This case concerned the calculation of New York corporate franchise tax for Sheraton Buildings, Inc., a company doing business both inside and outside the state. The Tax Commission included capital gain from the sale of an office building in Boston within the relator's entire net income and applied the statutory three-factor allocation formula based on property, receipts, and payrolls, allocating 31.8% to New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that set aside the assessment as arbitrary and unreasonable on the facts. The court held that the commission should have exercised its statutory discretion under Tax Law § 210(8) to use an alternative method that would produce a fairer allocation of income attributable to New York.
The case concerned the State Liquor Authority's denial of a liquor store's application to relocate its licensed premises after determining that the new location was within 200 feet of a school building with usable doorways, as required by subdivision 3 of section 105 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. The Authority had initially approved the relocation but rescinded the approval following a remand and additional evidence about the school's entrances. The lower courts annulled the Authority's determination and directed that the license be issued, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that order without costs. The core reasoning relied on administrative finality in the face of the statutory prohibition based on physical proximity measured from the nearest entrance.
This case involved a claim for workers' compensation benefits by Samuel Chernin for a mental injury allegedly caused by a mental shock at work on December 7, 1954, without any physical impact. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the claim, holding that the facts did not support a finding of an accidental injury under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The court declined to rule on whether psychological trauma arising from employment without physical injury could ever be compensable. The decision was based on the specific facts presented, leaving the broader legal question unresolved.
The case concerned whether the president of plaintiff West View Hills, Inc. had authority to commence litigation on the corporation's behalf without prior board approval. The suit alleged that defendants, who controlled both plaintiff and defendant Lizau Realty Corp., had improperly charged West View for construction costs on a building it did not own and had breached fiduciary duties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' rulings that the president possessed presumptive authority to institute the action to protect corporate interests, noting that the board had taken no action to prohibit it and that the directors' conflicts of interest made authorization unlikely. The decision relied on precedents recognizing implied presidential power to sue or defend when necessary to preserve the corporation, distinguishing cases where the board had explicitly refused permission. The court emphasized that the corporation's separate legal identity supported allowing the suit to proceed despite overlapping ownership.
The case involved multiple claims against the State of New York for injuries and deaths from a 1951 car collision at the intersection of a county road and State Route 13 in Cortland County, where a teenage driver proceeding east on the county road failed to yield and collided with north-south traffic on the state highway. The claims alleged negligence by the State in removing a stop sign (pursuant to a 1944 State Traffic Commission order) and replacing it with only a standard crossroad warning sign and route marker. The Court of Claims dismissed the claims after trial, but the Appellate Division reversed and awarded damages; the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the dismissals, holding that the standard signs were adequate because sight distances were unobstructed and stop signs are not required where visibility itself provides sufficient warning to motorists.
The case concerned whether the Town of Hempstead could extend the boundaries of an existing park district to include a neighboring subdivision, despite restrictive covenants in a 1951 deed dedicating beach land for park use limited to residents of the original Atlantic Beach tract. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's injunction, holding that the town's statutory powers under sections 190-194 and 198 of the Town Law and the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act to enlarge park districts and manage park property could not be limited by private restrictive covenants or exclusive easements in the dedication deed. The core reasoning was that these covenants, arising from a private 1941 declaration and assumed in the deed, were ineffective to abrogate the public powers of town officials to serve the broader community, although separate enforcement of private rights against the town might still be available through other remedies such as condemnation.