District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Kohn v. SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF HARRISBURG
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2011-09-22 · cited 12×
The case concerns three former Harrisburg School District administrators (superintendent, deputy superintendent, and assistant superintendent) who sued the School District, its Board of Control and Elected School Board along with their members, and the city mayor after their employment was terminated by a Board of Control vote without prior notice or a hearing. Plaintiffs alleged violations of federal and state due process protections, the state School Code, Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, and contractual rights, claiming they could not be discharged at will; one plaintiff additionally asserted a stigma-plus due process claim against the mayor. Defendants countered that the plaintiffs were at-will employees entitled to no process. The court evaluated multiple motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), reviewing the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs while considering attached documents and public records, and analyzed whether the plaintiffs possessed a protected property interest in continued employment under the Education Empowerment Act and related statutes.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Knaub v. TULLI
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2011-04-21 · cited 8×
In Knaub v. Tulli, a special-education teacher at a public cyber charter school sued the school and its CEO after she was suspended without pay and later terminated, alleging the actions stemmed from her advocacy on behalf of a non-student's individualized education program (IEP) and her internal complaints about confidentiality breaches and IEP compliance. The plaintiff brought claims for violations of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, First Amendment retaliation, and retaliation under the ADA, IDEA, and Rehabilitation Act. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissing the due process, equal protection, IDEA, and certain retaliation claims for failure to state plausible grounds for relief, while allowing the First Amendment retaliation claim based on internal complaints and the ADA/RA retaliation claim based on the May 2009 suspension to proceed. The decision rested on separating factual allegations from legal conclusions and assessing whether the remaining claims met the plausibility standard under Twombly and Iqbal.
civil rightsfree speechlabor & employment
Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2010-12-21
This case is a patent infringement action in which Kimberly-Clark sued First Quality Baby Products and related entities after an earlier declaratory judgment suit was dismissed. First Quality responded to Kimberly-Clark’s second amended complaint by filing an answer that added seven new counterclaims, including antitrust, fraud, Lanham Act, and unfair competition claims, along with new factual allegations. Kimberly-Clark moved to strike those counterclaims. The court granted the motion in part, striking six counterclaims because they would prejudice Kimberly-Clark, were filed after undue delay without leave of court, and fell outside the scope of the amended complaint; it allowed one counterclaim for false patent marking to remain because it was closely related to the patent issues and would not cause similar prejudice. The decision applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and considered factors such as prejudice, excusable neglect, and the interests of justice.
procedure
Dice v. Johnson
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2010-05-03 · cited 10×
The case involves the Dice family suing a humane society investigator, township code officers, a police officer, and an animal-rights activist over a 2007 property inspection, a fire that killed 18 dogs, a second fire that destroyed their farmhouse, and related citations for dog-law violations. The plaintiffs asserted federal claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments for retaliation, an unconstitutional search, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and due process violations, plus state claims for conspiracy, assault, malicious prosecution, defamation, and false light. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the record showed no genuine issues of material fact, including no evidence of coerced consent, retaliatory motive tied to protected conduct, or sufficient causation or malice to support the claims, after applying the summary-judgment standard and reviewing undisputed facts from the parties' statements and affidavits.
civil rightsprocedurefree speechcriminal law
Styers v. Pennsylvania
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2008-05-19 · cited 2×
In this § 1983 case, Pennsylvania State Police trooper Gregory Styers alleged that several defendants retaliated against him for using the internal grievance process to challenge a job transfer, in violation of his First Amendment rights. After trial, the jury found only one defendant, David Guido, liable and awarded $20,000 in punitive damages (later converted to $1 in nominal damages plus the punitive award), while other claims and defendants were dismissed. Styers' counsel then moved for $117,914.18 in attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court granted fees, recognizing Styers as a prevailing party whose success was not merely technical, but reduced the award due to the limited extent of relief obtained and excessive hours billed on tasks such as summary judgment briefing and trial preparation.
free speechcivil rights
St. Mary's Area Water Authority v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · 2007-02-02 · cited 18×
This case concerned a dispute between the St. Mary's Area Water Authority and its insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., over coverage under an all-risk policy for property losses from a chlorine gas leak caused by a pinhole in a pipe at a water-treatment facility. The Authority claimed coverage under the policy's mechanical-breakdown endorsement, while the insurer argued that exclusions for wear and tear, defect, corrosion, and pollution barred recovery. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court initially ruled that the insurer had to provide coverage, finding that denying it would render the mechanical-breakdown coverage illusory and that ambiguities in the pollution and contamination exclusions favored the insured. In this memorandum, the court addressed the insurer's motion for reconsideration of that interlocutory order, exercising broad discretion to review new evidence and arguments on whether coverage could apply without implicating the exclusions.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure