Robert Hunt Parker

The case concerned a charitable trust established by a 1930 deed conveying real property to Wachovia Bank as trustee for the benefit of the Alexander Children's Center, which included a restriction against alienation of the land. The central issues were whether that restriction was valid and whether a court of equity could authorize a sale of the property. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the restraint on alienation was void as against public policy because the deed treated the property as investment land to generate income rather than dedicating it to a specific charitable use on the premises. The court reasoned that while charitable trusts may exist in perpetuity and restraints are generally upheld when tied to a precise purpose, no such justification applied here, allowing equitable modification to sell the asset if beneficial to the trust.

property

This case involved a claim under the North Carolina State Tort Claims Act by a six-year-old child injured while exiting a school bus operated by the Wayne County Board of Education. The Industrial Commission awarded damages, which the Superior Court initially reversed but the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed. The court held that omitting the specific employee's name from the initial affidavit was not a fatal jurisdictional defect when cured by later stipulation identifying the driver, and that the hearing commissioner could issue a decision based on the full record (including stipulated evidence) absent timely objection. It further reasoned that a child of that age is incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that the evidence supported a finding of negligence by the bus driver.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over ownership of North Carolina marshlands and estuarine areas, where the State sought to establish title and alleged obstruction of navigable waters, while defendants counterclaimed title based on thirty years of adverse possession under known boundaries. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling for the defendants, holding that evidence of activities such as docks, fishing, leasing, and placing crates or signs failed to show hostile, exclusive possession for the full statutory period, especially in light of stipulations regarding navigable waters where defendants disclaimed ownership of the bottoms. The court applied the requirement that adverse possession must be under a claim of exclusive right and found the evidence insufficient to reach a jury on the counterclaim. It affirmed the determination that defendants had not obstructed navigable waters but remanded the case for a jury trial on whether the State holds title and is entitled to possession.

propertyenvironmentprocedure

This case involves a negligence claim arising from a car accident, in which plaintiff Anderson sued co-defendants Jenkins and Robinson. Jenkins filed a cross-claim seeking indemnity or contribution from Robinson, alleging that Robinson's negligence or breach of warranty regarding defective brakes was the sole cause of the accident. The court affirmed the dismissal of Jenkins' cross-claim, holding that indemnity is available only where a defendant's liability is passive or derivative of another's active negligence, which was not the situation here. If Jenkins were found liable, it would stem from his own active negligence in driving or failing to inspect the vehicle, precluding any right to indemnity. The court also ruled that a breach-of-warranty cross-action between co-defendants is not properly litigated in the underlying tort suit.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of raping a woman after offering to change her flat tire, then directing her to a remote area and threatening her life to compel intercourse. On appeal, the defendant challenged the denial of his motion for nonsuit, the admissibility of a police lineup identification, and alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State was sufficient to support the verdict, that the lineup identification was admissible because it had an independent origin from the victim's earlier identification of the defendant, and that the jury instructions were fair and impartial without expressing any opinion on the evidence.

criminal law

The case involved the appeal of defendant Edward Theodore Ray's conviction for the rape of Mrs. Jeane Daily in Durham, North Carolina, on December 7, 1966. Ray, an indigent defendant, challenged the admission of evidence including a cigarette lighter, a sweater with bloodstains and hair, and cigarettes, claiming they resulted from unlawful searches and seizures, and raised procedural issues related to his appeal in forma pauperis. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error. It reasoned that the evidence was lawfully obtained and properly admitted as it corroborated the victim's account without violating constitutional protections, and all assignments of error were overruled.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a defendant charged with crime against nature under North Carolina law who entered a plea of nolo contendere; the indictment did not name the other person involved in the alleged offense. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the indictment was legally insufficient and reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling upholding it. The court reasoned that under the state constitution, a valid indictment must clearly allege all essential elements of the offense, including the identity of any other participant, to provide notice, protect against double jeopardy, and support jurisdiction; a guilty or nolo plea does not waive this jurisdictional defect. As a result, the judgment was arrested, vacating the plea and sentence while allowing the state to proceed on a proper indictment if desired.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. and the Town of Carolina Beach over claims to newly created oceanfront land resulting from the town's erosion control project involving sand pumping and berm construction, governed by a 1963 special act (Chapter 511) that required the town to survey and record a 'building line' within 30 days after project completion and allowed affected property owners only six months from that recording to file suit. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action as time-barred under Section 3 of the act. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations defense failed on its face because the building line was surveyed, established, and recorded in May 1964—before any work on the sand berm even began in December 1964 and well before its completion in June 1965—contrary to the act's explicit requirement that the line be set only after the work was finished. The court reasoned that the findings of fact showed the limitation period had not been triggered in the manner required by the statute, so the action filed in May 1965 was not barred, and remanded for consideration of the remaining issues.

