The case concerns whether indictments should be set aside due to alleged errors in the impaneling of a grand jury, including the prosecutor's use of a private list of names during questioning of talesmen and the sustaining of challenges without sufficient legal grounds. The court decided to affirm the order upholding the indictments. The core reasoning is that while some rulings during jury selection were erroneous as a matter of law and certain methods were unfair, the resulting grand jury was still qualified, impartial, and representative of a fair cross-section of the community, satisfying constitutional requirements; inherent court power to set aside an indictment applies only when the jury fails to meet that standard, not for procedural errors alone.
The case involved authors who sold motion picture rights to their copyrighted story to Paramount Pictures under a contract granting exclusive adaptation rights and limited permission to use the authors' names, subject to conditions. The authors sued to enjoin Paramount from using their names as characters in a planned fictional sequel movie not based on the original story, and they moved for a preliminary injunction. Special Term denied the motion, but the Appellate Division, via stipulation treating the denial as a final judgment after trial, dismissed the complaint on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to enter final judgment because there had been no trial, no agreed statement of facts, and no ruling by the lower court on the parties' substantive rights, and remitted the matter for further proceedings.
The case concerned whether the New York State Labor Relations Board could order Holland Laundry to reinstate employees who struck in 1939 and to bargain with their union, despite a 1937 contract those employees had signed barring strikes and closed shops. In a prior Supreme Court action, the employer obtained a permanent injunction enforcing the no-strike clause after the workers walked out, and that judgment was never overturned. The Court of Appeals held that the injunction judgment conclusively justified the employer's refusal to reinstate the striking defendants and that, absent a current finding of majority union support among remaining employees, the Board lacked authority to compel collective bargaining or retroactively label the employer's compliance with the judgment an unfair labor practice.
The case involved an indictment returned by an Albany County grand jury against the defendant for crimes committed there. The Attorney General successfully moved at an Extraordinary Term for a change of venue to New York County on the ground that a fair trial could not be obtained in Albany County. The defendant then sought a writ of prohibition in the Appellate Division to prevent trial in New York, arguing that the court lacked authority to order removal on the People's application. The court held that Code of Criminal Procedure § 344 authorizes removal of a criminal action only upon the defendant's application and that the Legislature had validly restricted any broader common-law power of the Supreme Court to change venue. It therefore reversed the order denying prohibition and granted the petition.
The case concerned the constitutionality of a state statute regulating obscenity and indecency in publications, specifically whether it was unconstitutionally vague under free speech protections. The majority of the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment upholding the statute's application. The core reasoning in the majority was that judicial definitions could sufficiently limit the terms to avoid vagueness, distinguishing them from broader or undefined restrictions. A dissent argued that without clear legislative definitions, the statute permitted punishment of protected speech and improperly delegated standard-setting to community morality rather than enacted law.
This case involved a contractor's lawsuit against a railroad company to recover payment for work performed under a grade crossing elimination contract and for additional extra work. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the claims effectively sought to enforce the State of New York's constitutional obligation to fund such projects. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the railroad acted only as a state agent, with no independent corporate liability to pay until receiving funds from the State, and the complaint alleged no breach of that duty. The decision turned on the contract terms and state law requiring the State to pay construction costs in the first instance, limiting the railroad's role to forwarding received monies.
