John W. King

This case involved a debt collection action by Mast Road Grain & Building Materials Co. against Ray Piet, Inc. and its officers, including Ella Piet as guarantor, under a credit agreement that imposed a 24% annual finance charge on unpaid balances. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 24% interest from the date of demand until payment, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed that portion of the ruling. The court interpreted the credit agreement to mean that the contractual 24% rate accrued only up to the date of demand for immediate payment (treated as the filing of suit on November 17, 1981), after which remedies were limited to collection costs and attorney's fees. It held that, absent a clear contractual provision extending the higher rate post-demand, statutory interest at 10% under RSA 336:1 and RSA 524:1-a applies once litigation begins to prove and collect the debt.

business & regulatory

The case involved Joseph Toto's conviction for unauthorized possession of a narcotic drug after police found prescription drugs in his possession while he was in protective custody for intoxication. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the inventory search of the defendant's garbage bag was permissible under state law to reduce the likelihood of injury and did not violate due process. However, the court vacated the extended sentence because the defendant had not received prior notice of the possible application of the extended term statute as required, and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edward Stiles, a cab driver charged with two counts of theft by unauthorized taking and one count of attempted theft after he accompanied 81-year-old Frances George to multiple bank branches in January 1981 and withdrew thousands of dollars in cash from her account by stating she needed the money for bills, relocation, or transfer to another bank. The trial court denied pretrial motions to dismiss and found Stiles competent to stand trial, resulting in convictions on all counts. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed one theft conviction because the indictment failed to provide enough factual detail to notify the defendant of the specific charge, affirmed the remaining convictions after rejecting challenges to certain testimony and the victim's identification at trial, and remanded for a new competency determination because the trial court had applied an incorrect standard that did not match the Dusky test for the defendant's ability to understand proceedings and assist counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether New Hampshire's RSA chapter 483-A gave the state Wetlands Board exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving state waters, thereby barring private lawsuits for violations of common-law riparian rights. Plaintiffs, downstream landowners, sued defendants who had dredged a channel to divert the Cockermouth River without a permit, alleging damage to their property; the superior court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not clearly abrogate common-law rights to sue for unlawful diversions and that the board's regulatory authority over permits and penalties did not extend to resolving private riparian disputes when no prior authorization had been sought. The court rejected arguments based on primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, noting the statute provided no administrative path for such claims. It remanded the case for trial on the merits.

environmentpropertyprocedure

In State v. Harlow, the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered an interlocutory transfer from the district court regarding the handling and search of a person taken into protective custody under RSA chapter 172-B after police observed him walking unsteadily and determined he was intoxicated and incapacitated. The defendant was pat-searched, transported to jail, and had his wallet searched during booking, which revealed LSD capsules leading to drug possession charges; he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing violations of the statute and constitutions. The court held that police were not required to exhaust all other options before lodging an incapacitated person in jail but failed to meet additional statutory requirements under RSA 172-B:3, II and III, and that the wallet search exceeded the statute's limits allowing searches only for identification and to prevent injury. The court concluded the search violated RSA 172-B:3, VII, so the evidence must be suppressed, without reaching constitutional questions. Remanded.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce four of the defendant's prior criminal convictions (for issuing a bad check, disobeying a police officer, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest) to impeach her credibility if she testified at her misdemeanor theft trial. The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the conviction. The court explained that New Hampshire law permits the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment in the trial court's discretion to allow the jury to assess the defendant's credibility when she chooses to testify. It further held that convictions need not directly involve dishonesty to be admissible, as they may reflect a general contempt for the law, and that the potential effect of discouraging the defendant from testifying does not render the ruling improper.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from the Manchester Board of Mayor and Aldermen's decision to widen Granite Street and take about fifteen feet of property owned by V.S.H. Realty, Inc., with Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc., and Fireline Petroleum, Inc., as lessees. The plaintiffs appealed to superior court under RSA 231:34, arguing there was no reasonable occasion or necessity for the widening, and contested whether they were entitled to a jury trial and the proper scope of review. The superior court denied referral to a master and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, prompting an interlocutory appeal on the questions of jury entitlement and whether the appeal allowed a full new trial or only limited review for fraud, gross mistake, or insufficient evidence. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that there is no right to a jury trial on the issues of occasion and necessity in such eminent domain proceedings, as neither the constitution nor the relevant statutes provide one. However, it ruled that the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial de novo in superior court rather than limited appellate review, because the 1981 recodification of the appeal statute retained language previously interpreted to allow a new trial and showed no intent to narrow the scope of review.

propertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Charles Zysk's convictions for burglary and theft by unauthorized taking after he was accused of breaking into AAmco Transmission in Manchester and stealing tools. Zysk appealed, arguing that delays in his trial violated his speedy trial rights under the federal and state constitutions, that his confession should have been suppressed because he was intoxicated and did not validly waive his Miranda rights, that the confession lacked sufficient corroborating evidence, and that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence were improper. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the convictions after applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test to the speedy trial claim, finding the delays were justified and the defendant had not promptly asserted his rights or shown prejudice; it also upheld the trial court's rulings that the confession was voluntary with adequate corroboration and that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly stated the law without shifting the burden of proof.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether plaintiff Dwight Peabody had timely secured a mechanic's lien on defendant Raymond Wentzell's property for work reconstructing a sawmill after a fire. The court affirmed the master's ruling that the lien had expired because the contract work was completed in late September 1979, triggering the 90-day continuation period under RSA 447:9, and the attachment was not filed until March 1980. The core reasoning was that evidence of the parties' conduct supported the finding that additional work performed after September was not part of the original contract and did not extend the statutory period for securing the lien.

propertyprocedure

The case arose from a bank's foreclosure on a mortgage securing loans totaling $120,000 on an inn owned by the plaintiff, after the plaintiff fell more than nine months behind in payments; the bank sold the property for $150,000, prompting the plaintiff to file an eighteen-count writ alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligence, and wrongful foreclosure. The superior court dismissed seven counts on a motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment on the remaining eleven, and the plaintiff appealed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud-based counts because they failed to allege specific fraudulent representations made with intent to induce action, reversed the dismissal of count I because it adequately stated a breach of contract claim with resulting damages, affirmed the summary judgments and procedural rulings, and held that the plaintiff waived objections to the qualifications of the appointed master and auditor by participating in the proceedings without timely objection. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the surviving claim.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved determining which school district was responsible for the special education costs of Bryan L., a child adjudicated delinquent and committed to the Youth Development Center until the end of his minority. After his parents relocated from Manchester to Littleton, the trial court initially assigned liability to Manchester but later, following a statutory amendment, assigned it to Littleton; the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the latter ruling on appeal. The court held that under RSA 186-C:13, liability rests with the district where the child resides, defined by legal custody rather than physical placement, and that the parents retained legal custody despite the YDC commitment. It drew on the statutory definition of residence and precedent interpreting similar provisions to conclude that Bryan resided with his parents in Littleton.

criminal lawfamily law

This case concerns whether New Hampshire courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a lawsuit seeking damages for injuries from a car accident that occurred in Manchester, New Hampshire. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently lent his car to an unlicensed driver who then drove to New Hampshire and caused the crash. The superior court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed on interlocutory appeal. The court held that the state's long-arm statute, RSA 510:4, reaches nonresidents when a tortious act produces injury inside the state, even if the underlying conduct occurred elsewhere, and that this application satisfies federal due process because the defendant specifically authorized use of the vehicle on New Hampshire roads, making litigation there foreseeable.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over a preemptive right to purchase real estate reserved in a 1951 deed by William Morse Cole when conveying property to Kaiora Camp, Inc. The plaintiff, North Bay Council, Inc., which bought the property in 1962 without actual knowledge of the right, sought a declaration that it could sell the property freely and an injunction against the defendants, Cole's heirs, from interfering. The court decided that the preemptive right was valid but subject to the rule against perpetuities, becoming void twenty-one years after Cole's death in 1961, and that the defendants were barred by laches from enforcing specific performance at the 1962 purchase price due to their failure to investigate despite constructive notice and the resulting prejudice to the plaintiff from increased land value. The core reasoning was that New Hampshire courts apply the rule against perpetuities flexibly to honor the grantor's intent and that laches applies when ignorance stems from negligence in not investigating recorded deeds.

