The case involved a plaintiff born in Pennsylvania who was allegedly exposed in utero to DES there, leading to health issues diagnosed while she resided in New Jersey; she later sued multiple manufacturers in New York under the state's 1986 toxic tort revival statute after an earlier action was dismissed as time-barred. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that New York's borrowing statute (CPLR 202) required application of Pennsylvania's shorter limitations period, which barred the claim. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint, holding that the revival statute's language did not override the borrowing statute and that the legislature intended the revival window to apply only to New York residents, not to out-of-state plaintiffs lacking any connection to the state. The decision rested on the statute's text, legislative history, and policy against extending special relief to nonresidents whose claims accrued elsewhere.
The case Babigan v. Wachtler was an appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, brought by John H. Babigan against Sol Wachtler and other respondents, with Robert Abrams participating as intervenor-respondent. On January 15, 1987, the court issued a decision in which the listed justices concurred. No opinion or reasoning was provided by the court.
This case involves a proposed class action by plaintiff Weinberg against Hertz Corporation alleging unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable practices in its car rental business, including excessive refueling service charges, daily fees for collision damage waiver (CDW) and personal accident insurance (PAI), and non-prorated overtime charges for late vehicle returns, in violation of General Business Law § 349, the UCC, and rental contracts. The trial court denied class certification on grounds that identifying class members would impose an undue economic burden on Hertz exceeding the value of individual claims averaging around $31. The appellate court reversed, holding that class action certification was appropriate under CPLR 901 because the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and superiority were satisfied, Hertz's unsubstantiated cost estimates did not outweigh the need to aggregate small consumer claims, and reliance issues could be addressed at trial without defeating class status.
This case involves the Church of Scientology of New York challenging the New York City Tax Commission's denial of real property tax exemptions for three parcels it owns, under Real Property Tax Law § 420-a, which exempts property owned and used exclusively by a bona fide religious organization without pecuniary profit to individuals. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order by vacating the judgment that had remanded the matter to the Tax Commission and instead remanded the proceeding to the Supreme Court for a full evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned that the existing record from a brief hearing and subsequent investigation was inadequate to resolve key factual issues, including whether the petitioner is organized and conducted exclusively for religious purposes in good faith, whether income inures to the benefit of its founder through royalties or other arrangements, and whether the properties are used exclusively for religious purposes, requiring a hearing under CPLR 7804(h) to assess if the denial was arbitrary or capricious.
The case involved Edgar Pauk, a former assistant professor at Queens College, who sued the Board of Trustees of the City University of New York after being denied tenure in 1975, claiming that the decision violated his employment contract by failing to base the appointment on merit and fitness as required by the New York Constitution. Pauk had previously brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking tenure based on his years of service, which was dismissed, followed by a federal civil rights suit that was also dismissed as time-barred. In this action, he asserted three causes of action, including one for breach of contract incorporating the constitutional merit requirement. The Appellate Division held that the contract claim was barred by res judicata under the transactional analysis approach, because the underlying allegations about the tenure denial and constitutional violation could have been raised in the earlier Article 78 proceeding, even if different remedies were sought.
This case involves a libel claim by a New York State Supreme Court Justice against the publisher Viking Penguin, Inc., and authors Jack Newfield and Paul Du Brul over statements in the book "The Abuse of Power" alleging the justice improperly intervened to release an alleged organized crime figure from police custody. The publisher issued a hardcover edition in 1977 and a paperback edition in 1978 using unsold copies with modified covers and copyright pages, and the suit was filed more than a year after the hardcover but within a year of the paperback. The court held that the paperback constituted a republication triggering a new limitations period under New York's one-publication rule and that factual issues existed regarding whether the publisher acted with actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, so summary judgment was properly denied as to the publisher. As to the authors, who had no role in deciding to issue the paperback and had agreed to remove the statements from future printings, the court granted summary judgment because the republication was not attributable to them. The order was modified accordingly to dismiss the claims against the authors while affirming the denial for the publisher.
