Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1981-07-02 · cited 4×
This case involves an appeal by Sharon Steel Corporation and Summit Systems, Inc. from a New Hampshire insurance commissioner's cease-and-desist order under the state's Security Takeover Disclosure Act (RSA ch. 421-A). The companies had acquired over 10% of Nashua Corporation's stock through nine open-market block transactions on national exchanges without complying with the act's registration and disclosure requirements for takeover bids; they argued the purchases fell under a statutory exemption for broker-dealer transactions in the ordinary course without solicitation and that the act was unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. The commissioner found that brokerage activity on the plaintiffs' behalf involved solicitation, triggering the act, and the superior court proceedings led to an interlocutory transfer presenting issues of statutory interpretation and constitutionality. The court held that the transactions constituted a takeover bid subject to the act and that the statute applies constitutionally because it regulates evenhandedly, advances New Hampshire's interest in protecting local shareholders of companies headquartered in the state, and does not impose burdens on interstate commerce that are clearly excessive relative to local benefits.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Corso v. Merrill
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-08-20 · cited 144×
In Corso v. Merrill, parents sued a driver for negligent infliction of emotional distress after one parent heard a car strike their child outside their home and both immediately observed the seriously injured child at the scene. The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed whether such bystander recovery was possible, reversing the trial court's dismissal of the claims. The court overruled its prior precedent in Jelley v. LaFlame, which had required plaintiffs to be in the zone of physical danger, and instead permitted recovery when the emotional distress was foreseeable under traditional negligence principles. It relied on evolving case law from other states, scholarly commentary, and the facts that the parents sensorially perceived the accident and its immediate aftermath. The case was remanded for trial on the emotional distress counts.
torts & liability
Wise Shoe Co. v. Town of Exeter
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-08-20 · cited 5×
This case involved two petitions for tax abatement filed by Wise Shoe Co. and its successor Sports-Tek, Inc., challenging the Town of Exeter's assessments on a commercial property for the tax years 1975 and 1976 under RSA 76:17. The trial court dismissed both petitions, finding insufficient evidence of disproportionate taxation for 1976 and ruling that Sports-Tek lacked standing as a person aggrieved for the 1975 taxes because it did not own the property on the assessment date. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of both actions, holding that expert testimony and the purchase price supported the trial court's conclusion that the assessments were consistent with fair market value at a 100% equalization ratio, and that while an assignment of the 1975 claim conferred standing, the same evidentiary record precluded abatement for that year as well.
taxespropertyprocedure
State v. Boone
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-08-17 · cited 15×
In State v. Boone, the defendant was indicted and convicted by a jury of aggravated felonious sexual assault for allegedly raping the victim in a deserted parking lot after meeting her at a party, with evidence showing the victim suffered severe injuries requiring surgery. The court addressed two procedural issues: whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment at the close of the state's case for insufficient proof that the victim was not his spouse, and whether it erred in refusing a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple assault. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly denied both requests, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence from witness testimony that the victim had just met the defendant that night to prove she was not his spouse, and that a simple assault instruction was not warranted because the evidence, including the defendant's admission of sexual penetration, was incompatible with guilt of only the lesser offense. The court overruled the defendant's exceptions.
criminal lawprocedure
Fletcher v. Frisbee
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-07-18 · cited 27×
This case involved commercial lessees who attempted to exercise a five-year lease renewal option but sent notice by regular mail a few days after the required 30-day deadline. The trial court ruled that the lessees had not properly exercised the option and that the landlord had no duty to extend the lease. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that equity can relieve a slight delay in exercising an option when the landlord suffers no prejudice from a change in position, that notice by regular mail was sufficient because it achieved the same purpose as registered mail, and that a renewal clause calling for mutually agreed rent is enforceable by implying a reasonable rental amount. The court sustained the lessees' exceptions and remanded the case for the trial court to decide whether specific performance of the renewal should be granted.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Walker v. Walker
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-07-18 · cited 6×
This case involved a post-divorce dispute in which the plaintiff, Mr. Walker, sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to invalidate the superior court's appointment of a commissioner to sell the parties' jointly owned house and to remove that commissioner. The divorce decree had directed that the property be sold and proceeds divided equally once certain conditions were met, but the plaintiff refused to cooperate with the sale after his ex-wife remarried. The trial court ruled that it had authority to appoint the commissioner and found no cause for removal, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that RSA 458:19 grants broad ancillary powers to effectuate property divisions in divorce cases, a practice widely recognized in other jurisdictions, and that evidence of the plaintiff's lack of cooperation justified the appointment while the commissioner's actions were reasonable and did not demonstrate bias. The court also imposed double costs on the plaintiff for pursuing repeated frivolous challenges.
