective, as its general assertions of mental incompetence and inability to care for himself did not provide the particularity needed for the ward to prepare a defense, and therefore vacated the guardianship appointment. The ruling emphasized that while petitions need not be exhaustive, they must include enough specifics to align with the statute's protective purpose, and a new petition could be filed since the proceedings are civil in nature.

procedurefamily lawcivil rights

This case involved a second trial for aggravated felonious sexual assault after the first trial ended in a mistrial due to the prosecutor's improper display of a blood-stained bedspread. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the retrial violated double jeopardy protections, that certain child witnesses were incompetent to testify, that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, and that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's actions did not constitute the type of overreaching that bars retrial under double jeopardy principles, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the juvenile witnesses competent, that the evidence was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and that any erroneous admission of hearsay testimony was harmless error.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a kidnapping charge against Gerard Bean. The court addressed whether the police's warrantless seizure of Bean's car, which was about to be driven away, violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and whether the trial judge erred by not giving limiting instructions on a prior conviction introduced by the defense. The court ruled that the seizure was lawful due to exigent circumstances at the time of arrest, allowing the subsequent search under a warrant, and that the defendant had waived any claim regarding the jury instructions by not requesting them and bringing out the conviction himself. Therefore, the evidence from the car was admissible, and the conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a developer who purchased land in 1966, recorded a subdivision plan in 1968 with town approval, and built streets, utilities, and homes on most of the lots before the town adopted a 1970 zoning ordinance requiring minimum lot sizes of 40,000 square feet, which the developer's 10,000-square-foot lots did not meet. After the planning board refused to approve further development of the remaining 16 lots under the new rules, the developer sought a declaratory judgment on whether it had vested rights to proceed. The court held that the developer acquired vested rights to complete the subdivision as originally planned, allowing the remaining lots to be developed at the smaller size, though other zoning restrictions such as limits on one- and two-family homes still apply. The reasoning centered on the developer's substantial good-faith construction and reliance on prior approvals for the project as a whole, the resulting diminution in land value if the new lot sizes were enforced, and the unfairness of requiring changes after 70 percent of the subdivision was completed and taxed as individual lots.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a constitutional challenge to New Hampshire's aggravated felonious sexual assault statute, RSA 632-A:2 VIII (Supp. 1979), which criminalizes sexual penetration with a non-spouse who is mentally defective when the actor knows or has reason to know of that condition. The defendant, indicted under the statute, moved to dismiss on grounds that the undefined term “mentally defective” rendered the law unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the federal and state constitutions. The court upheld the statute, construing “mentally defective” to mean a mental deficiency rendering the person incapable of legally consenting, and held that the scienter requirement together with this narrowed interpretation provided sufficient fair warning to avoid vagueness.

criminal law

In this malicious prosecution case, plaintiff Hamilton Stock sued defendant Steven Byers, the Chief of Police of Barnstead, after Byers assisted in initiating a kidnapping prosecution against Stock based on a victim's statement; the charges were later nol-prossed without a probable cause hearing. The trial court denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict, and a jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict because the evidence established probable cause as a matter of law. Probable cause existed based on the victim's detailed statement, which the defendant had no reason to doubt and which was not shown to have been substantively altered, and the court noted that neither the later dismissal of charges nor any personal animosity toward the plaintiff could negate that probable cause.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

This case involved a dispute over the estate of Zella Shaka after her death, in which her stepchildren claimed that she and her late husband Athan had made an oral agreement to execute mutual wills leaving their combined property equally to Athan's three children. The plaintiffs sought to enforce that agreement in equity after Zella's 1973 will left most of the estate to her son James. A jury found that the oral agreement existed, the trial court upheld the verdict and imposed a constructive trust to divide the assets equally, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that multiple statements by Zella confirming the agreement, corroborated by other witnesses and the surrounding circumstances, provided clear and convincing evidence supporting the jury's finding.

family lawproperty

The case involved the conviction of a defendant for the attempted first-degree murder of his wife, after he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and waived a bifurcated trial. The trial court admitted expert testimony from the State on the battered wife syndrome, which suggested the assault fit a pattern of domestic violence rather than resulting from mental illness, to rebut the defense psychiatrists' insanity opinions; it also allowed the testimony in rebuttal and instructed the jury on the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance. The defendant appealed, arguing the evidence was prejudicial and irrelevant to insanity, that rebuttal use and hypothetical questions were improper, and that the burden allocation and lack of explicit sequencing instructions violated due process by shifting the State's burden. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testimony was relevant to the insanity issue and not unduly prejudicial, that the State could introduce sanity evidence in rebuttal for an affirmative defense, that the instructions sufficiently prevented confusion between intent and insanity, and that the burden allocation was constitutional. The court noted the defendant could have requested bifurcation to separate the issues but did not.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a wrongful death action under RSA 556:11 could be brought on behalf of a nonviable fetus that was aborted following a car accident allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff, who was 10 to 12 weeks pregnant at the time of the crash, sought damages both for her own injuries and as administratrix for the fetus. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that no such action lies for a nonviable fetus, adhering to prior precedent in Poliquin v. MacDonald that required viability for a stillborn fetus to support a death claim. The court reasoned that common-law protections for fetuses were always contingent on live birth, that Bennett v. Hymers permitted prenatal-injury suits only by children born alive, and that policy considerations require limiting the scope of liability rather than extending it to nonviable fetuses.

