John Archibald Campbell

This case was an ejectment action over a lot in Peoria, Illinois, where the plaintiff claimed title under a 1847 federal patent derived from an 1823 congressional act confirming settler claims, while defendants claimed under an 1838 patent that saved prior rights and asserted adverse possession under Illinois' seven-year statute of limitations. The court reversed the Circuit Court's judgment for the plaintiff. The core reasoning was that the defendants' residence and possession through tenants on the larger patented quarter section extended to the disputed lot (used as a place of business), even after subdivision into lots, satisfying the statute's actual residence requirement without any fiduciary relation created by the patent's saving clause, consistent with Illinois Supreme Court precedent on the same facts.

property

This case involves a dispute over land titles in Peoria, Illinois, where the plaintiff sought to enjoin execution of a prior judgment that had been affirmed on writ of error, claiming superior title and defects in the defendants' location and survey under the federal acts of May 1820 and March 1823. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the injunction. The court reasoned that objections to the relative merits of the legal titles or to the surveys could not be raised in equity after judgment at law, that such survey and location issues fell within the exclusive administrative jurisdiction of the Land Office, and that the plaintiff's patent expressly reserved rights under the 1823 act, making any failure to raise timely objections binding.

propertyprocedurefederal power

The case was an ejectment action over lots in New York City, with plaintiffs claiming title under the will of Mary Clarke, which placed the Chelsea farm in trust for Thomas B. Clarke during his life and then conveyed it in fee to his living issue at his death. The defendant traced title to conveyances and mortgages executed by Clarke under a series of New York legislative acts from 1814-1817 and chancery court orders that discharged the original trustees, allowed Clarke to act as trustee, and permitted sales or mortgages to pay his debts and support his family. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's judgment for the plaintiffs, reasoning that federal courts must apply the settled law of New York as interpreted by its own courts on questions of common law and land titles, especially where those interpretations had become established rules of property relied upon by many parties in the state.

propertyfamily lawfederal power

This was an ejectment action over a lot in Peoria, Illinois, in which Forsyth claimed title derived from a congressional confirmation of an 1823 French land claim that was surveyed in 1840 and patented in 1847, while the defendants claimed under an 1838 federal patent to a quarter-section that included the lot but contained a saving clause for rights under the 1823 act; the defendants had resided on and cultivated part of the quarter-section for more than seven years and paid taxes on it. The circuit court instructed the jury that the defendants' possession was not adverse because of the saving clause and ruled for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 1838 patent conveyed fee-simple title, the saving clause merely protected the United States from warranty claims and did not except the lot from the grant or create any fiduciary duty, and the defendants' possession was therefore adverse so that the Illinois seven-year statute of limitations barred recovery.

property

The case involved a dispute over title to several leagues of land in Refugio County, Texas, where the plaintiff asserted ownership based on an 1834 land grant from the Mexican state of Coahuila and Texas to colonists Power and Hewetson, along with subsequent deeds and inheritance transfers. The defendants countered with claims under Texas state grants and statutes of limitations. The court addressed three questions regarding the grant's validity, the nature of a conveyance document, and the ability of U.S. citizens to inherit Texas land in 1836, but resolved the case on the first issue alone. Relying on its prior decision in League v. Egery, the court held that Coahuila and Texas lacked authority to convey land in the coastal leagues without approval from the central Mexican government. This ruling invalidated the plaintiff's title, leading to affirmance of the district court's judgment for the defendants.

property

The case involved a judgment in ejectment recovered against a deceased tenant in possession of land in Illinois federal circuit court. After the tenant's death, his attorney and landlord filed a writ of error in the names of the tenant's heirs to challenge the judgment in the Supreme Court. One heir objected that the writ was unauthorized and sought its dismissal. The court overruled the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Illinois practice permits a landlord who defended the suit in the tenant's name to prosecute a writ of error using the heirs' names when acting in good faith and assuming responsibility for costs, with the option to substitute as defendant upon remand.

