Dan K. Moore

In State v. Thomas, the defendant was convicted of murder based on circumstantial evidence including statements to a third party, blood-stained clothing matching the victim's blood type, a matching fingerprint, and testimony from the victim's young son Eric Stancil, who was about five and a half at the time of the crime. The defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's ruling that allowed Eric to testify after a voir dire hearing and arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the child was competent because he demonstrated an understanding of the difference between truth and lies, awareness of biblical concepts of truth-telling, and normal recall ability for his age, consistent with precedents like Wheeler v. United States. The court further found the chain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish both the corpus delicti and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, overcoming the motion for nonsuit, with no prejudicial error in the trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of attempted rape who challenged the admission of the victim's in-court identification of him as her assailant, arguing that the trial court failed to make timely findings on its reliability under Neil v. Biggers standards and that the identification was inherently unreliable; he also contested the state's use of extrinsic evidence to impeach an alibi witness with a prior inconsistent statement. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that no pretrial identification procedure had occurred, so the Biggers reliability analysis and formal findings were not required, leaving the identification's credibility for the jury to decide. The court further ruled that impeachment of the alibi witness was proper because the inconsistent statement concerned material subject matter central to the defense. Finding no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings, the court affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Vaughn, the defendant appealed his North Carolina murder conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because no probable cause hearing was held before the grand jury returned a true bill, by denying his motion to quash the indictments due to allegedly improper jury commission selection methods under G.S. 9-3, and by making certain evidentiary rulings on character evidence and a prosecutor's question about parole eligibility in another state. The North Carolina Supreme Court overruled all assignments of error and found no prejudicial error in the proceedings. The court reasoned that G.S. 15A-606 does not require a probable cause hearing once an indictment has been returned, that the jury commission's systematic process and use of officials to identify disqualified persons complied with statutory requirements without unlawful exclusions, and that the evidentiary decisions were proper under the rules of evidence and did not unduly prejudice the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned disputes over liability on promissory notes, guaranty agreements, and a letter of credit issued by First Union National Bank in connection with a loan involving multiple parties including the Stewarts, Pridemore, O'Grady, and the MacQueens. Plaintiffs sought to introduce parol evidence that their obligations were conditioned on the Stewarts remaining liable, but the trial court excluded this evidence and ruled without making findings of fact under Rule 52 despite conflicting testimony about the execution of the documents. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence and failing to resolve factual disputes, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial as to O'Grady and the MacQueens, while affirming the judgment against Pridemore on grounds that his own actions bound him to the note regardless of the Stewarts' status.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Love, the defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of New York extradition laws and his right to a speedy trial, as well as in admitting certain evidence and denying a mistrial. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no error in the trial proceedings. The court reasoned that any issues with New York extradition procedures should have been raised in New York courts, the delay in trial did not violate speedy trial rights under the Barker v. Wingo factors given the defendant's flight and lack of prejudice, the evidence was admissible either as non-hearsay or under exceptions, and the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying mistrial after sustaining an objection and instructing the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a trial court erred by excluding a chiropractor's expert testimony on a plaintiff's diagnosis in the absence of other medical evidence. The court held that the ruling could not be reviewed for error because the plaintiff failed to make a specific offer of proof showing what the excluded testimony would have been. The core reasoning was that an offer of proof is required whenever a witness is barred from testifying on a specific matter, even if framed as a question of the witness's competency, so that the reviewing court can assess prejudice; the limited exception for total exclusion of a witness did not apply here since the chiropractor had testified on other aspects of the case.

