William B. Wright

The case involved a dispute over whether the plaintiff, Alexander McCotter, had formed an enforceable contract to sell land on Ward’s Island to the City of New York. The plaintiff offered in 1851 to sell his property via arbitration to set the price, but the Common Council’s resolution authorized arbitration on different terms that included additional land not offered by the plaintiff and permitted selection of a third arbitrator. Later city resolutions in 1858 directed purchase of the land, but the plaintiff’s subsequent offers had been withdrawn, no price was fixed, and the comptroller never negotiated or accepted any terms. The court held that no contract was ever formed because the parties’ proposals did not match and essential terms remained open. It affirmed the judgment in favor of the city.

property

The case concerned the validity of an 1866 New York statute that created a board of excise to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in the Metropolitan Police District (excluding Westchester County), imposed restrictions on sales including on Sundays and election days, prohibited sales to minors and intoxicated persons, and made unlicensed sales a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. Defendants Barrie and Currier were prosecuted for selling liquor without licenses after the act took effect. The court affirmed the judgments against them, holding that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power to regulate liquor sales for public welfare. It reasoned that the legislature could impose new licensing requirements and restrictions without violating the federal or state constitutions, that prior licenses or common-law rights did not create irrevocable grants immune from later regulation, and that judicial review should presume statutes constitutional absent clear conflict with constitutional limits.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a receiver appointed in supplementary proceedings after an unsatisfied judgment against Mary E. Foster, who sought to compel her trustees to pay trust income toward satisfying the debt. The trust, created by her father's will, directed the trustees to apply the net income for her support during her life, with a gift over on her death. The court affirmed the judgment sustaining the defendants' demurrer and dismissing the complaint. It held that the beneficiary's interest in the trust was protected from creditors under statutes prohibiting alienation of such interests, extending rules from land trusts to personal property trusts. The complaint also failed to allege any existing surplus income beyond what was needed for the beneficiary's support.

propertyprocedure

In this case, James McGregor sued Duncan McGregor to foreclose a mortgage securing a $4,000 debt; after James died and named Duncan as co-executor of his will, James's other executor sought to revive the foreclosure action via supplemental complaint. Duncan demurred, arguing defects including failure to join the co-executor as plaintiff, lack of parties, and insufficient facts to revive the suit. The court overruled the demurrer and affirmed on appeal, holding that the cause of action survived the plaintiff's death under the Code and that one executor may maintain an equitable action against a co-executor to determine and enforce a debt owed to the estate without improper transfer of assets. The reasoning emphasized equity's ability to adjudicate the indebtedness and direct appropriate disposition of funds while accounting for the defendant's dual roles as debtor and executor.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over title to real property that Ebenezer Titus had devised in his will upon his death in 1835. The will directed that his wife Martha hold and dispose of the estate for the benefit of herself and their three daughters (the plaintiffs), which the court construed as creating a valid power in trust over three-fourths of the real estate. Martha Titus later conveyed the land to one daughter, Martha Bowen, in a transaction that provided no meaningful consideration or benefit to the other beneficiaries and that Bowen knew was subject to the trust. The court held that the conveyance was not a valid exercise of the power in trust because it amounted to a fraudulent gift that impaired the plaintiffs' interests, and therefore the deed was invalid as to three-fourths of the property; title remained in the heirs subject to the power, entitling the plaintiffs to relief such as sale or conveyance of their share. The decision reversed the Special Term judgment that had dismissed the complaint and affirmed the order for a new trial.

property

This case involved a dispute over payment for imported millinery goods, where New York merchants (plaintiff's assignors) arranged for a Swiss manufacturer (defendant) to draw drafts on London bankers for the purchase price. After the bankers went bankrupt, the merchants directed the defendant to draw on one of their partners in Paris instead and later paid the resulting debt with promissory notes; the defendant had also collected a small dividend by proving the bankers' acceptances in bankruptcy proceedings. The merchants' assignee sued to recover the amounts paid on the notes, arguing that the prior collection from the bankrupt estate entitled them to repayment. The court decided for the defendant and dismissed the complaint, holding that the merchants remained primarily liable as principal debtors and that the bankers' acceptances served only as collateral security. The court reasoned that payment of one's own undisputed debt cannot be recovered merely because the creditor also collected partially from collateral, especially where the facts showed no agreement that the collateral discharged the underlying obligation.

business & regulatory