John T. Watson

This case involved subcontractors who filed cross-claims to foreclose labor and material liens on a newly built home purchased by the Daughtreys, who had also granted a mortgage to First National Bank in Albuquerque. The trial court entered judgment for several lien claimants, and the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed as to Blueher Lumber Company, Dar Tile Company, and Orrion Perry after finding their cross-claims were timely filed and served under the one-year statutory period in N.M.S.A. § 61-2-9 and applicable rules of civil procedure. The court reversed as to claimant James O. Carpenter, holding that his cross-claim was filed outside the limitations period and that later amendments could not relate back because no timely claim for relief had been asserted. Additional issues addressed included verification of lien documents and the award of attorney fees as costs.

propertyprocedure

In Witt v. Hartman, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to approve a reimbursement voucher for out-of-state travel expenses under N.M.S.A. § 11-1-9, which requires prior written authorization from the governor or designee and compliance with department rules. The trial court quashed the alternative writ, and the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that mandamus requires a clear ministerial duty, which the statute does not impose here, and that a petitioner cannot challenge the constitutionality of the very statute relied upon to compel performance while also failing to follow the applicable rules and regulations.

procedure

This case arose from the bankruptcy of contractor Mock Homes, Inc., involving disputes over the validity and priority of mechanic's liens on a residential property lot. The appellants, home owners and mortgage holders, appealed separate judgments that foreclosed liens in favor of various claimants, including one that equated priorities among valid liens. The New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that none of the judgments were final under Rule 54(b) because they lacked an express determination of no just reason for delay, did not resolve all claims such as the unadjudicated lien of Orrion Perry, and required further court action to complete the relief.

procedureproperty

This case involved the New Mexico Real Estate Commission's suspension of a broker's and salesman's real estate licenses for six months each, based on findings that they failed to deposit client funds into a trust or escrow account and failed to maintain such an account as required by statute. The district court affirmed the Commission's decision, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission had erred as a matter of law by requiring a trust account even when no client funds were involved and by allowing the Commission's administrator—who had investigated and testified against the licensees—to be present during deliberations. The court further found that these errors in procedure and legal interpretation prejudiced the licensees' rights under the Uniform Licensing Act, requiring reversal rather than affirmance.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns whether a trial court's failure to give a mandatory uniform jury instruction (U.J.I. 17.1 stating that faithful performance of jurors' duties is vital to justice) required reversal of a verdict in a civil case. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that although the instruction is mandatory under Rule 51(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's adoption order, its omission is not automatically reversible error. Instead, the court must determine from the record whether the failure prejudicially affected a substantial right of the parties, without presuming prejudice. After reviewing the jury's oath and other instructions given, the court found no such prejudice here and reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling, remanding for consideration of other issues.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over the residue of James Franklin Moore's estate, which his will left to the 'Shriners’ Hospital for Crippled Children, in Dallas Texas,' though no hospital existed under that exact name. Appellant Moore sought to have the gift declared lapsed, while appellee Texas Scottish Rite Hospital for Crippled Children and intervenor Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, Inc. (a Colorado corporation) each claimed the bequest. The trial court made extensive findings on the testator's Masonic affiliations in Dallas, his familiarity with local institutions, and his general charitable intent, concluding that he meant to benefit the Texas Scottish Rite Hospital. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's determination of intent was supported by substantial evidence and that extrinsic facts resolved any ambiguity in the will's description without need for speculation. The court rejected arguments from both the appellant and cross-appellant that the evidence showed a different beneficiary or required the gift to lapse.

property