procedure

In State v. Mason, the defendant appealed his convictions, challenging the trial court's denial of motions to compel the State to allow defense interviews with witnesses and for a continuance to review newly provided evidence such as fingerprint materials. The court held that the prosecutor had not instructed witnesses to refuse discussions with defense counsel, as shown by the district attorney's statements and lack of contrary evidence, and that the denial of further continuance did not violate the defendant's rights to effective counsel or confrontation since he had adequate time to prepare after arrest and discovery. Additional claims regarding jury instructions on first-degree rape, pretrial custody credit, and lay witness testimony identifying bloodstains were rejected as either unsubstantiated, administrative matters, or permissible shorthand statements of fact under precedent. The appellate court found the trial free of prejudicial error and upheld the verdicts and judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Snead, the defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor after his car went into a ditch. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for nonsuit due to lack of evidence about his condition while driving, in denying a mistrial after suppressing his post-arrest statements to police (with a curative instruction given instead), and in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of reckless driving after consuming alcohol. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence—including the recent accident scene, defendant's admission of driving, and his intoxicated state shortly afterward—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt at the time of driving, that the curative instruction sufficed to address the suppressed statements, and that the evidence was positive as to every element of the charged offense with no conflicting evidence supporting the lesser offense. The court also ruled that the motion to set aside the verdict was within the trial court's discretion and showed no abuse.

criminal law

In State v. Ross, the defendant was convicted after testifying in his own defense and being cross-examined about illegal drugs discovered in his home during a prior unrelated police search that a district court had ruled unlawful. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the cross-examination was proper, as any witness who takes the stand, including a criminal defendant, may be impeached with questions about specific acts of criminal or degrading conduct even without a conviction, provided the questions are asked in good faith. The court noted that the defendant failed to raise a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule objection at trial or on initial appeal and that such impeachment evidence aids the jury in assessing credibility. A dissent argued that the tactic improperly allowed inquiry into matters for which the defendant had effectively been cleared and amounted to putting unproven facts before the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Headen, the defendant challenged the admission of Deputy Sheriff Wiggs's in-court identification testimony, arguing it was tainted by impermissibly suggestive pretrial procedures including a photo lineup where officers named the defendant and later confirmed his identity in a courthouse encounter. The court held that the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test from Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite, determined they created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, rendering the testimony inadmissible under due process. Weighing factors such as the witness's limited opportunity to observe, lack of attention to features, vague description, uncertainty until confirmation by officers, and the long delay since the 1974 crimes, the court found the identification unreliable. It concluded the error was prejudicial and ordered a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a defendant convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and armed robbery who appealed multiple trial rulings, including the denial of a motion to dismiss for alleged violations of his statutory rights under G.S. 15A-501 to be advised of his right to communicate with counsel and friends, the denial of a mistrial after a witness's stricken testimony, and the denial of motions for nonsuit. The court decided that the motion to dismiss did not properly raise the statutory rights issue, that the defendant failed to show any violation or prejudice, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial after curative instructions to the jury. The court further held that the nonsuit motions lacked merit based on a companion case with substantially similar evidence and that formal post-verdict motions were properly denied due to no abuse of discretion or fatal record defects. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the trial free from prejudicial error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the constitutionality of North Carolina's Peeping Tom statute, G.S. 14-202, which prohibits secretly peeping into a room occupied by a female person. The trial court ruled the statute unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, as it is presumed constitutional and can be interpreted to require a wrongful intent to invade privacy, consistent with legislative intent to address the targeted evil while providing fair notice. It also concluded that the statute is not overbroad, because a limiting construction excludes legitimate or inadvertent conduct from its scope.

