The case involved a receiver for the Excelsior Hay Carrier Company suing to vacate a judgment obtained by Delaney against the company, on grounds that the judgment lacked consideration and was secured through collusion with company officers to defraud creditors. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling vacating the judgment and resolving the underlying claim on the merits. The core reasoning was that fraud vitiates judgments, a receiver may bring suit in equity on behalf of creditors when they had no prior opportunity to challenge the judgment, and the evidence from the three related agreements showed the transaction was structured so the company bore minimal risk while Delaney controlled sales, supporting findings of no valid debt and collusion in allowing default.
The case involved a dispute over a maltster's claim of lien for charges on processing multiple lots of barley for a customer and the enforceability of a promise by third-party holders of negotiable warehouse receipts to pay the full balance due. The plaintiff had retained possession of the malt and refused delivery until the defendants, who held two of the receipts as pledgees after advancing funds to the customer, promised to cover the general account. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that the defendants' promise was supported by valid consideration in the form of settling the plaintiff's colorable lien claim and avoiding litigation, even if the lien itself might not have been fully enforceable at law; the defendants had knowledge of the claim and received the malt after making the assurance.
This case involved a claim by plaintiff Mott against Consumers' Ice Company for injuries sustained when the company's ice cart driver collided with the plaintiff's carriage. The trial court granted a nonsuit for the defendant, but the court reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the question of the employer's liability for the servant's acts should have been submitted to the jury. The court explained that an employer is responsible for a servant's wrongful acts committed within the general scope of employment and in furtherance of the employer's business, whether done negligently, wantonly, or willfully, but not if the servant acts entirely outside the employment for personal purposes. Evidence showed the driver was engaged in his duties at the time of the collision, and the defendant's answer did not conclusively establish that the act was beyond the scope of employment so as to preclude recovery. The court further noted that the answer's admissions did not estop the plaintiff from arguing liability.
The case involved a dispute over whether a written memorandum of agreement between the parties created an express contractual obligation on the defendants (Cleveland Rolling Mill Co.) to perform certain acts related to the manufacture and testing of Booth rails under a license arrangement. The court held that the agreement, though informally drafted without technical language, used wording equivalent to an express promise by both parties, making their obligations mutual rather than mere conditions. It distinguished prior cases where no such promise existed or could be implied and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The opinion also addressed and upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings on witness testimony regarding rail durability and steel quality as competent to show the cause of the rails' failure.
This case involved a dispute over a life insurance policy in which the insurer defended a claim by alleging a breach of warranty based on the applicant's equivocal answer to an interrogatory asking for the name of his family physician or usual doctor. The court decided that no breach could be found because the answer did not affirm any specific fact and was prepared and dictated by the insurer's own agent after the applicant disclosed the relevant details about two physicians who had treated him. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, reasoning that any factual question about the usual physician was for the jury (which the defendant had waived) and that the insurer could not rely on technical deficiencies in an answer it had itself formulated.
This case involved two employees in the New York City fire department—Simms as a surveyor in the bureau of combustibles and Royal as an assistant to the fire marshal—who were removed from their positions by the Board of Fire Commissioners. They challenged the removals through writs of certiorari, arguing they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before removal. The court held that the employees could be removed at the board's pleasure because they were subordinate ministerial officers rather than regular clerks or heads of bureaus under the 1873 city charter. The reasoning relied on the statute's explicit distinction between protected classes of employees and others, applying the principle that the power to appoint generally includes the power to remove when tenure is not otherwise specified, and on the returns establishing the nature of their roles.
