Stephen Morse Wheeler

This case was an eminent domain proceeding in which the State took 5.6 acres of the plaintiffs' land in fee and landlocked another 17.1 acres for the construction of Interstate 93, with the jury awarding $7,000 in damages after trial. The State appealed, contending that evidence of the quantities of gravel and loam on the taken and landlocked parcels, along with prior gross income from gravel operations, was improperly admitted and could lead to an excessive or speculative verdict. The court ruled that the evidence was competent to establish the property's most advantageous use and fair market value at the time of taking, as long as the jury was instructed not to compute damages by simply multiplying unit quantities by market prices, and found no error in the admission of the evidence or the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a landowner appealing an eminent domain damages award for land taken for a schoolhouse after the 60-day statutory deadline had passed due to mistake and misfortune. The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the appeal must be filed within sixty days as required by RSA 199:18, which incorporates the strict time limit from highway cases under RSA 234:24 stating "and not thereafter." The core reasoning was that statutes of limitation are absolute, with no provision for extensions, and the court lacks inherent power to extend them contrary to clear legislative intent. Since amending the appeal would not change the outcome, no remand was needed.

propertyprocedure

In Allen v. Hampton, several property owners sued the town of Hampton for negligence in failing to maintain its municipal drainage system, resulting in water damage to their real estate and belongings. The town moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity and that no cause of action was stated. The court denied the motions, holding that a municipality can be liable for negligence in drainage maintenance whether the system is a governmental or proprietary function, particularly when negligent acts invade adjoining property owners' rights, as established in precedents regarding highways and municipal works. The case was remanded for further proceedings after the exceptions were overruled.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case was a challenge by neighboring property owners to the Manchester zoning board of adjustment's grant of a variance permitting conversion of a large old dwelling and garage at 754 Chestnut Street into a dwelling and funeral home in a single-residence zoning district. The trial court dismissed the appeal after a hearing, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board's decision was not unreasonable or unlawful under RSA 31:78. The majority reasoned that the record supported findings of unnecessary hardship from the property's size and age limiting its marketability for permitted uses, that the neighborhood's character had been altered by many prior variances allowing multi-family and business uses, and that the proposed use would not adversely affect the area or violate the ordinance's spirit, with conditions for screening and signs. A dissent argued that no special conditions existed to justify a business use variance in a prevailing residential zone.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a challenge to the timeliness of an appeal from a decision by the Commissioner of Employment Security regarding an employer's liability under RSA 282. The Superior Court initially denied the state's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, but the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the appeal was not filed within the required ten days after the mailing of the decision. The court reasoned that even though the tenth day fell on a Sunday, extending the deadline to Monday March 1, the plaintiff mailed the appeal notice on that Monday and it was received on Tuesday March 2, which was after the deadline under RSA 282:6-F(4). Therefore, the appeal was dismissed and judgment was entered for the defendant.

procedurelabor & employment

This case involved a plaintiff who was injured after falling on a defective public sidewalk adjacent to the defendant's business premises in Manchester, New Hampshire. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had prior notice of the defect but failed to repair it, though no affirmative act by the defendant caused the issue. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the abutting property owner owed no duty to maintain or repair the public sidewalk. The reasoning relied on the common-law rule that such owners have no obligation to keep public sidewalks safe absent causing the defect, with the statutory duty to repair instead resting on municipal highway agents under RSA 252:3 and RSA 247:10. The case was remanded accordingly.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved personal injury claims by Mildred Gossler against the city of Manchester after she fell on a city sidewalk, with her husband seeking consequential damages. The city moved to dismiss on grounds that highway maintenance is a governmental function shielded from tort liability under municipal immunity. The court upheld the dismissal, applying longstanding precedents that bar recovery against municipalities for such functions. It declined to abolish or modify the rule of governmental immunity, reasoning that the doctrine originated in early common law, remains followed by most jurisdictions, and that any change with potential widespread financial impacts on cities should come from the legislature rather than judicial action.