criminal law

In State v. Abernathy, defendants Abernathy and Jaynes appealed their criminal convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by limiting their cross-examination of accomplice witness Ronald Clark regarding his potential bias or expectation of leniency, by providing insufficient jury instructions on scrutinizing accomplice testimony, and by allowing certain character evidence and instructions about aiding and abetting. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in sustaining objections to repetitive or improperly founded questions, as defendants had already extensively cross-examined Clark on his plea deal, criminal history, and lack of promises from the State. The court further ruled that the requested accomplice instructions were adequately covered, the character witnesses were properly qualified, and the contested jury instruction merely recited the State's contentions without improper judicial comment, resulting in no prejudicial error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Silvester Joyner, who was charged with first-degree rape, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and crime against nature after an attack on a victim. The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's denial of motions to dismiss under G.S. 15A-954(a)(4) for alleged flagrant constitutional violations during interrogation and for insufficient evidence on elements like the defendant's age and the nature of the weapon and injuries. The court found that the defendant had been read his Miranda rights, signed waivers, and that conflicting testimony was resolved by the trial judge's findings, which were supported by evidence; it also held that birth records proved age, the bottle's deadly character and injury severity were jury questions supported by evidence, and crime against nature includes tongue penetration of the vagina. The court concluded there was no error and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Franklin Junior Saults, convicted as an accessory before the fact to arson for paying and directing Jacky Lee Parker to burn Ola Mae Yelton's occupied dwelling in Mitchell County. After the verdict, Saults moved to arrest judgment, claiming the indictment was fatally defective because it omitted the word "maliciously," an element required for arson itself. The court ruled the indictment valid, holding that malice is not an element of accessory before the fact under G.S. 14-5 and that alleging the defendant counseled, procured, and commanded the principal to commit "arson" sufficiently apprised him of the charge and its elements. The opinion also rejected challenges to jury instructions on accomplice testimony and found sufficient evidence to support the verdict, resulting in a finding of no error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a contractor's lien for building a motel could relate back under pre-1975 North Carolina law to the date of initial on-site surveying, staking, and clearing work, thereby gaining priority over a later-recorded construction deed of trust held by Wachovia Realty Investments. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the contractor, Frank H. Conner Co., and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that G.S. 44A-8 granted a lien for labor and materials used in making an improvement, which included such preparatory services, and that G.S. 44A-10 required the perfected lien to relate back to the first furnishing of that labor or materials at the site. This made the lien effective before the deed of trust was recorded, even though a later statutory amendment explicitly added surveying services. The decision also upheld summary judgment for the lien amount based on uncontroverted contract evidence.

property

The case involved a dispute over the rightful holder of a North Carolina district court judgeship following the 1974 election in which incumbent Randy Duncan lost to Benjamin Beach. Duncan argued he remained entitled to the office because Beach was statutorily ineligible due to age, rendering Beach's nomination and election a nullity, the votes for Beach void, and Duncan either the sole qualified winner or entitled to hold over under G.S. 128-7 until a qualified successor took office. After Beach resigned in 1977 upon discovery of his ineligibility, Governor Hunt appointed L. Oliver Noble, whom Duncan sought to oust. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Beach qualified as a de facto officer whose judicial acts were valid, that his resignation created an actual vacancy under the state constitution, and that Duncan had no legal right to reassume the office after surrendering it without contest in 1974. The Governor's appointment of Noble therefore properly filled the vacancy.

elections

In State v. Hill, the defendant was tried for the murder of Herman Rofe and appealed his conviction, primarily challenging the admission of his confessions to prior assaults in Bertie County and a statement about traveling through Swansboro. The trial court had denied a motion to suppress after finding that the defendant was repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights, initially invoked silence, but later voluntarily waived those rights and made statements without coercion. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings supported voluntary waivers and that subsequent questioning did not violate Miranda under Michigan v. Mosley, as the defendant freely chose to speak after renewed warnings. The court also rejected challenges to jury instructions on premeditation and deliberation and to the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict, finding no error in the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Thomas, charged with first-degree murder of his wife, who sought continuances to obtain additional psychiatric evaluations, including an EEG, to assess his sanity and capacity. The trial court denied the final motion for continuance after multiple examinations at Dorothea Dix Hospital and by private experts had already been conducted, and proceeded to trial where the defendant was convicted. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of discretion or constitutional violation in denying the continuance, as the defendant failed to show prejudice, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation based on the circumstances of the stabbing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs, a law firm, seeking to enforce payment on a $150,000 installment note executed by defendant Koyt Everhart Jr. as part of a property settlement following his divorce from Jane Everhart; the firm had received a one-third assignment and collection rights from Jane via a separate document, but sued the maker and guarantors without joining her as a party. The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the note was not a negotiable instrument under the UCC because it expressly incorporated terms from the separation agreement, making the promise conditional, so the plaintiffs could not qualify as holders entitled to sue alone. Jane was deemed a necessary and indispensable party whose joinder was required for the action to proceed, and the case was remanded for a new trial with her added as a defendant.

procedurefamily law