Henry E. Frye

In Roberts v. Swain, plaintiff Douglas Roberts sued three UNC police officers for claims including assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after an unlawful arrest and detention, resulting in a jury award of $18,100 in damages. The defendants had made a pretrial offer of judgment for $50,000 under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which the plaintiff rejected. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that costs and attorney fees incurred after the offer but before final judgment must be included when calculating the "judgment finally obtained" to determine whether the plaintiff must bear post-offer costs. The court's reasoning relied on its prior definition in Poole v. Miller that the "judgment finally obtained" means the amount ultimately entered by the court, including applicable adjustments such as fees and costs awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, without limitation to pre-offer amounts.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved defendant William Davis, who pled guilty to the first-degree murders of his aunt Joyce Miller and cousin Caroline Miller in 1996. After a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder along with numerous mitigating factors, recommending a death sentence for Joyce Miller's murder and life imprisonment for Caroline Miller's. The trial court imposed those sentences. On appeal, Davis raised 32 claims of error in the sentencing proceeding. The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected all arguments, held that the proceeding was free of prejudicial error, and concluded after proportionality review that the death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate given the circumstances, including the murder occurring in the victim's home with a weapon and in the presence of children.

criminal law

In Watson v. Dixon, a Duke University employee sued a coworker for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from workplace harassment, and sued the university for ratifying the conduct. The jury awarded the plaintiff modest compensatory damages plus $5,000 in punitive damages against the coworker and $500,000 in punitive damages against the university. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that an employer's punitive-damage liability under a ratification theory of vicarious liability is not capped by the amount assessed against the employee. The court reasoned that punitive damages serve distinct deterrent and punitive purposes that would be undermined if an employer's exposure were limited to the employee's financial resources.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case concerned a dispute between motel owners and the North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association over the handling of a windstorm and hail insurance claim following Hurricane Emily in 1993. The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer's delays, inadequate investigations, improper payment attempts involving a third-party mortgage interest, and low settlement offers amounted to unfair practices under state insurance law and constituted unfair or deceptive acts under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. The trial court found a violation of § 75-1.1, trebled the jury's damages award, and granted attorneys' fees; the Court of Appeals reversed. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the insurer violated § 75-1.1 through acts prohibited by N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) committed with sufficient frequency to indicate a general business practice, and that this violation stood independently of any per se violation. The court remanded for reinstatement of the amended judgment including trebled damages and fees.

business & regulatory

The case involved the interpretation of North Carolina General Statute § 14-27.7A(b), which defines a Class C felony for engaging in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a person aged 13, 14, or 15 when the defendant is more than four but less than six years older, except if married to the person. Defendant, aged 20, was convicted of violating the statute after having intercourse with a 14-year-old victim, though he claimed consent. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that consent is not a defense to the charge. The court reasoned from the statute's plain language specifying only marriage as an exception, the legislative purpose of protecting children, and comparisons to other statutes in the same article that explicitly address consent or lack of consent.

criminal law

In Thompson v. Waters, homeowners sued Lee County for negligent building inspections that allegedly approved construction violating the state building code, resulting in structural defects shortly after completion, along with a separate claim against the contractor. The trial court granted the county's motion to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based on the public duty doctrine, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, ruling that the public duty doctrine does not apply to bar the negligent inspection claim against the county. The court reasoned that the doctrine had previously been limited primarily to law enforcement contexts and declined to extend it to municipal building inspectors, without needing to address the special relationship or special duty exceptions.

torts & liabilityprocedure