torts & liabilityfamily law

The case involved claims by the executrix of Robert C. Brice's estate against a nursing home for alleged negligence in care and breach of a contract to provide a special diet, filed more than two years after the decedent's 1973 death. The court held that RSA 556:11 barred the tort-based negligence claim but did not bar the contract claim in assumpsit. The core reasoning was that the statute creates a substantive limit on actions that abate at death under common law, such as torts, rather than a merely procedural limitation subject to equitable estoppel; contract actions do not abate in the same manner and the damages sought were consistent with contractual recovery. The matter was remanded for further proceedings on the contract count.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned plaintiffs' petition for certiorari seeking superior court review of the Keene Planning Board's approval of the Acorn Ridge Subdivision as a planned unit development. The superior court dismissed the petition after finding that the plaintiffs had not shown the board's decision to be illegal, unjust, or unreasonable. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs had standing as aggrieved persons under RSA 36:34 despite not abutting the property, clarifying that certiorari orders require judicial review of the petition before issuance rather than automatic clerk action or board reconsideration, and concluding that the subdivision met applicable zoning density and design requirements without needing additional open space or amenities. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs bore the burden to prove the decision's invalidity by a balance of probabilities but failed to do so.

propertyprocedure

In this divorce case, the wife challenged the trial court's authority to award alimony and substantial property to the husband and argued that the distribution was an abuse of discretion. The court held that RSA 458:22, construed to avoid constitutional invalidity under equal protection principles, empowers courts to order payments to husbands in the nature of alimony when justice requires. It further ruled that the evidence supported the marital master's recommendations regarding the husband's limited education and earning capacity, the assets acquired during the marriage, and the wife's substantial income, so the awards did not exceed the court's broad discretion. The decision therefore affirmed the decree granting the husband a Florida condominium, a shopping center, other real property, jewelry, and monthly support.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether plaintiffs injured in a 1974 car accident could bring a direct action against the deceased driver's insurer under RSA 268:16 I, after failing to file a timely claim against the driver's estate under RSA ch. 556. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that no such direct action is available, reversing the trial court's denial of the insurer's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the statute's provision making the insurer's liability "absolute" still requires a final judgment against the insured as a prerequisite to any duty to pay, and that the two-year limitation period for suits against estates rationally advances the goal of efficient estate administration and thus does not violate equal protection.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a legislative appropriation of funds sufficient for a 7 percent salary increase for university system employees required the Board of Trustees to provide that increase to all employees or permitted merit-based distribution. The State Employees' Association, representing certain university employees, sought a declaratory judgment after some received no increase or less than 7 percent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court decided that the appropriation mandated a 7 percent across-the-board raise for every employee. Its core reasoning was that the statute's clear language, the legislative purpose of cost-of-living relief, comparisons to state employee raises, and supporting legislative history and recent practices all indicated an intent for uniform increases rather than discretionary merit awards.

labor & employment

This case involved a contract dispute between a New Hampshire manufacturer of wooden crutches and a Canadian brokerage company that sold hardwood veneer, where the plaintiff alleged late delivery and poor quality of goods ordered for delivery in Laconia. The plaintiff served process on the defendant under New Hampshire's long-arm statute, RSA 300:14, and the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that jurisdiction was proper, concluding that the statute applied because the contract was to be performed in part in New Hampshire and that the defendant's contacts with the state—including repeated sales, advertising in trade magazines distributed there, and an officer's visit—were sufficient to satisfy due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision rested on the view that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being sued in New Hampshire given its ongoing business activities and the fact that the suit arose directly from those activities.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether Michael Galvin qualified as a resident of his mother's household under her auto insurance policy issued by Travelers, which would extend liability coverage to him for an accident in which he was driving and injured passenger Connolly. The trial court found that Galvin was not a household resident at the time of the October 1976 crash, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that evidence of Galvin's lease of a separate residence, his stated intent to make a permanent change and live on his own, and his temporary returns only for convenience supported the finding that he did not reside with his mother. The court also held that a reasonable reading of the policy would not extend coverage under these facts. The declaratory judgment action resolved the coverage dispute in favor of the insurer.

torts & liabilityprocedure