William A. Hoke

The case concerned whether the City of Durham could spend $250,000 in proceeds from the sale of a prior city lot to build a new public auditorium on city property without obtaining voter approval. The court upheld the city's plan and dissolved the restraining order against it. The funds consisted of cash and secured notes already in hand, with no new debt or taxes involved. The court held that constructing the auditorium served a valid public purpose under general law and the city charter. Because no additional liability would be created, the constitutional provision requiring a popular vote for municipal debt did not apply, provided contracts limited spending to the existing fund.

propertytaxes

The case was a civil action seeking to enjoin issuance of bonds under North Carolina's World War Veterans' Loan Fund Act (chapter 190, Public Laws 1923). The court examined the complaint's allegations, which were admitted by the defendants' demurrer, and determined that the act's express requirement for approval by a majority of the state's qualified electors had not been satisfied. As a result, the court concluded that the bonds would not constitute valid and binding obligations of the state. It held that the demurrer should therefore have been overruled rather than sustained. A fuller opinion was to be filed later.

electionstaxes

The case concerned a plaintiff's effort to obtain a judgment against two defendants following a jury verdict in Superior Court that affirmed his right of recovery in a suit originating from a justice's court. The court held that judgment should be entered against both defendants as requested. It reasoned that a judgment must follow as a matter of law once facts are properly established by verdict in a duly constituted suit, that service on the out-of-county defendant was valid under the applicable statute, and that both defendants had submitted to the court's jurisdiction by appealing the justice's ruling.

procedure

This case concerns a dispute over ownership of land in North Carolina where plaintiffs sued defendants for trespass based on the cutting of timber shortly before the action was filed in 1923. Plaintiffs relied on 1865 state grants and subsequent conveyances to establish title, while defendants asserted ownership through later grants from 1886 and 1905, claiming title by adverse possession under color of title or actual occupation. The jury found in favor of defendants on most issues, including ownership under the later grants and no wrongful cutting, leading to judgment for defendants. The court granted a new trial, holding that a 1905 grant could not serve as color of title under state statute because it overlapped prior grants, and that the jury instructions on the 1886 grant improperly allowed title to mature to the full boundaries without requiring proof of adverse and exclusive possession specifically on the overlapping portion of plaintiffs' superior title.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the liability of Globe Indemnity Company as surety on bonds posted by Milton L. Walters, manager of a state-licensed cotton warehouse under North Carolina's warehouse system statutes. Walters issued receipts for cotton stored by third parties, later delivered the cotton without canceling the receipts, and used the receipts as collateral for his personal loan from Murchison National Bank; the bank accepted them without actual knowledge of the prior delivery. After the state paid the resulting loss from its indemnity fund, the court addressed whether the surety had to reimburse the state. The court decided that the surety was liable, reasoning that the receipts remained negotiable, the bank acted in good faith, and the bond covered the manager's default in failing to cancel receipts as required by statute.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether an assessment under the 1921 amendment to North Carolina's General Banking Act to repair a bank's impaired capital could create personal liability for stockholders or whether enforcement was limited to selling their shares. The court decided that the statute authorizes only the sale of a delinquent stockholder's stock at public auction after notice, with any balance returned to the shareholder, and does not permit a personal action against the stockholder. This holding rests on the principle that when a statute creates a new right and provides a specific remedy, that remedy is exclusive, consistent with interpretations of the similar National Banking Act and North Carolina precedent. The requirement that the assessment be 'payable in cash' was interpreted as requiring prompt payment but only through the sale mechanism specified in the law.

business & regulatory

The case involved a manufacturing company that sought to correct the assessed valuation of its property for tax purposes, recover taxes already paid based on that valuation, and compel the local board of commissioners to reassess the property. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on demurrer. It held that the taxpayer had failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, including a proper application to the State Board of Assessment under the 1923 revenue statute, which has supervisory authority to review and correct local assessments. The opinion emphasized that statutes require taxpayers to pursue and exhaust these administrative procedures before seeking judicial relief.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case concerned the interpretation of an 1876 deed conveying property to Matilda E. Van Lear for life, with remainder to the lawful heirs of her body who were living at her death (and the issue of any such heirs who predeceased her). Plaintiffs claimed that the deed conveyed a fee simple to Matilda under the rule in Shelley's case, making them the current owners after acquiring her interest. Defendant, Matilda's son Robert, argued that the deed created only a life estate in Matilda with remainder to her children as purchasers, so that he retained a one-third interest. The court held that the rule in Shelley's case did not apply because the deed's language showed the grantor intended 'heirs' to designate a restricted class of children living at Matilda's death rather than technical heirs taking by descent; thus Matilda received only a life estate, Robert owned one-third, and his claim was valid.

property

The case concerned the interpretation of a clause in Elizabeth Huneycutt's will devising a house and lot to her three named grandchildren as primary takers, with contingencies that if any died without bodily heirs or before age 21 their share would go to the survivors, and if all died without bodily heirs the property would revert to the testator's children and their lawful heirs. The court held that the plaintiffs, the grandchildren, could not presently convey good title to the property. It reasoned that the devise created a defeasible fee in the grandchildren subject to a substitutional gift to the ultimate takers, whose identities could not be ascertained until the preceding estate terminated by the death of the first takers without issue, and that deeds from some but not all potential heirs of the testator's children were therefore insufficient to assure the title.

property

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of land originally belonging to John H. Daniel, Jr., who died in 1864 leaving a will that gave his widow a life estate and the remainder to those who would inherit if he had died unmarried and without a will. The widow later remarried and had additional children; their posthumous son from the first marriage died in 1888 without descendants, and the plaintiffs (collateral relatives of the original testator) claimed the property against defendants who held interests through the widow's second marriage. The court affirmed a nonsuit for the defendants, holding that the posthumous child took a vested remainder under the will and canons of descent, which passed to his mother upon his death and then to her other children. The decision rested on the will's language limiting the widow to a life estate while passing the remainder to the testator's own lineal or collateral heirs, combined with statutes governing after-born children and rules of descent that applied after the child's death.