property

The case involved a libel suit by a town's former fire chief against thirteen citizens who signed a petition accusing him of misconduct and seeking his removal, which was submitted to the board of selectmen and led to a hearing where all charges were dismissed. The trial court dismissed the action, finding the petition absolutely privileged as part of a judicial proceeding. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petition was not absolutely privileged because the selectmen's hearing lacked the procedural safeguards of a true judicial proceeding, but it was protected by a qualified privilege tied to the constitutional right to petition for removal of a public official. Under this privilege, the defendants could be liable only if the plaintiff proved they knew the statements were false. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the privilege applied based on the facts.

free speechtorts & liability

The case involved a boundary dispute between neighboring landowners in Clarksville, New Hampshire, concerning whether the plaintiff's property extended to the centerline or easterly side of Hurlburt Farm Road or only to the westerly side. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the boundary was the westerly side of the road, rejecting the plaintiff's claims to title by deed or adverse possession and to an easement by adverse use. The decision was based on the language of the original deed from the common predecessor, which did not convey any part of the road, and findings that the neighbors' use of the road and fence was permissive rather than adverse.

property

The case centered on a cable company's attempt to enforce an option to purchase a building included in its lease with a local Odd Fellows lodge, after the lodge refused to sell without consent from the organization's Grand Lodge as required by its internal code. The superior court granted specific performance, finding the cable company protected as a third-party purchaser without notice under the recording statute. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the company was not a bona fide purchaser because it had not paid the purchase price before receiving notice of the consent requirement, and that specific performance was an inappropriate remedy since it would compel a non-party to consent to the sale.

property

The case involves Blue Cross/Blue Shield's efforts to enforce a subrogation clause in a health insurance policy to recover medical expenses it paid for a minor, Marc St. Cyr, who was injured in a motorcycle accident caused by a school bus. The insurer sued the minor directly and sought to attach part of any settlement, but the trial court ruled the action premature and suggested intervention in the underlying tort suits. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had no enforceable subrogation rights against the minor because, under established law, the parent rather than the child is liable for and entitled to recover a minor's medical expenses. The opinion also addressed a related claim against another insurer for tortious interference with contractual relations, reversing summary judgment due to unresolved factual issues about intent.

healthcarefamily lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a declaratory judgment action by the Laconia Rod & Gun Club against its insurer, Hartford, to determine whether the insurer was required to defend a negligence lawsuit brought by a patron injured after being served alcohol at the club. The policy contained an exclusion for liability arising from the sale or service of alcoholic beverages by an insured engaged in that business or by an owner of premises used for that purpose, if based on violation of alcohol laws or service to an intoxicated person. The superior court ruled that the exclusion applied and barred coverage. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that the phrase 'in the business of' was ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured club, which did not operate for profit, so the exclusion did not apply and coverage existed.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved homeowners who sought a zoning variance to operate a beauty salon in the basement of their single-family residence due to the wife's illness preventing outside work. After the zoning board initially denied the variance and later granted it on rehearing following a remand, the superior court set aside the board's decision, and the defendants appealed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicants failed to show unnecessary hardship because the wife's illness related to personal circumstances rather than special conditions unique to the land, and the parking area on the property did not render it unsuitable for residential use and was self-created. The court did not reach the alternative ground of res judicata.

property

This case concerned whether a surviving spouse could claim a statutory one-third share of a deceased spouse's estate under RSA 560:10 by challenging transfers to a revocable inter vivos trust. The wife had placed nearly all her assets into such a trust, retaining full powers to amend, revoke, or control the property during her life, with income going to the husband after her death and the remainder to their children. The husband waived the will and sought to invalidate the transfers as illusory to include the assets in the estate. The court held that such transfers defeat the spouse's statutory rights unless made specifically to deprive the surviving spouse of those rights, following the intent-based test from prior New Hampshire cases rather than adopting the illusory transfer doctrine from Newman v. Dore. The reasoning centered on balancing the policy allowing free disposition of property against protecting a surviving spouse's guaranteed share, while noting that the legislature could alter the approach if desired.

family lawproperty