J. Frank Huskins

This case involves an employee, Cullen Walston, seeking workers' compensation benefits from Burlington Industries and its insurer for respiratory conditions including chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and possible byssinosis, which he attributed to thirty years of cotton dust exposure. The Industrial Commission denied the claim after finding the diseases were ordinary conditions of life not proven to result from causes peculiar to his employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed that ruling and reinstated the denial of benefits. The court held that the medical testimony established only a possibility of causation from workplace dust, with smoking identified as the likely primary factor, which was insufficient to meet the statutory requirements under G.S. 97-53(13) for an occupational disease. Findings supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal, and the employee failed to prove the requisite causal connection.

labor & employment

In State v. Hall, defendant Ezekiel Hall was convicted of kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury after he and an accomplice robbed a gas station, abducted the attendant at gunpoint, and shot him during their escape. Hall appealed, arguing that the kidnapping indictment was defective for omitting explicit language about lack of consent and that there was a fatal variance between the indictment's charge of kidnapping to facilitate armed robbery and the evidence, which he claimed showed the kidnapping occurred only to aid flight after the robbery was complete. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the term "kidnap" in the indictment sufficiently implied seizure against the victim's will under state law and that the evidence supported the charged purpose because the kidnapping served dual purposes of facilitating both the robbery and flight, with the robbery not being fully "completed" until the entire episode ended. A dissent argued that the evidence failed to prove the specific purpose alleged in the indictment, creating a fatal variance under prior precedent like State v. Faircloth.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mario Lopez Stedman, who was fifteen years old when he allegedly committed offenses in December 1978 that led to juvenile petitions in district court. Under both the pre-1980 juvenile statutes and the new Juvenile Code effective in 1980, the district court held exclusive original jurisdiction over such cases unless transferred to superior court, rendering the 1979 superior court indictments void for lack of jurisdiction. The court also addressed the application of new provisions (G.S. 7A-596 et seq.) allowing nontestimonial identification orders like fingerprinting of juveniles, rejecting ex post facto challenges because those rules did not alter offenses, defenses, or required proof. Jurisdiction over the juvenile ended upon his eighteenth birthday in February 1981, after which the district court lacked authority to act. The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated a later district court order and directed that Stedman be tried in superior court as an adult.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Johnson, the defendant appealed his North Carolina criminal conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a statement on grounds that voluntariness was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the denial of his request for new counsel due to disagreements over pleas and investigation, the sufficiency of evidence that a ballpoint pen used in an assault was a dangerous weapon, and the trial court's jury instructions implying a verdict was required. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction, ruling that the prosecution need only prove voluntariness of a statement by a preponderance of the evidence under state and federal law, that the defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel issues or that the pen could not be deemed a deadly weapon, and that the instructions were proper. The court based its decision on precedents like Lego v. Twomey for the evidentiary standard and found no prejudicial error in the record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved whether a police officer's search of the passenger compartment of a defendant's truck after his custodial arrest violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the search was permissible under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton. The court reasoned that Belton establishes a bright-line rule allowing such searches as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest of a vehicle occupant, even if the defendant has been secured in a patrol car, and rejected arguments that the search was not contemporaneous, that cases like Arkansas v. Sanders applied, or that Belton should not be applied retroactively. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for reinstatement of the original judgment.

criminal law

The case concerned whether two savings accounts held at Mechanics & Farmers Bank had been validly assigned by the original depositors to the Rosensteins. The trial court ruled the assignments effective and awarded the funds to the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that a bank rule required the bank's consent for any transfer. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, holding that the bank's rules and regulations restricted only assignment of the passbooks themselves and contained no restriction on assignment of the underlying accounts, so the accounts were validly transferred even without the bank's consent.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Jones, the defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and kidnapping after an incident involving a shotgun; he appealed on grounds that a shotgun seized from his car should have been suppressed as the product of an unconstitutional stop and search, that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on second-degree rape and sexual offense, and that his rape and kidnapping convictions violated double jeopardy. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observations of the parked car and the defendant's actions, that the shotgun was lawfully seized in plain view as contraband, and that no lesser-included offense instructions were required because there was no evidence of force other than the weapon. The court further ruled that rape and kidnapping do not merge for double-jeopardy purposes under state law. It therefore found no prejudicial error and upheld the convictions and sentences.