family lawpropertyprocedure
State v. Noel
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-07-11 · cited 15×
The case involved a defendant convicted of burglary after being found hiding at a restaurant that had been broken into, with tools and evidence of forced entry and theft inside. The defendant challenged the admission of his statements made after receiving Miranda warnings, arguing that drug and alcohol intoxication prevented him from understanding his rights and making a valid waiver, and also sought a directed verdict on grounds that intoxication negated the specific intent required for burglary. The court overruled both exceptions and upheld the conviction. It held that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant understood his Miranda rights based on the circumstances and his responses at the scene, and that sufficient evidence, including the officers' observations of sobriety and the physical evidence, allowed a reasonable jury to find the requisite intent despite the intoxication defense.
criminal lawprocedure
Goodrow v. Perrin
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-06-27 · cited 37×
The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Albert Goodrow, Jr., who had pleaded guilty and served a sentence for violating New Hampshire's statutory rape law (RSA 632-A:3) by engaging in sexual relations with a 14-year-old when he was 23. Goodrow challenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing that it infringed on a fundamental right of privacy in consensual adult sexual activity and that it imposed criminal liability without requiring proof of a culpable mental state (mens rea or scienter) regarding the victim's age. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied the petition, assuming without deciding that a privacy right existed but holding that the state's compelling interest in protecting minors outweighed it; the court further ruled that the legislature could validly impose strict liability in this context without violating due process. The decision rested on precedents recognizing the state's independent interest in youth welfare and the historical treatment of statutory rape as an offense not requiring knowledge of age.
criminal lawcivil rights
Culhane v. Culhane
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-05-23 · cited 3×
This case involved a former wife's suit in assumpsit against her former husband to recover unpaid amounts due under a 1969 written separation agreement that provided for weekly support payments to her and their children. The trial court enforced the agreement and awarded damages of $19,169.05, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing an agreed statement of facts. The court held that New York law governed the contract's validity and found the agreement enforceable because it contained no express written provision requiring divorce or dissolution of the marriage, mutual promises supplied adequate consideration, and prior child-support modification orders in other states did not trigger res judicata, collateral estoppel, or full-faith-and-credit bars since those proceedings addressed different issues. The opinion notes that the separation agreement expressly survived any divorce decree.
family lawprocedure
Paquette v. St. Clair
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-05-23 · cited 4×
This case involved a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff hired the defendants, who were in the antiques business, to appraise and sell her antiques on consignment under a written agreement that included a 25% commission and required the plaintiff's approval for sales. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants made untimely payments, sold items below agreed prices, and wrongfully retained unsold property, leading to a trial before a master who found for the plaintiff and awarded $2,500 in damages plus interest and $750 in legal expenses. The superior court approved the verdict, and on appeal the supreme court affirmed, reasoning that the record supported findings of withheld funds for two years justifying interest, losses from below-value sales, and bad faith conduct that warranted an award of legal fees under applicable law.
business & regulatoryproperty
Wood v. General Electric Co.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-05-09 · cited 23×
In Wood v. General Electric Co., the plaintiff sought workers' compensation for permanent partial disability of his right leg following a 1972 industrial accident, appealing a labor commissioner's award of 10% impairment that excluded evidence of pain affecting use. After the superior court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under RSA 281:26 IV, the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted certiorari, ruling the petition timely under a prospective 30-day guideline drawn from RSA 281:37 I. The court held that loss of use due to pain is compensable, interpreting the statute's reference to "loss or loss of the use" of a body member to include pain that prevents normal function, supported by medical evidence and out-of-state precedents, and remanded for redetermination by the commissioner.
labor & employmentprocedure
Carbonneau v. Town of Exeter
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-04-20 · cited 18×
This case involved a property owner in Exeter seeking a variance to convert a barn on his residentially zoned lot into a beauty parlor for his son, after the zoning board denied the application on grounds that no hardship was shown, property values would be harmed, and the use would violate the ordinance's spirit. The superior court overturned the denial, ordered the variance granted, and ruled the R-2 residential classification unreasonable as applied to the property, though it upheld the ordinance's enactment. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the superior court, concluding that the statutory requirements for a variance—including unnecessary hardship tied to unique property conditions—were not met because the lot retained residential potential and was not distinguishable from surrounding land. The court also affirmed that the zoning ordinance was validly enacted with adequate notice. The ruling restored the board's denial of the variance.
propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Erin Food Services, Inc. v. 688 Properties
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-04-13 · cited 34×
This case involved a dispute over whether Erin Food Services validly exercised an option to purchase property from 688 Properties under a series of build-and-lease agreements for a Burger King restaurant. The plaintiff sought specific performance after tendering a purchase price that excluded appreciation on the property from 1971 to 1973 and offering an available site in Illinois. The court found that the 1973 lease contained a mutual mistake, as the parties had agreed that 688 Properties would receive a full return on its investment including appreciation from 1971 onward, and that Erin's tendered price was therefore insufficient. The lease was reformed accordingly, rendering the option exercise invalid and vacating the decree of specific performance. The ruling rested on evidence of the parties' intent and conduct, including prior tenders that included the full appreciation period.
