The case concerned whether a federal permit allowed Henry Ford & Son, Inc. to erect a dam across the Hudson River for private water-power development, or whether this violated New York State's property rights in the riverbed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff riparian owners, holding that the federal license only waived any federal navigation-related objections and did not authorize invasion of state-owned lands. The core reasoning was that Congress's commerce power extends only to matters connected with navigation, not to granting plenary authority for private power projects; the state holds the riverbed in trust, and any structure built without state consent constitutes a purpresture subject to abatement by parties specially injured.
The case concerned whether the Public Service Commission had authority to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity to a bus company seeking to operate in Long Beach before the company obtained the city's local consent. The dissenting opinion concluded that the Commission could properly grant the certificate, as the statute lists the certificate and local consent as two distinct prerequisites to operation and contains no language limiting the Commission's jurisdiction until consent is secured. The dissent reasoned that the Commission's sole task is to assess public convenience and necessity, while disputes over the validity of local consent must be resolved separately, and that any contrary interpretation would improperly divert the Commission from its core duties. The opinion would affirm the Appellate Division's judgment upholding the Commission's action.
The case concerned whether premises where liquor was sold and consumed, resulting in intoxication and disorder, qualified as a public nuisance under New York law defining such nuisances as acts annoying or endangering the comfort, health, or safety of a considerable number of persons or offending public decency. The court affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant maintained a disorderly house based on evidence that patrons became intoxicated on site and left in that condition near school children and others. The reasoning emphasized that actual disorder satisfied the statutory criteria, but mere violation of the federal Volstead Act alone would not, as the legislature did not view orderly liquor sales as inherently immoral or indecent given historical context and prior precedents.
The case concerned a joint venture between Meinhard and Salmon to manage and operate a hotel property under a twenty-year lease, where Salmon later obtained a new, much longer lease on the same and adjacent property without informing Meinhard. The court decided that Salmon owed Meinhard a fiduciary duty arising from their joint venture and that he breached it by not disclosing the renewal opportunity, resulting in a judgment giving Meinhard a share of the new lease. The core reasoning was that the duty of loyalty in such arrangements extends to opportunities connected to the venture even if not a formal partnership, though the dissent viewed the venture as too narrow and the new lease as too distinct to trigger that obligation.
The case concerned whether bonds issued by the Manitoba Power Company were negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law, which would allow a purchaser in due course to retain them even if acquired from a thief. The court held that the bonds were negotiable because they contained an unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum to bearer on a specified future date. References in the bonds to the trust mortgage were interpreted as relating solely to the security, the rights of holders with respect to that security, and related terms, without modifying or conditioning the promise to pay itself. Provisions regarding redemption, acceleration upon default, and a sinking fund were also found not to impair negotiability, as they did not alter the unconditional nature of the payment obligation on its face.
This case involves a taxpayer's petition for a peremptory mandamus directing the President of the Borough of Manhattan to remove alleged street encroachments, such as a box stoop and bay window, from a private building. The lower court granted the order despite the property owner's absence from the proceeding and her lack of opportunity to contest the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that no such mandamus order can issue without the owner's presence in court, because the city holds authority to grant revocable licenses for structures that have long been permitted and do not unreasonably interfere with street use. The petition was dismissed with costs.