This case concerns a dispute over title to approximately 12 acres of land in North Carolina, where the plaintiff traced ownership through a state grant and subsequent conveyances, while the defendant asserted title based on adverse possession for the statutory period, both with and without color of title from unregistered deeds. The trial court admitted testimony regarding an alleged verbal land swap between predecessors and instructed the jury that possession under a verbal agreement would be permissive rather than adverse. The Supreme Court held this evidence incompetent as parol proof of a conveyance and that the jury instruction was erroneous, particularly given the lack of a common source of title and the rules under the Connor Act regarding unregistered deeds as color of title. It therefore ordered a new trial.
The case involved a suit by Ivy River Land & Timber Co. against two insurers, American Insurance Company (a New Jersey corporation) and Dixie Fire Insurance Company (a North Carolina corporation), seeking recovery on separate fire insurance policies after property damage. American Insurance sought removal of the action to federal district court on diversity grounds, which required showing that the claim against it was separable from the claim against the in-state insurer. The court held that the causes of action were separable because each insurer's liability arose solely from its own independent policy promise, with no joint obligation, and a separate suit could be maintained against each without affecting the other. Under the removal statute (Judicial Code sec. 28), this separability permitted removal of the entire suit to federal court. The trial court's removal order was therefore affirmed.
This case involved a wrongful death claim brought by the plaintiff after her intestate was killed in a blast explosion at a mine operated by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged negligence by the defendant but failed to obtain an alias summons or take other steps after the original summons was not served by its return date of 28 July 1925, resulting in a discontinuance of the action under C.S. 480. The court held that this failure meant the action was not properly continued from its original filing date, and a new summons issued more than one year after the death could not satisfy the requirements of the North Carolina wrongful death statute (C.S. 160), which mandates that such actions be instituted within one year as a condition of the right itself. The court affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that statutory procedures for maintaining continuous process must be strictly followed to preserve jurisdiction and the cause of action.
The case involved a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant over an alleged oral contract in which the plaintiff agreed to provide services operating the defendant's home place and pay for farming equipment and the defendant's sister $500, in exchange for the defendant conveying a tract of land by deed or will. The plaintiff sued for benefits received by the defendant due to breach, and the defendant counterclaimed alleging breach by the plaintiff. The jury found that a contract existed, that the defendant breached it, and awarded the plaintiff $2,147 plus interest, while rejecting the defendant's claims. The court ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to comply with C.S. 564 by not stating the rule for measuring damages arising from the implied contract if the parol agreement was disaffirmed and benefits received.
The case involved a milling company seeking damages for the State Highway Commission's construction of a bridge and approaches that took portions of its ferry, low-water bridge, and access roads along Rocky River while also diverting customer traffic away from its water-powered mill. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the Highway Commission, finding no compensable taking or net damages, and the appellate court affirmed with no error. The court reasoned that the claimed losses were largely consequential damages from the new public highway rather than direct takings of property, that general and special benefits from the improved road offset any harm, and that jury instructions correctly limited recovery to pecuniary effects on the value of the property taken or directly affected.
The case concerned whether the City of Asheville could validly sell certain land (the Ryerson property) through a private sale without complying with the public auction requirements of C.S. 2688. The court held that the city lacked authority to proceed by private sale and that any conveyance would be invalid unless the general statute's procedures—public outcry sale after 30 days' notice—were followed. The core reasoning was that the city's 1923 charter, which grants power to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, must be read in pari materia with the longstanding general statute; the two are not repugnant, so both apply, and municipal powers are strictly limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied. Good faith, a favorable price, or practical convenience cannot override the statutory mandate.