propertybusiness & regulatory
New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-04-13 · cited 30×
This case involved a workers' compensation claim by the widow of a company executive who died from a heart attack after periods of intense work-related stress during a company merger and subsequent inventory process. The deputy labor commissioner initially awarded benefits, but the superior court denied them, finding insufficient evidence that the employment caused the heart attack. The New Hampshire Supreme Court remanded the case, ruling that prolonged psychological stress from work can be a compensable cause of a heart attack if both legal causation (work-related stress exceeding normal levels, depending on the employee's prior health) and medical causation (stress probably contributed to the attack) are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
labor & employment
King v. Thomson
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-04-13 · cited 7×
This case involved a petition for a writ of certiorari by John King, the former director of probation, seeking an order requiring the State to pay the unpaid balance of his legal fees and expenses from defending against an unsuccessful removal proceeding brought by the New Hampshire Board of Probation under RSA 4:1. The removal hearing lasted fifty days, and King had to retain private counsel after his request for state-provided counsel was denied by the Acting Governor and Executive Council, while the board received such representation. The court granted the petition and ordered the State to pay the contested balance of $28,559.41. The core reasoning was that RSA 4:1 created a protected property interest in King's office that could only be removed for cause after notice and hearing, and by defending himself King was protecting an important state interest in retaining qualified officials. Multiple statutes, including RSA 7:8, 7:9, and 7:12, along with a later amendment to RSA 4:1, demonstrated the legislature's intent that the State cover reasonable counsel fees when a state official defends against such proceedings.
procedurelabor & employmentcivil rights
Meserve v. State
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-03-23 · cited 5×
In this case, the Boston & Maine Corporation appealed a public utilities commission order requiring it to bear the costs of maintaining railroad warning signals at a grade crossing built for a state highway extension, after the commission had initially assigned those costs to the state. The court affirmed the order, holding that the commission had jurisdiction under RSA 365:28 to reconsider and modify its prior order despite the expiration of the rehearing deadline in RSA 541:3, because the earlier order conflicted with the statutory mandate in RSA 373:10. The court reasoned that RSA 373:10 unambiguously requires railroads to maintain and pay for such signals, that this statutory directive overrides any prior allocation, and that res judicata does not bar correction of a legal error when the commission has ongoing authority to alter its orders.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Chasse v. Banas
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-02-28 · cited 14×
The case involved a patient involuntarily committed to the New Hampshire Hospital who alleged that doctors negligently prescribed and administered excessive daily doses of the drug Mellaril, far above recommended levels, causing her permanent vision loss. The trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the individual doctors, the hospital superintendent, and the state hospital on grounds of sovereign immunity. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed those dismissals and remanded for trial, ruling that RSA chapter 135-B waived sovereign immunity by expressly guaranteeing civilly committed mental patients a right to adequate and humane treatment. The court reasoned that this statutory right implies a damages remedy for breaches of the duty of proper medical care and that the statute applied retroactively because it created no new duties for the defendants.
civil rightshealthcaretorts & liability
Kennedy v. Shaw
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-02-28 · cited 11×
This case involved a dispute between a plaintiff and his former attorney (defendant) over mortgages on the plaintiff's business and personal property, including a request for an accounting, constructive trust, and discharge of mortgages. The trial court, after the defendant failed to timely answer an amended bill in equity seeking discharge of two specific mortgages, treated the allegations as confessed under court rules and ordered the mortgages discharged. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld this decision, ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a late answer, as the defendant (an attorney representing himself) had no valid excuse, and the confessed facts supported the relief granted.
propertyprocedure
Corson v. Brown Products, Inc.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1979-01-31 · cited 38×
The case involved Freeman Corson, who suffered a work-related head injury on January 7, 1976, resulting in permanent irreversible coma and total loss of bodily function, after he had already been awarded total disability benefits under RSA 281:23 and medical benefits under RSA 281:21. Corson sought additional scheduled permanent impairment benefits under RSA 281:26, which the labor commissioner denied based on the worker's lack of awareness of the losses, drawing from informal committee discussions rather than statutory text. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that RSA 281:26 entitles the employee to impairment benefits as a separate right based solely on loss of use, without any requirement of consciousness or awareness, and remanded the matter for determination of reasonable attorney fees while ruling that interest is not available on the medical benefits awarded.
labor & employmentprocedure
State v. Goodwin
Supreme Court of New Hampshire · 1978-12-20 · cited 38×
The case involved a defendant convicted as an accomplice to kidnapping and aggravated felonious sexual assault after he was present during the abduction and rape of a high school student by the principal offender, Francis Taylor, including actions such as unlocking his apartment and failing to intervene. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the accomplice-to-aggravated-felonious-sexual-assault conviction, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant's presence and conduct aided the commission of the crimes under RSA 626:8. However, the court reduced the kidnapping conviction from a class A felony to a class B felony, holding that rape alone did not constitute the required 'serious bodily injury' under RSA 633:1 II and that the trial judge improperly made this factual determination at sentencing instead of submitting it to the jury with proper instructions. The case was remanded for resentencing on the kidnapping charge under class B standards.
criminal law