Franklin Freeman

This case was a class action brought by vehicle lessees against Mazda dealers, manufacturers, and the finance company PRIMUS, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and unfair trade practices over an undisclosed $158.50 fee charged when exercising a purchase option at the end of the lease. After settling with the dealership defendants, plaintiffs obtained class certification from the trial court, which also ordered PRIMUS to send notice of the action to potential class members identified from its records. PRIMUS pursued an interlocutory appeal of the certification order, prompting the court to examine whether such orders are immediately appealable. The court reasoned that class certification orders are interlocutory and not appealable as of right unless they affect a substantial right, while separately analyzing the notice directive under Rule 23 as distinct from a discovery sanction.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a taxi and search a passenger based on a tip from an informant about a drug courier arriving by bus from New York. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the seized marijuana and cocaine, finding the tip was effectively anonymous and not adequately corroborated before the stop. The Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, but the state supreme court reinstated the suppression order. The court reasoned that under the totality-of-the-circumstances test from Illinois v. Gates, the officers failed to verify key details such as the suspect's name, nationality, or destination before intervening, rendering the stop a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It distinguished the facts from Alabama v. White and aligned them more closely with Florida v. J.L., where an uncorroborated tip was insufficient.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Israel, the defendant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging both the sufficiency of the State's circumstantial evidence linking him to the victim's death by strangulation in her apartment and the trial court's exclusion of evidence implicating another individual, Marvin Mitchell, who had a history of violent interactions with the victim and appeared on surveillance video entering and leaving her building around the time of death. The court held that the State's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to it, was sufficient to support submission to the jury and sustain the conviction. However, it concluded that the excluded evidence was relevant and admissible because it identified a specific alternative perpetrator with both opportunity and motive, going beyond mere speculation, and its omission undermined the reliability of the verdict. Because there was a reasonable possibility that admitting the evidence would have produced a different outcome, the court granted the defendant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Smith, the defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree forcible rape, and first-degree arson after committing these offenses against a victim in her apartment on January 16, 1995, and was sentenced to death for the murder along with consecutive prison terms for the other crimes. The defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the short-form murder indictment under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, various aspects of jury selection, and the proportionality and fairness of the death sentence, including claims of passion or prejudice. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence in full, holding that short-form indictments authorized by N.C.G.S. § 15-144 are constitutional because they encompass the elements and maximum penalty of first-degree murder without needing additional facts charged. The court also conducted proportionality review against other capital cases, found the sentence neither excessive nor disproportionate, and determined there was no evidence the jury's recommendation was influenced by passion or prejudice. The opinion concludes there was no prejudicial error in the capital sentencing proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose when a store employee reported to the Department of Social Services her observation of a mother slamming her fifteen-month-old child onto a counter, prompting a two-month investigation into possible child abuse or neglect. The mother sued the employee and her employer for slander per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging the report was made in retaliation rather than good faith. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, which the Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed as to the slander claim against the employee. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on that claim, holding that the mandatory reporting statutes confer civil immunity and create a presumption of good faith that the plaintiff failed to rebut with evidence of actual malice. The Court therefore concluded that the statutory protections barred the slander claim as a matter of law.

criminal lawfamily lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involves Gary Dean Greene, who was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of his father and sentenced to death. After an initial sentencing was vacated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court due to McKoy error, the trial court resentenced Greene to death following a new capital sentencing proceeding. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that life imprisonment means imprisonment for life without considering possible future government actions or in refusing to submit the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity. The court's reasoning relied on precedents that parole eligibility is not a proper jury consideration in capital cases and that the defendant's record of primarily nonviolent offenses related to substance abuse and theft did not require submission of that mitigating factor.

criminal lawprocedure