propertyprocedureenvironment

In this case, plaintiffs sought to set aside a prior judgment against them by alleging that the defendant had used a false statement of account that failed to credit payments made. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the action, and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the alleged fraud was intrinsic to the merits of the prior proceeding rather than extrinsic or collateral fraud in its procurement, and therefore could not support an independent equitable action to attack the judgment. Such claims must instead be raised by motion in the original case or on appeal. The court also rejected a procedural challenge to the timing of the demurrer ruling, noting that any proposed amendment would not have affected the outcome.

procedure

This case arose from a 1965 car-train collision at a rural railroad grade crossing in North Carolina, where the driver, Bertha Price, approached from a direction with obstructed sight lines due to a bank and weeds, saw the train late, braked, and stalled on the tracks. The Price family sued the Seaboard Air Line Railroad for negligence, with claims brought by the driver, her husband as car owner, and their two minor daughters as passengers. The court affirmed compulsory nonsuits against the driver and husband, finding the driver contributorily negligent, but reversed the nonsuits as to the children because they had no control over the vehicle. It also upheld the trial court's striking of complaint allegations about the railroad's post-accident removal of the bank and weeds, ruling such evidence inadmissible to prove prior negligence under standard evidentiary principles. The opinion consolidated the cases and addressed related procedural and evidentiary issues at trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a larceny charge against defendant James Charles Smith for allegedly stealing $20 in cash from a wallet left in a desk drawer in a state office on April 8, 1966. The state's evidence included testimony that the victim had previously handled the wallet and a fingerprint expert's opinion that one of three latent prints lifted from the wallet matched the defendant's right thumb, but there was no direct evidence of when or how the print was made or that any theft occurred. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for compulsory nonsuit at the close of the state's case, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction because the victim believed she had lost the money rather than had it stolen, the fingerprint could have been impressed at any time, and it was implausible that a thief would take only one bill and leave another. The court emphasized that the state failed to prove the larceny as alleged and cited precedent requiring evidence that money was actually stolen.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved three defendants charged with breaking and entering, possession of burglary tools, and related offenses after they were found inside a fenced Borden’s Milk & Ice Cream Company facility in Charlotte on July 2, 1967, following activation of a burglar alarm; police discovered signs of forced entry through a tunnel and wall, along with tools, and the defendants directed officers to their nearby car. The trial court admitted statements made by the defendants after they were advised of their constitutional rights and overruled objections to evidence about the car’s location. On appeal, the defendants challenged the admission of their statements and the trial court’s refusal to inquire into a juror’s alleged note-taking during the trial. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the statements were voluntary, that any note-taking issue was not timely raised and caused no prejudice, and that no other errors warranted reversal, resulting in affirmance of the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a proceeding to approve a settlement contract entered into by the Sigmund Sternberger Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit charitable corporation, with the family beneficiaries of inter vivos trusts and a will created by the late Sigmund Sternberger, whose estate was valued at over $5 million and primarily directed to those trusts. The lower court, after hearing evidence, stipulations, and arguments from all parties including the executor, guardian, and Attorney General, made detailed findings and approved the contract as preserving the charitable purposes against potential challenges such as a will caveat. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment, holding that the findings supported the conclusions of law, that court approval was appropriate for the foundation's actions, and that the Attorney General was a proper party to protect charitable trust interests.

propertyprocedurefamily law

In State v. Hayes, the defendant was indicted on three counts including larceny of an automobile valued at $1,200 (a felony) and a misdemeanor under G.S. 20-105; he moved to quash the indictment on jurisdictional grounds before pleading. The Superior Court of Guilford County overruled the motion, the jury convicted on the first count only, and the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had original jurisdiction over the felony larceny charge and that the motion to quash was properly denied, but it granted a new trial because the trial judge's instruction on the presumption arising from recent possession of stolen property was erroneous. The court reasoned that the instruction could be read as improperly shifting the burden to the defendant to rebut a presumption of guilt, rather than treating the presumption merely as one evidentiary fact for the jury to weigh in determining whether the State had proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Sellers, the defendant, after pleading nolo contendere to a felony charge of non-burglarious breaking and entering under G.S. 14-54, moved for the first time on appeal to arrest judgment on the ground that the indictment failed to identify the building with sufficient particularity. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the indictment, which charged breaking and entering into 'a certain storehouse, shop, warehouse, dwelling house and building occupied by one Leesona Corporation,' was valid because it alleged all essential elements of the offense created by the statute. The court reasoned that where an indictment properly charges the statutory elements, any need for greater specificity is remedied by a motion for a bill of particulars rather than by arrest of judgment or quashing the indictment, and it relied on precedents such as S. v. Knight and S. v. Burgess to conclude that the pleading was adequate to support the conviction and sentence. The motion was overruled and the judgment affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a bailment dispute in which plaintiff Olan Mills, Inc. left its airplane with defendant Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc. at Charlotte Municipal Airport for radio repairs; during the plaintiff's absence a storm arose, the unsecured plane was blown into a tree and telephone pole, and it sustained severe damage. Plaintiff sued for negligence, alleging the defendant bailee failed to exercise ordinary care in securing the aircraft. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for compulsory nonsuit and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff; on appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court found no error. The court reasoned that the admitted bailor-bailee relationship imposed a duty of ordinary care, that plaintiff's evidence of failure to tie down or chock the plane was sufficient to go to the jury, and that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on standard securing practices and on the plane's repair costs.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a defendant's appeal from a conviction and prison sentence for assault with intent to commit rape, challenging the validity of the jury's verdict on grounds that the clerk's question led to an ambiguous 'yes' response that the clerk then interpreted as guilty, allegedly violating the right to a jury trial under the state and federal constitutions. The court held that there was no error in the trial or verdict. It reasoned that the verdict was not ambiguous or improperly influenced because the jury was polled and each member confirmed the guilty verdict, making it definite and certain, and distinguished the facts from prior cases like State v. Godwin and State v. Gatlin where judges had improperly suggested verdicts to the jury. The court further noted that an appeal examines the record proper, including whether the verdict supports the judgment, and found the punishment within statutory limits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a second appeal by an indigent defendant convicted of first-degree burglary and assault with a deadly weapon following a retrial in Cleveland County Superior Court. The defendant challenged the denial of his motion for nonsuit, the denial of a jury view of the crime scene, and the failure of police to provide Miranda warnings before any interrogation. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury, that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the jury view given the passage of time, and that Miranda warnings were immaterial because no statements obtained from the defendant were introduced at trial. It affirmed the burglary conviction but vacated inconsistent and contradictory judgments on the assault count and remanded that count for entry of a proper sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with a criminal offense, likely impaired driving, who requested a jury trial resulting in transfer from municipal court to superior court in Lenoir County under a local statute. The superior court had original jurisdiction, and the defendant was properly tried on an indictment rather than the original warrant, rendering challenges to the warrant moot. The court found that the breathalyzer test results were improperly admitted because the officer's qualifications as an expert were not adequately shown in the record and his statements to the defendant about refusal may have been coercive under the relevant statute. Although other evidence was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the evidentiary error required a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the ownership of multiple sunken shipwrecks and their artifacts lying within one marine league of North Carolina's Atlantic coast. The court held that the State of North Carolina owns the wrecks and is entitled to their immediate possession, affirming a permanent injunction barring the defendants from diving on or removing items from the sites and ordering the return of already-salvaged artifacts. The core reasoning was that state constitutional and statutory provisions, confirmed by federal law (43 U.S.C. § 1312), establish the state's jurisdiction and ownership over the submerged lands and the wrecks as derelicts that the state has never abandoned, while the state's wrecks statutes do not divest the state's prerogative rights over these long-submerged vessels.

propertyfederal power