torts & liability

This case involves an eminent domain action in which the State of New Hampshire acquired the plaintiffs' entire lot and buildings for a highway bypass project, initially awarding $16,500 in compensation. A jury trial resulted in a verdict of $17,934 for the plaintiffs, who appealed various rulings, primarily challenging the qualifications of the State's expert witness on property valuation and the exclusion of certain costs like relocation expenses and taxes from the damages. The court determined that the expert was properly qualified based on his experience as an appraiser and assessor, that any issues with his testimony affected its weight rather than admissibility, and that removal costs, increased interest, and post-taking taxes were not recoverable elements of damage under established precedent. The plaintiffs' exceptions were overruled, upholding the jury's award.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether an out-of-state partnership acting as an itinerant vendor was required to pay Laconia a local license fee of three percent of the value of goods it purchased at a forced sale in the city, after already paying a state license fee and a deposit. The court decided the vendor was not liable for the local fee. The statute's computation method produced a charge unrelated to the costs of issuing licenses or regulating the business and instead operated as an ad valorem tax on the goods. Because the rate differed from the rate applied to other personal property in the city, the fee was invalid under the state constitution's proportionality requirement for taxes on estates.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a petition by the administratrix of an estate seeking an accounting from the decedent's sister, who managed his affairs under a power of attorney but refused to provide an account after his death in 1957. The lower court dismissed the petition on statute of limitations grounds, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the action is a bill in equity for accounting rather than an attempt to reopen the estate, and that the statute does not bar the claim because the defendant resided outside the state until 1963. The court reasoned that the general statute of limitations runs only against those within the state, and the allegations of the defendant's actions under the power of attorney state a valid cause of action unless barred, which they are not here.

procedureproperty

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by an insured party, Merrill Laplant, against his liability insurer, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., to determine whether the insurer was obligated to pay interest on tort verdicts from the date of the writs to the date of judgment, in addition to the policy limits of $25,000 per person. The underlying tort actions had resulted in verdicts totaling $49,756.72 plus costs, with pre-judgment interest of about $8,007.45, and the insurers had tendered the policy limits plus post-judgment interest. The court held that the insurer had no further liability beyond the amounts already tendered. The reasoning was based on the policy language, which required payment only of interest accruing after entry of judgment until the policy limit was paid or tendered, combined with the statutory rule that a tort defendant's liability includes pre-judgment interest but the insurer's contractual duty was limited accordingly; since the tender included the full policy amount plus all post-judgment interest, the obligation was satisfied.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved landowners in Exeter, New Hampshire, who sought a temporary injunction to prevent the town from condemning part of their property via eminent domain for a municipal sewage and waste treatment plant, arguing that RSA 252:5 authorized takings only for main drains or common sewers and not for treatment facilities. The court denied the injunction after the town deposited assessed damages of $3,500 (which the owners later withdrew) and an appeal on damages remained pending. It held that RSA 252:5 did not need to be read expansively because RSA 31:92 independently granted towns authority to condemn land for such public works, as confirmed by precedent in Leary v. Manchester. The petition was dismissed as no other basis for injunctive relief was presented, rendering mootness arguments unnecessary.

propertyenvironment

This case concerns a group of landowners along the Pemigewasset River who filed an equity action against an upstream paper manufacturer, alleging that its discharge of sulfite waste and other pollutants created a recurring private nuisance through foul odors, sludge deposits, and property damage. The defendant raised an affirmative defense based on state statutes classifying the river as Class D waters and granting a compliance period until 1969 before abatement orders could issue. The court sustained the plaintiffs' demurrer to that defense, holding that the water-classification law was intended to protect public health and welfare without abrogating private landowners' equitable remedies for nuisance, and that the Legislature lacked constitutional authority to authorize ongoing private nuisances. The matter was remanded for further proceedings on whether the nuisance could be abated by reasonable measures short of a total ban on discharges.

environmentpropertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved three consolidated actions arising from a March 1960 automobile collision at an intersection in Laconia, New Hampshire, in which Ruth Cormier and her minor daughter sought damages for personal injuries and property loss against defendant Robert Stevens, who in turn sued Cormier. After a jury trial, verdicts were returned for Stevens in all actions. The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, alleging that the verdicts rested in part on perjured testimony by Stevens and his expert witness regarding the expert's credentials and organization; they also argued that the evidence showed Stevens was negligent. The trial court denied the motions, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the offer of proof would at most impeach a non-party witness and did not meet the standard for setting aside a verdict, that credibility and liability questions were properly left to the jury, and that the evidence supported the finding that Stevens was not negligent.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries from a 1956 car accident caused by the decedent, filed against the estate's administrator after the decedent's death in 1962. The trial court dismissed the second action as barred by the general six-year statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that under RSA 556:11, since no action was pending at the time of death and the claim was not yet barred by the general limitations period at that time, the plaintiff could bring the suit within two years of the death, which he did. The first action had been dismissed for being filed too soon after the administrator's appointment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case was an appeal from a probate court decree disallowing the will of Lena M. Bartis on grounds that it was procured by undue influence by her son Stanley. The trial court found on the evidence that the 84-year-old testatrix, who was dependent on Stanley, isolated from other family members, and had executed multiple wills drafted at his direction, did not act with free will, and dismissed the appeal. The reviewing court affirmed, ruling that the evidence sufficiently established undue influence under the standard that the testatrix's will power was destroyed and another's substituted for it. Exceptions taken during trial were deemed waived as they were not briefed or argued.

family lawproperty

In Mutterperl v. Lake Spofford Hotel, Inc., the plaintiffs, consisting of the estate of Suzanne Mutterperl and her husband Sol individually, sued the defendant hotel after Mrs. Mutterperl fell and fractured her hip in their room on August 7, 1960, when the lights went out due to an overloaded and improperly fused electrical circuit triggered by plugging in a heater. The jury returned verdicts of $10,000 for the estate and $42,500 for Sol for medical expenses and loss of consortium. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the verdicts and overruled the defendant's exceptions, holding that expert testimony on the unsafe electrical installation was properly admitted, that the evidence supported a finding of negligence by the hotel, and that contributory negligence was not established as a matter of law considering the plaintiffs' ages and physical conditions. The court also found no error in the admission of evidence, jury instructions, or other trial rulings.

torts & liability

The case involved the Dover Housing Board petitioning to enforce a municipal housing ordinance under RSA ch. 48-A against the owner of an unoccupied multi-tenement building found to be dilapidated, a fire hazard, and unfit for human habitation. The court decided that the ordinance remained valid despite never being published after adoption, that the building qualified as a "dwelling" under the statutory definition even though it had been vacant for years, and that the board was entitled to remedial relief requiring the owner to bring the property into compliance or remove it. The core reasoning relied on longstanding precedent interpreting the publication statute as not invalidating ordinances for lack of publication, the broad statutory language covering structures intended for habitation, and the chapter's purpose to remedy unsafe housing conditions whether occupied or not.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Hardware Mutual Casualty Company seeking a ruling that its garage liability policy did not cover a minor driver, Kenneth Garabrant, who caused a fatal car accident while operating a vehicle loaned by its insured, Hopkins Garage, without permission. The trial court ruled that Hardware had no duty to defend the resulting tort suits, while Merchants Mutual Insurance Company was obligated under the driver's non-owner policy but not its family automobile policy. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the finding of no coverage under Hardware's policy due to the absence of any evidence of permission, express or implied, for Kenneth to use the vehicle. It further held that Merchants' non-owner and family policies both provided coverage for the accident, as the loaned car qualified as a temporary substitute automobile regardless of permission, obligating Merchants to defend the actions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved two plaintiffs seeking recovery for personal injuries and property damage from a 1962 automobile accident, with verdicts of $500 plus costs awarded to each in municipal court. The defendant sought to appeal the judgments to the Superior Court under a 1957 statute allowing appeals from municipal court civil judgments, but the court denied the appeal and transferred the legal questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that RSA 502:24, which makes findings of fact final in municipal courts in larger towns and directs legal questions to the Supreme Court, controlled over the later statute. It reasoned that the 1957 legislation did not repeal RSA 502:24 by implication, consistent with prior precedent interpreting similar provisions to avoid duplicative fact-finding. The court overruled the defendant's exceptions and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.

proceduretorts & liability