propertyfamily law

The case concerned a passenger ejected from a Louisville & Nashville Railroad train in 1922 after failing to obtain a ticket, with the plaintiff alleging that agents put him off before the train fully stopped into a deep, muddy ditch, causing him to slip and sustain physical injuries while avoiding the moving train. The jury found for the defendant on the claim regarding the right to eject but for the plaintiff on the claim that the manner of ejection caused harm. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that even when a carrier has the right to remove a passenger, that right must be exercised with reasonable care for the person's safety, and breach of this duty resulting in injury creates liability.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over the compensation owed to landowners whose property was condemned by a power company for an overhead electrical transmission line right of way. The trial court instructed the jury on measuring permanent damages as the difference in fair market value of the land before and after the taking, with a modification allowing consideration of the value of the land covered by the right of way due to the broad easement sought. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that while the modification deviated from the standard rule for power lines, it was appropriate here because the petition allowed for extensive use of the strip, akin to railroad condemnations, and there was no reversible error.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Snow Hill Banking & Trust Co. had formed a valid partnership with two individuals to operate a drug store after the bank took over the store's assets to secure a prior debt, and whether the bank could be held liable for partnership obligations. The court held that the agreement constituted a partnership under standard definitions requiring contribution of property or money for a joint business with shared profits, and that the jury's finding of no dissolution in 1922 was supported by the evidence. On the ultra vires issue, the court reasoned that a bank may enter such an arrangement when reasonably necessary to realize value from collateral acquired in its regular banking business, making the contract enforceable at least as to the assets contributed. The judgment was affirmed, directing receivers to pay partnership debts from assets and divide any surplus according to investments.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy issued by Georgia Casualty Co. to Leaksville Light & Power Co. covered a claim for bodily injuries caused by one of the company's trucks driven by an employee. The court held that the policy did not provide coverage for the claim. The policy contained explicit conditions excluding coverage for injuries caused by drivers not included in the compensation schedule or by any vehicle or person in charge of a vehicle, and the court found these provisions clear and applicable, rejecting arguments for ambiguity in favor of the insured. The decision affirmed the lower court's judgment denying coverage.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a criminal prosecution under North Carolina's Turlington Act for violations related to the manufacture, sale, and possession of intoxicating liquors, including multiple counts in the indictment. The trial court denied a motion for nonsuit and instructed the jury on the statutory provisions, resulting in a general guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Act's rule making possession prima facie evidence of intent to sell applies broadly and suffices for conviction, that a general verdict stands as a conviction on all valid counts unless error vitiates the entire verdict, and that any erroneous instruction on a separate receiving count did not require reversal. The opinion also noted the state's authority under its police powers to enact liquor regulations stricter than federal law, provided they do not conflict with the Eighteenth Amendment.

criminal lawfederal power

The case involved a parent charged under a North Carolina compulsory attendance statute (O.S. 5758) that required parents or guardians to send children ages eight to fourteen to school for the full term the local public schools were in session, with penalties for violation. The defendant was prosecuted specifically for failing to send his children to the public school in his district, but the court found the warrant defective because it did not allege failure to attend any school as the statute defines the offense. The trial court's jury instructions were also erroneous in shifting the burden to the defendant to prove attendance at another school or an exemption, rather than requiring the state to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that the charging document and proof must match the statute's terms exactly, without provisos or exceptions that would alter the burden. It therefore ordered a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

This case concerned a workplace injury at a cotton mill where an employee cleaning the lower part of a boiler was struck and seriously hurt by a heavy iron piece that fell from above after being displaced by coworkers cleaning the boiler flues under a foreman's direction. The trial court denied the employer's motion for nonsuit, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that an employer must exercise reasonable care to provide a safe workplace, and directing employees to work on top of the boilers while the plaintiff worked below created a foreseeable hazard that breached this duty. Although fellow employees may have been negligent, the employer's decision to proceed with the work under those conditions, combined with the foreman's supervision despite the plaintiff's warning, made the company responsible. The judgment below was therefore affirmed.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved an employee, Jesse Corbitt, who was injured while working for the defendant company on a road construction project when a heavy jack used to lift a derailed engine slipped and caught his hand. The plaintiff sued for negligence, claiming the single jack provided was inadequate for the task. The court held that the evidence permitted a jury finding of negligence, both because the jack appeared insufficient and because the unexplained failure supported application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court had properly submitted the case to the jury under an adequate charge, and the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed with no error found.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved a dispute over a disability insurance policy issued by New York Life Insurance, where the plaintiff sought benefits claiming total incapacity due to tuberculosis that prevented him from any remunerative work. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding he was wholly incapacitated during the relevant period. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions to the jury accurately reflected the policy terms requiring complete inability to engage in any occupation for profit, not merely the plaintiff's prior farming activities, and that evidence of prior payments by the insurer was properly admitted.

business & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff who had obtained an unpaid federal court judgment against Pamlico Cooperage Company after the company sold all its assets in 1920 for full value and distributed the proceeds exclusively to other creditors. The court decided that the buyer, National Veneer Company, bore no further liability as a good-faith purchaser without notice of any fraudulent intent. However, Pamlico's directors and officers were held liable for breaching their duty to distribute assets equally among all creditors when the insolvent company's sale effectively amounted to a dissolution, particularly by preferring debts on which they were personally liable as endorsers.

business & regulatory