Emery B. Denny

This case involves a motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff's truck was stopped on an icy highway, raising issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. Following a jury trial, the plaintiff appealed, assigning error to the submission of the contributory negligence issue and to portions of the jury charge. The court determined that the trial judge's instructions were inadequate, as they consisted largely of the parties' contentions without declaring and explaining the applicable law to the evidence as required by G.S. 1-180. The court further held that negligence must be assessed under statutory or common law standards rather than Highway Patrol criteria. The court therefore ordered a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by the parents of a young child who died after falling into the pit of an outdoor privy on the defendants' property while trespassing. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the complaint, and the appeals court affirmed that ruling while allowing the plaintiff to amend. The court reasoned that an ordinary privy is not an attractive nuisance or inherently dangerous instrumentality, the defendants had no duty to anticipate that a child of tender years would trespass and fall into the pit without allegations showing they knew of any hazardous condition like accumulated water, and liability for injuries to child trespassers requires proof that the defendant knew or should have known children were likely to be present and exposed to danger. The court further noted that common dangers are the responsibility of parents to guard against and that the allegations did not establish foreseeable risk or a violation creating liability.

torts & liability

This case concerns a challenge to a deed executed by Elva P. Hammond on September 5, 1962, brought by her next friend against the Bullards, alleging that Hammond lacked mental capacity and that the deed was procured through fraud and undue influence. The defendants appealed the denial of their motions for nonsuit and raised issues regarding the qualification of lay witnesses to opine on mental capacity and an alleged error in the jury instructions. The court affirmed the judgment below, reasoning that an action by a next friend was permissible, the evidence was sufficient for the jury, the witnesses had adequate observation opportunities, and any instructional error was technical and harmless because the jury was properly instructed on the ultimate issue and not misled. The jury's findings of mental incompetence and fraud distinguished the case from precedents like Davis v. Davis.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a prosecution for subornation of perjury, where the defendant was accused of inducing a witness to give false testimony in a prior trial concerning ownership of whiskey. The trial court convicted the defendant, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The court reasoned that in perjury or subornation cases, the falsity of the testimony must be proven by two witnesses or one witness plus corroborating circumstances independent of the witness's own statements. Here, the additional evidence consisted only of officers recounting the witness's admissions of lying, which did not qualify as sufficient corroboration under established precedent. Therefore, the motion for nonsuit should have been granted.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a rear-end car collision in which the plaintiff sued the defendants for damages allegedly caused by their negligence. The trial judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff had suddenly stopped her car without any signal, but the evidence showed the plaintiff's car was already stopped and visible for more than a mile when first seen by the defendants. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that submitting material facts to the jury that were not supported by any evidence constituted prejudicial error, and therefore granted the plaintiff a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with lottery-related offenses who moved to suppress evidence of purported lottery tickets seized under a search warrant, arguing the warrant was invalidly issued. The trial court denied the motion after hearing testimony, including from the assistant clerk who issued the warrant, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that ruling. The court found the warrant illegal because the assistant clerk failed to require a sworn affidavit or examine the complainant as mandated by G.S. 15-27, relying instead on her testimony that she merely witnessed signatures without understanding her statutory duties. Although the improperly obtained evidence should have been suppressed, the court ordered a new trial rather than dismissal, noting the State might have other admissible evidence to support the charges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State Highway Commission taking property for highway construction and whether landowners could seek compensation for the resulting loss of access to their premises via a pre-existing private or neighborhood road. The trial court excluded evidence of that access road's existence at the time of the taking, on the ground that it was not a state-maintained public highway, and also barred evidence of water damage because it had not been specifically pleaded. The Supreme Court held this exclusion was error, reasoning that closing off such access without providing a reasonable alternative can diminish the property's fair market value in the same manner as loss of access to a public highway, and that relevant evidence of value diminution need not be pleaded with particularity in condemnation proceedings. The court distinguished prior cases where alternative access had been provided and ordered a new trial.

propertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment that an ordinance adopted by the City of Raleigh was unconstitutional, along with injunctive relief. The court held that the action must be dismissed because no genuine justiciable controversy existed between the parties. The core reasoning was that North Carolina's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes courts to adjudicate only actual disputes affecting the parties' rights, status, or legal relations, and does not permit adjudication of abstract or theoretical questions or issuance of advisory opinions. Here, the city had issued no license under the ordinance and taken no action that violated any of the plaintiffs' rights or caused them any loss.

procedure

The case concerned whether the recipient of North Carolina real property, devised under a general power of appointment exercised in a will and included in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, must pay a pro rata share of the federal estate tax when the will contained no express direction on tax allocation. The lower court ruled in favor of the executors on two grounds, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed (with a modification on interest accrual), holding that the defendant owed approximately 16.66% of the tax plus interest. The court reasoned that 26 U.S.C.A. § 2207 expressly authorizes the executor to recover such a proportionate amount from the appointee unless the decedent directed otherwise, that the property was properly included in the gross estate under the federal statute, and that this federal rule applied even though the situs of the property was North Carolina and the will was probated elsewhere. The court also noted that Nevada's apportionment statute would produce the same result but did not rely on it as binding here.

taxespropertyfederal power

This case arose from a head-on collision on a two-lane highway in which plaintiff Calvin Cline, a passenger in defendant Buford Scott’s westbound car, was seriously injured after defendant Sidney Atwood’s eastbound truck crossed into the oncoming lane. Cline sued both drivers, alleging negligence by Atwood (including driving under the influence and failing to keep control) and by Scott (including failing to pull onto the shoulder to avoid the collision). The trial court denied Scott’s motion for nonsuit at the close of evidence, but the appellate court reversed that ruling. The court held that Atwood’s sudden lane change created an emergency, that Scott’s evasive turn was not negligent under the circumstances, and that Atwood’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident, citing precedents such as Butner v. Spease and Capps v. Smith. Accordingly, judgment as of nonsuit should have been entered in Scott’s favor.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the North Carolina Utilities Commission's determination of rates for Westco Telephone Co., specifically the fair value of the company's property used and useful in providing service as of December 31, 1963, and the appropriate rate of return on that value. The lower court had affirmed the Commission's findings of a fair value of $4,120,000 and a 3.8% rate of return, which the Supreme Court reviewed on appeal. The court held that the valuation was supported by substantial evidence, including expert appraisals and original cost data, consistent with the requirements of G.S. 62-133 that rates be fair to both the utility and consumers by considering factors such as depreciated original cost, replacement cost, and other relevant elements. It further upheld the rate of return as within the Commission's discretion, given the company's low-interest REA financing and service expansion, and emphasized that Commission-set rates are presumed just and reasonable absent evidence of arbitrariness.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs who built private sewer lines on their property to serve their filling station and trailer park, which later connected to the City of Rockingham's sewer system; the city began charging sewerage service fees to users of those lines, including a motel and store. Plaintiffs sued, claiming the city's fees and use of the lines constituted a taking of their property without compensation. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the city's establishment of sewerage service charges and collection of fees did not amount to appropriation or control of the private lines, distinguishing this from cases where municipalities assumed maintenance or ownership. The court reasoned that such charges are fees for using municipal facilities rather than taxes or takings, and mere connections without the city exercising dominion do not create liability. It reversed the trial court's denial of the city's motion for nonsuit.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a defendant charged with forgery and uttering forged checks stolen from an auto parts business. The trial court admitted limited testimony about two additional checks not named in the indictments but later instructed the jury to disregard it, and it denied the defendant's motion for nonsuit at the close of the state's evidence. On appeal, the court held that the evidence about the extra checks was not sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial and that the state's proof of unauthorized signatures, the defendant's endorsement and passing of the checks, and receipt of payment was sufficient to support the charges and carry the case to the jury. The remaining assignments of error were overruled, resulting in affirmance of the conviction with no error found.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over an agreement titled 'Right of Way Easement Option' for a pipeline on land, where the plaintiff challenged a finding that it granted a present easement rather than merely an option for a future conveyance. The court decided that the instrument created a defeasible easement upon the initial $10 payment that became indefeasible upon timely payment of the additional $316 within four months, and that this easement was valid and binding. The core reasoning was that covenants or agreements concerning land use can operate as grants of easements when they reflect the parties' manifest intention, with no special words required, and that determinable easements are recognized under North Carolina law, as shown by precedents involving conditional or time-limited easements. The agreement had been executed under seal, acknowledged, and registered before the plaintiff acquired the property, leading the court to affirm the lower court's judgment.