criminal lawgunscivil rightsprocedure

The case involved an indigent defendant who received a suspended prison sentence in a prosecution under G.S. 49-2 for willful failure to support an illegitimate child, conditioned on making support payments. The court declined to decide whether such a defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel, holding that the question was not properly before it. Paternity itself is not a crime, and only willful nonsupport may be prosecuted, with willfulness required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The ruling on the defendant's motion for appropriate relief was not yet ripe because the trial court had not determined whether he willfully failed to comply with the judgment or invoked the suspended sentence. The case was remanded for that determination, after which any invocation of the sentence could be appealed.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the trial court properly admitted testimony from two women about prior assaults by the defendant in his prosecution for the rape and assault of a third woman, Miss Allen. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the evidence was admissible and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The court reasoned that the assaults shared sufficient similarities—including occurring within a four-hour period, targeting lone women, and involving choking—to show a common plan or scheme under an exception to the general rule barring evidence of other crimes. Additional connections, such as the defendant using a knife and car stolen from one victim to commit the charged offense, further supported admissibility to establish intent and explain the chain of circumstances. The court concluded that any error from one witness's testimony was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Cooper, the defendant pled guilty to fourteen felonies involving possession of stolen credit cards and was placed on probation with a condition prohibiting him from operating a motor vehicle in North Carolina between 12:01 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. After the trial court revoked probation upon finding that he had driven at night in violation of this condition, the Court of Appeals ruled the condition invalid. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the restriction was valid under G.S. 15A-1343(b)(17) because nighttime driving was reasonably related both to the offenses (which could involve use of a vehicle to receive or dispose of stolen property) and to the defendant's rehabilitation by limiting his exposure to criminal activity. The court further held that a probationer must raise any challenge to a probation condition no later than the revocation hearing itself and cannot first contest its validity on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Elsie Morrison, an employee who contracted an occupational lung disease from her work in the textile industry and claimed total disability under North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act, though medical evidence showed the disease caused only 55 percent of her incapacity while 45 percent stemmed from unrelated conditions like diabetes and phlebitis. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation based on the 55 percent figure, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling on appeal. The court decided that when supported by competent evidence, the Commission must apportion benefits under G.S. 97-30 for partial incapacity rather than award full benefits under G.S. 97-29 for total incapacity, because the statutes limit compensation to the portion of incapacity resulting from the occupational disease. The core reasoning was that the Act is not a general health insurance scheme, factual findings by the Commission are conclusive if evidence-based, and statutory language requires distinguishing work-related from non-work-related contributions to disability.