propertyprocedure

The case involved creditors who sold goods on credit to a firm that allegedly conspired with others to fraudulently assign and conceal its property, hindering collection of the debts. The plaintiffs sued in tort for damages from the conspiracy after one debt matured but before full payment was due. The Supreme Court held that the action could not be maintained, as a general creditor without a lien, attachment, or other specific legal interest in the property has no actionable right violated by the fraudulent disposition, and any resulting damage is too remote and contingent. The Court reasoned that conspiracy alone does not create liability absent a tortious act infringing a recognized legal right, and existing remedies like attachment or fraudulent conveyance statutes must be pursued instead. It reversed the lower court's judgment allowing recovery.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a dispute over title to a 2.5-league parcel of land in Refugio County, Texas, that the plaintiff claimed through an 1834 grant issued by the state of Coahuila and Texas to colonists Power and Hewetson within the coastal littoral leagues. The defendants contested the grant's validity on the ground that it lacked the consent of the Mexican federal executive, which was required under the colonization laws of 1824 and 1828. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment that the grant was invalid, holding that the uniform decisions of the Texas Supreme Court on this point of old local law were conclusive and binding.

propertyfederal power

This case concerns a dispute over title to approximately 560 acres of land in Louisiana east of the Mississippi River, originally claimed under Spanish possession before U.S. acquisition. Carney traced his title to a 1824 federal certificate issued to settler Robert Yair under the Act of May 8, 1822, based on an 1805 settlement, which he purchased at a probate sale; the Tates claimed the same land through their ancestress Nancy Tate's 1811 settlement, whose heirs obtained a later 1848 decision from the local register and receiver annulling Yair's certificate and granting them the land instead. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Louisiana Supreme Court's judgment in Carney's favor, ruling that the register and receiver lacked authority under the 1819 and 1822 acts to overturn a prior confirmed claim and decide substantive title questions involving conflicting rights. The Court reasoned that those officials' powers were confined to locating and surveying claims, not adjudicating legal title disputes or annulling earlier grants after years of possession and intervening sales, consistent with prior precedents interpreting the statutes.

propertyfederal power

This case concerned a dispute over title to a portion of public land in Illinois that had been part of a federal grant to the state for railroad construction under the 1850 act. The appellee claimed title through a private sale purchase in November 1855, while the appellant asserted a superior pre-emption right based on settlement and improvements beginning in October 1855, for which a patent had issued. The Supreme Court held that the land was subject to pre-emption once the reserved sections were restored to market after the state's selections were completed, reversing the circuit court's decree in favor of the appellee and directing dismissal of the bill. The core reasoning was that the exception for reserved alternate sections in the 1841 pre-emption act was temporary, and after being offered at public sale, such lands lose their reserved character and become available for pre-emption rights to actual settlers under the liberal policy of federal land laws.

propertyfederal power

The case involved a contract dispute in which the plaintiffs, holders of a patent for a fuel-saving device called Sickles’s cut-off, alleged they had attached the device to the defendants’ steamboat engine under an agreement for payment equal to three-fourths of the resulting fuel savings, with the amount to be determined by a specified experiment. The plaintiffs sued in assumpsit for additional payments and sought to rely on a prior lawsuit in which they had obtained a verdict and judgment on a similar declaration, arguing that the earlier proceeding conclusively established the contract and estopped the defendants from contesting its existence, validity, or performance. The Circuit Court agreed and excluded defense evidence challenging those matters. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior judgment did not operate as an estoppel because the verdict had been rendered on a multi-count declaration and it was not clear that the special contract count had been decided; the defendants remained entitled to show what issues had actually been litigated. The Court explained that res judicata requires identity of the issues actually tried and that a general verdict does not necessarily resolve every count.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over title to a league of land in Fayette County, Texas, originally granted by the Mexican government. The plaintiff claimed ownership based on a 1852 judgment against the German Emigration Company followed by an execution sale and purchase in 1853. The defendants asserted adverse possession under deeds from the company dating to 1848 and 1850, invoking Texas statutes of limitations for three and five years of possession under color of title. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred by submitting the limitations defenses to the jury when the documentary evidence and undisputed facts showed no support for them as a matter of law, and by excluding evidence offered to prove the deed to Von Roeder was a fraudulent conveyance under the statute of 13 Elizabeth as adopted in Texas.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a claim by the appellees for a four-league tract of land in Yuba County, California, based on a grant from the Mexican Governor Micheltorena to Theodore Sicard. The claimants sought confirmation of this title through the board of commissioners for settling land claims. The Supreme Court found the supporting testimony insufficient, consistent with its prior rulings in United States v. Nye and United States v. Rose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the District Court's judgment and dismissed the petition.