property

The case involved defendant Keith, who was tried on criminal charges and challenged the admission of his confession to police as well as the validity of the arrest warrant. The court ruled that the confession was voluntary and that any defects in the warrant or its service had been waived. The core reasoning was that the trial judge properly conducted a voir dire hearing on voluntariness, supported by evidence that the defendant was informed of his rights and chose not to invoke them, and that procedural irregularities in bringing a defendant to court do not bar prosecution once jurisdiction is obtained and no timely objection is made.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Darrell Gray Stubbs on charges of breaking and entering a building and larceny of merchandise valued over $200. The defendant appealed, contending that his statements to witnesses should not have been admitted without proof they were voluntary and that the jury instructions failed to properly define breaking and entering or require a finding on the property's value for the larceny count. The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the statements were properly admitted because confessions are presumed voluntary and no objection was raised, and that the jury charge was sufficient since breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony is unlawful by nature. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding there was no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Hinkle v. Hinkle arose from a divorce proceeding in which the parties had a prior separation agreement granting the wife custody of the minor children and specifying financial obligations, but the husband later sought absolute divorce and custody. The trial court awarded custody to the husband and ordered him to pay the wife's moving costs, attorneys' fees, and rent; the husband appealed the financial order and the wife appealed the custody ruling. The court modified the order to eliminate the requirement that the husband pay moving and rental expenses, holding that a valid separation agreement remains binding on such matters and cannot be altered by the court absent consent. It affirmed the custody award, reasoning that the best interests of the children control and that the children's preferences, while relevant, are not determinative. The decision noted that custody and child support are exceptions to the general enforceability of separation agreements.

family law

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance company was obligated to pay a non-negotiable draft it had issued to settle a claim for personal property destroyed by fire in a mobile home. The draft, prepared based on a proof of loss by the company's adjuster and drawn by its authorized general agent on the company itself, named specific payees and stated it was in full settlement. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff bank, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no acceptance was required because a draft drawn by an agent on its principal with authority is treated as a promissory note or accepted bill that binds the drawer upon issuance. The court distinguished cases where the agent's authority was limited and found no evidence of bad faith or grounds to countermand the instrument.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Brown, defendants were convicted of felonious breaking and entering and larceny after a trial in which a prosecution witness testified about a conversation linking one defendant to an adding machine stolen from a specific business; the trial court struck the most prejudicial portion of the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it, but denied a mistrial motion. Defendants also challenged the admission of questions on cross-examination about their prior indictments for similar offenses. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that any error from the stricken testimony was cured by the instruction and that, when a defendant testifies, the prosecution may properly cross-examine about prior indictments for like offenses as impeachment. The court therefore found no error in the trial proceedings and affirmed the convictions, with a concurring opinion noting nuances in the larceny instructions but agreeing the judgment should stand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the death of Leggette, an employee operating heavy equipment rented by McCotter (general employer) to Crowder (special employer) on a construction site, while he voluntarily assisted with placing steel beams. The determinative issue was whether McCotter, Crowder, or both were liable for workers' compensation benefits under North Carolina's Workmen’s Compensation Act. The court held both employers liable, reversing the lower court and remanding for affirmance of the Industrial Commission's award. It reasoned that when a lent employee performs work benefiting both employers and both exercise some measure of control, the employee may recover from either or both, drawing on authorities addressing dual employment, retained control over rented equipment, and joint participation in the work.

labor & employment