Morris Pashman

In Lynn v. Lynn, a divorce proceeding, the husband obtained a medical degree and license during the marriage while the wife worked to support the household; after the parties separated, the wife became disabled due to Meniere’s Disease and sought alimony and equitable distribution. The trial court treated the degree and license as marital property under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, valued it at over $300,000, and awarded the wife 20% of that value plus alimony and counsel fees. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the equitable distribution award, holding that professional degrees and licenses are not "property" subject to distribution, and remanded for redetermination of alimony (including reimbursement alimony based on the wife’s contributions and needs) and counsel fees in light of the changed distribution ruling. The Court reasoned that alimony, rather than property division, is the appropriate mechanism to address economic disparities and support obligations arising from the marriage.

family lawproperty

In this divorce case, the central issue was whether an M.B.A. degree earned by the husband during the marriage qualified as marital property subject to equitable distribution under New Jersey statute, and whether the wife could recover financial contributions she made to support him while he obtained the degree. The court held that the degree itself is not property because it lacks key attributes of property, such as transferability, and its value is too speculative to be treated as an asset for distribution. The court therefore affirmed that the degree was not subject to equitable division. However, it reversed the denial of any relief to the wife and remanded for consideration of reimbursement alimony to compensate her for the support provided during the husband's education, based on principles of fairness and avoidance of unjust enrichment.

family lawproperty

This case involved a divorce between Anita and Robert Hill, where the wife sought reimbursement for her financial contributions to the household while her husband attended dental school. The trial court awarded the wife $13,000 as half of her net contributions, treating it as equitable distribution, but the Appellate Division reversed that award. The New Jersey Supreme Court modified the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to consider a limited award of either rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony, based on the principles established in the companion case Mahoney v. Mahoney. The Court reasoned that such an award might be appropriate where one spouse supported the other's professional education with the expectation of shared future benefits, taking into account the wife's current needs and the husband's ability to pay.

family law

The case concerned a New Jersey taxpayer's challenge to the constitutionality of the New Jersey Building Authority Act, which authorized the Authority to issue bonds for state office facilities and required legislative approval via concurrent resolution for major projects and leases. The plaintiff argued that the legislative veto provisions violated the state constitution's separation of powers and presentment clauses, and that the financing structure breached debt limitations. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the Act, finding the limited legislative oversight compatible with executive functions and distinct from a broader veto mechanism invalidated in a related case, while concluding that the Authority's bonds did not constitute state debt. The court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the complaint.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the constitutionality of New Jersey's Legislative Oversight Act, which authorized the Legislature to veto nearly all proposed state agency rules through a concurrent resolution of both houses without the Governor's involvement. The court held the Act unconstitutional, ruling that its broad legislative veto mechanism violated the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine by excessively interfering with the executive branch's duty to execute the laws. The decision further reasoned that the Act improperly allowed the Legislature to amend or repeal statutes outside the Presentment Clause process, which requires majority approval in both houses plus gubernatorial action or a two-thirds legislative override of a veto. The court distinguished narrower forms of legislative-executive cooperation but found this particular scheme granted excessive power to the Legislature in both lawmaking and enforcement.

procedure

This case involved consolidated personal injury and wrongful death suits by workers (or their survivors) exposed to asbestos products, alleging strict liability against manufacturers and distributors for failing to warn of health risks like asbestosis and mesothelioma. The sole issue on appeal was whether defendants could assert a state-of-the-art defense, claiming that the dangers were unknown and undiscoverable when the products were marketed decades earlier. The court reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to strike the defense, holding that such a defense is unavailable in strict liability failure-to-warn cases. It reasoned that, under precedents like Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., knowledge of a product's dangerousness is imputed to the defendant, so the focus is solely on whether the product was reasonably safe, not on what was scientifically knowable at the time of distribution. The court noted that warnings, like certain safety features, can generally be added without reducing a product's utility.

torts & liability