This case involves a defendant originally convicted in Domestic Relations Court of being the father of an illegitimate child and willfully refusing to support it, with a six-month road sentence suspended on conditions; after a de novo trial in Superior Court he was again found guilty and given a similar suspended sentence requiring monthly support payments plus reimbursement. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial judge's jury instruction defining "willfully" as acting "wrongfully and unjustifiably, without valid and good excuse." The appellate court ruled that this definition was legally incorrect, as the statute (G.S. 49-2) requires only an intentional neglect or refusal to support, and the erroneous charge diverted the jury from the proper element of the offense. Because the mistake concerned an essential component of the crime, the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
The case is a negligence action in which the plaintiff pedestrian appealed from a jury verdict, contending that the trial judge failed to properly explain the law under G.S. 1-180 by misstating statutes on windshield wipers, pedestrian right-of-way in crosswalks, and the duty to keep a lookout. The court reviewed the full charge and found it sufficiently addressed the evidence and core legal principles, with any omitted details being subordinate matters that required a specific request for additional instructions. It further noted that the plaintiff's own evidence placed him outside the protection of the cited pedestrian statutes, as the location was not a qualifying intersection or marked crosswalk. The court therefore found no reversible error and upheld the verdict.
The case Maddox v. Brown was a wrongful death action arising from a collision between a bus and a motorcycle near an intersection, in which the plaintiff alleged that the bus driver's negligence proximately caused the death of the motorcycle rider. The court reviewed the trial court's denial of the defendant's demurrer to the evidence and motion for nonsuit, which challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence on both the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court concluded that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, permitted reasonable inferences supporting the defendant's proximate negligence and did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law, so both issues were properly submitted to the jury. The court therefore found no error in the verdict and affirmed the judgment.
The case Essick v. City of Lexington arose from a negligence claim by the personal representative of a deceased employee against the City of Lexington and its Utility Commission, with the employer (Dixie Furniture Company) and two of its employees (Link and Taylor) joined as additional parties; the dispute centered on the interaction between the Workmen’s Compensation Act and common-law rules regarding contributory negligence, subrogation rights under G.S. 97-10, and immunity under G.S. 97-9. The court reversed the trial judge’s dismissal of the complaint on the ground of contributory negligence, holding that such negligence did not appear as a matter of law on the face of the pleadings. It further ruled that Link and Taylor were entitled to the statutory immunity afforded those conducting the employer’s business and therefore should be dismissed as parties, while the employer had been improperly joined in the manner attempted. The core reasoning emphasized a liberal construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to achieve its remedial purposes, the supremacy of its provisions over conflicting common-law doctrines where they apply, and the limited scope of subrogation claims that do not justify unnecessary party joinder.
The case concerned whether an unincorporated fraternal organization could sue in its common name over property rights and whether a corporation whose charter had been suspended for nonpayment of taxes could defend in court. The trial court had reversed a clerk's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on grounds that the unincorporated plaintiff lacked capacity to sue and the suspended corporate defendant could not function or defend. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that statutes authorizing such organizations to acquire, hold, and convey property in their common name necessarily include the capacity to sue and be sued regarding that property, and that a suspended corporation retains incidental powers to protect its assets and stockholders' interests in litigation. The matter was remanded for further proceedings in the superior court.
The case involved an appeal from a jury verdict in a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle collision, with issues concerning the defendants' negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court held that the evidence was properly submitted to the jury on both issues and found no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions. It reasoned that the court was not required to read statutes verbatim to the jury or engage in speculative discussion of intoxication absent evidence linking it to the injury as a proximate cause, and that the overall charge adequately covered the rights of drivers at intersections. Other exceptions were examined and found without merit, leading to affirmance of the judgment below.
