The plaintiff sued the IRS, seeking an order that he could not be compelled to sign tax returns or related documents under penalty of perjury on the grounds that doing so would violate his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, along with related relief barring IRS investigations or fines. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss after de novo review, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. It held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity under the APA or any other statute, and because the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act independently barred the requested relief. The court further reasoned that longstanding precedent establishes the Fifth Amendment does not excuse the requirement to sign tax returns, and the plaintiff had other legal remedies available under the tax code.
In Glass v. Bemis Co., Inc., an African-American former employee sued her employer alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII based on pay disparities, disciplinary actions, work assignments, and termination, along with a disability discrimination claim tied to a work injury. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the initial EEOC charge was time-barred due to failure to sue within 90 days, later charges were filed outside the 90-day window after receiving right-to-sue notices even with mailing extensions, the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies on the disability claim by not amending her EEOC charges, and she provided no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on pretext or a hostile environment. The decision addressed the merits after deeming the action timely for equitable reasons despite the filing delay.
This case involves Smith Barney and its employee seeking to enjoin a NASD arbitration proceeding initiated by a union pension fund over investment disputes from the 1980s, using Nebraska's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act in state court. The defendants removed the action to federal court, arguing ERISA preemption created federal jurisdiction, but the magistrate judge granted remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district judge affirmed on appeal. The court held that federal jurisdiction must appear from the face of a well-pleaded complaint, a federal defense or the underlying ERISA-related claims are insufficient, and complete preemption does not apply here because the petition seeks only state-law relief regarding arbitration enforceability. The decision distinguished cases like Kramer v. Smith Barney where ERISA claims were directly at issue in the state complaint.
The case involved a former school district superintendent who sued the district and its board members, alleging violations of her due process and First Amendment rights, Title IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681), and breach of her employment contract, stemming from events surrounding a Title IX investigation and her termination. The plaintiff had previously signed a settlement agreement that included a release of claims in exchange for payment and resignation. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the three federal claims, finding the release valid and binding under Nebraska contract law and that any alleged breach by the defendants was not substantial enough to allow rescission. With no remaining claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law breach-of-contract claim and dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
This case involves a declaratory judgment action filed by Marianna Imports, Inc. in Nebraska federal court concerning the infringement and validity of a patent held by Helene Curtis, Inc. for a permanent wave hair solution. Helene Curtis had filed an earlier infringement lawsuit against Marianna in Illinois federal court several months prior, though service in that case occurred after Marianna served its declaratory action. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), applying the first-filed rule followed in the Eighth Circuit. The reasoning centered on the absence of compelling circumstances to depart from the rule, noting that the Illinois action was filed first, involved overlapping witnesses and convenience factors favoring Illinois, had already begun discovery, and that both parties' filings were strategic in nature.
The case involved plaintiff Edward Ronwin, who sought to open a securities account with Smith Barney without agreeing to a predispute arbitration clause; after the firm required the clause and returned his funds, Ronwin sued alleging the clause was an unenforceable contract of adhesion, violated the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breached a contract for a cash account, and breached a fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that adhesion contracts containing arbitration clauses are enforceable absent unconscionability, that Supreme Court precedent upheld such clauses against claims under the securities laws, that any contract was terminable at will with funds returned, and that no facts supported a fiduciary breach. Jurisdiction existed under diversity but did not save the claims.