labor & employment

This case concerned the application of North Carolina's "Quick Access" statute, G.S. 58-155.60, to securities deposited by the insolvent foreign insurer Reserve under older deposit requirements in Article 20 of Chapter 58. The deposits, held in trust for North Carolina policyholders, created liens under G.S. 58-185 for claims, losses, and return premiums in the event of insolvency, with the Insurance Guaranty Association authorized to access the funds for paying claims. The court held that the statute could be applied constitutionally to the case without divesting existing lien rights and clarified the interrelationship among the deposit, liquidation, and guaranty association statutes. It determined that the Association could initially use the deposit funds as seed money for expenses but must ultimately distribute them pro rata to satisfy policyholder claims under G.S. 58-185, with any remainder only then available to the Association. The decision modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling on these priorities.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Norris, the defendant was tried for first-degree murder after fatally shooting her husband and raised a claim of self-defense at trial. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of murder, manslaughter, and self-defense but defined 'without justification or excuse' in a manner that required all four elements of perfect self-defense to be present before the jury could consider any self-defense benefit. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that this instruction was erroneous because it failed to account for imperfect self-defense, under which a defendant who reasonably believed deadly force was necessary but was the aggressor or used excessive force would be guilty only of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that the flawed charge may have improperly prevented the jury from returning a manslaughter verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Mazzacco, who was injured while cutting trees on rental property owned by defendants Harvey and Rosemary Purcell after a rope rigged to fell a tree section unexpectedly catapulted him. The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court properly granted directed verdicts for the defendants, focusing on their duty of care to plaintiff as an invitee and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court held that plaintiff was an invitee owed a duty of ordinary care, including warning of hidden dangers, and that a jury could reasonably find Harvey Purcell negligent for failing to warn about the unsafe rope rigging he had created, but found no such breach by Rosemary Purcell who lacked knowledge of the condition. It further concluded that the evidence did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law, reversing the directed verdict for Harvey Purcell and remanding for further proceedings while affirming the directed verdict for Rosemary Purcell.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case concerned whether a group life insurance policy issued by Nationwide to employer Hornwood remained in effect at the time of employee John Gatewood's death in December 1975. Gatewood had been injured at work, received workers' compensation, and had his employment terminated in August 1974 for economic reasons, after which no further premiums were paid and no waiver-of-premium claim was submitted. The court held that the policy was not in force because Gatewood ceased to be a certificateholder upon termination of employment, the waiver clause did not extend coverage after termination, and no conversion to an individual policy had occurred. Accordingly, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and trial court rulings that had found coverage by operation of the waiver provision and entered judgment for the insurer and employer.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case addressed whether dependents of a worker who suffered serious bodily disfigurement from a covered workplace accident could receive a postmortem compensation award under the Workers’ Compensation Act after the employee died from unrelated causes while receiving temporary total disability benefits. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the dependents were entitled to the award. The court reasoned that the employee’s pending single claim under the Act encompassed all injuries including discretionary compensation for disfigurement under G.S. 97-31(22), the burns and scarring met the legal standard for serious disfigurement by potentially reducing future earning power, and G.S. 97-37 requires payment of any unpaid compensation to surviving dependents when death occurs from other causes.

labor & employment

The case involved charges of breaking and entering, larceny, and rape at a home on June 23. The only evidence linking the defendant to the scene was four fingerprints on a window screen, which the State could not show were made at the time of the charged offenses. The North Carolina Supreme Court held this evidence insufficient to withstand a motion for nonsuit, as the defendant had admitted to committing similar crimes at the same location weeks earlier and the victim could not identify him. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion and remanded for entry of a judgment of nonsuit.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bracey, the defendant faced three separate armed robbery charges arising from incidents on the same street in Wilmington within a ten-day period, each involving similar circumstances of two assailants assaulting business attendants and taking cash without weapons. The trial court consolidated the charges for a single trial under G.S. 15A-926(a), but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient transactional connection among the offenses. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that joinder was proper because the crimes shared a common modus operandi, location, timing, victims, and motive, satisfying the statutory requirement of a series of acts connected together or part of a single scheme or plan, and the defendant showed no prejudice from the consolidation. The Court also vacated the sentence due to ambiguity in the trial court's findings regarding the defendant's eligibility for youthful offender status and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the division of child support obligations for minor child Vicki Register between her divorced parents after custody was awarded to the maternal grandparents. The trial court had ordered the father and mother each to pay $15 per week toward the child's support. The court held that state statutes establish primary liability for a minor child's support on the father, with secondary liability on the mother only upon pleading and proof that the father cannot reasonably meet the full needs of the child. Because the record contained no findings or evidence regarding the father's ability or inability to pay the full support amount, the order requiring the mother to contribute was reversed. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine the father's capacity to pay before imposing any support obligation on the mother.

family law

The case involved a criminal defendant appealing the denial of his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor asked during recross-examination whether he had taken and failed a polygraph test. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the motion and found no prejudicial error. The court reasoned that the defendant had opened the door to questions about the polygraph by testifying on direct examination that he had offered to take a lie detector test, which could mislead the jury, and that the prosecutor's questions were therefore competent to rebut that impression even though polygraph results are generally inadmissible without stipulation. The trial court had sustained the defense objection, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

criminal lawprocedure