property

The case concerned whether an 1833 Pennsylvania statute granting a tax exemption on real property owned by Christ Church Hospital created a perpetual legislative contract that could not be altered by a later law. In 1851, the state enacted a statute repealing such exemptions for property not in actual use by the owner and from which income was derived. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 1851 law partially repealed the exemption and that the resulting tax assessment did not violate the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the 1833 exemption was a revocable privilege rather than a binding contract, that no consideration was given in exchange for it, and that the state's taxing power must remain flexible to meet changing conditions.

taxesproperty

The case involved Salvador Castro petitioning the Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner of the Land Office to issue a patent for one square league of land in California that had been confirmed to him by a district court decree under an 1839 Mexican grant known as San Gregorio. The Circuit Court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court explained that the surveyor general's survey disregarded the boundaries and quantity limits from the original grant, and instead followed only the metes and bounds in the deed and confirmation decree; the Commissioner has supervisory authority under federal law to ensure that surveys conform to the controlling terms of the original grants. This authority stems from the 1851 Act to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, which empowers the Commissioner to review surveys before issuing patents, even when a court has confirmed a claim.

propertyfederal power

The case involved a lawsuit by the plaintiff on a sealed financial instrument issued by the city of Vicksburg payable to bearer. The defendant raised multiple defenses, including a plea of non est factum denying execution of the instrument, which was filed without the affidavit required by Mississippi statute. The circuit court overruled the plaintiff's demurrers to the pleas and entered judgment for the defendant, but the Supreme Court held that under state practice followed by the circuit court, such a plea without the required affidavit is demurrable. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case.

procedure

The case involved a challenge by foreign legatees, subjects of the King of Wurtemberg, to a 10% Louisiana tax imposed on their shares of a succession from a Louisiana decedent whose property was located in the state. The legatees argued that the tax violated a provision in the 1844 US-Wurtemberg treaty allowing heirs and legatees to take property while paying only the same duties as local inhabitants. The Supreme Court affirmed the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling upholding the tax, holding that the treaty did not apply to testamentary dispositions by citizens of one contracting party regarding property located in their own country, as its purpose was limited to preventing discriminatory taxes on aliens holding property in the other country. The Court noted that the Louisiana statute applied equally to citizens domiciled abroad and did not discriminate based on alienage in like circumstances.

taxespropertyfederal power

The case involved a dispute over title to a large parcel of land in Sacramento County known as the rancho del Paso, originally granted by Mexican authorities in 1844. The plaintiff, as assignee of the decedent's heirs, sought possession, while the defendant claimed through a codicil in the decedent's will that devised the property to his nephew. The Circuit Court ruled for the defendant after a jury trial, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Court held that under Mexican law as modified by established local custom in California, the codicil was validly executed with two witnesses, that the witnesses and testator need only understand the substance of the disposition rather than every word, and that proof of signatures plus the testator's statements was sufficient to establish the instrument's authenticity and compliance with formalities.

propertyfamily law

The case involved a dispute over a 1845 contract for the sale of Arkansas land, where buyer Woodfolk agreed to pay Notrebe in installments for unimproved acreage and received a promise of a fee-simple deed with general warranty upon completion of payment. After paying in full, Woodfolk discovered an existing mortgage on the land securing Notrebe's stock subscription debt to the Real Estate Bank of Arkansas and sought specific performance requiring the estate to clear the encumbrance or post substantial indemnity. The lower court ordered the executors to remove the mortgage or deposit state bonds or unencumbered property worth over four times the purchase price as security. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Woodfolk had notice of the mortgage before completing payment, had not contracted for additional indemnity beyond the warranty covenant, and that equity would not impose extra security obligations on the vendor when the buyer could rely on the warranty or pursue damages at law.

property

This case involved a lawsuit by Hillard & Mordecai against Benjamin, who had guaranteed a contract for Hopkins & Leach to manufacture and deliver a steam engine and related machinery for a flour mill according to detailed specifications and warranties. The court held that Benjamin was liable under the guaranty for the full and faithful performance of the contract, including the warranty of quality and capacity, rather than only for refunding advances if the machinery was not delivered at all. The reasoning was that the guaranty terms were general and unrestricted, extending to the principals' obligations and accessories like latent defects; a later settlement and payment between the plaintiffs and principals did not release or extinguish the warranty claims, which could only be tested by use; and damages were to be measured by the amount needed to supply the deficiencies to fulfill the contract.

business & regulatory