Earl W. Vaughn

This case involved a dispute over restrictive covenants on defendant's property that prohibited more than one dwelling. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendant's construction of a second residence, and after initial orders requiring removal of the incomplete structure, defendant sought to modify the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) by converting the structure into a permitted garage. The trial court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed and directed modification; the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed that decision and remanded the case. The court held that Rule 60(b)(5) grants the trial judge discretion to relieve a party from a judgment's prospective application when it is no longer equitable, and the Court of Appeals improperly removed that discretion by mandating a particular outcome. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion, potentially with conditions to protect the plaintiffs' interests under the covenants.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a law firm's attempt to intervene in a domestic dispute between Carol Thompson and her husband to enforce a contingent fee contract for legal services or, alternatively, to recover the reasonable value of services rendered before discharge. The Court of Appeals had already ruled the contingent fee contract void as against public policy, a holding that became the law of the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the void contract gave the firm no interest in the underlying suit, requiring vacation of the intervention order and dismissal of the firm's action. It further ruled that no recovery was available on a quantum meruit basis when an express contract is unenforceable for public policy reasons, reversing the Court of Appeals' remand for valuation of services. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the intervenors.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of first-degree sexual offense after he forced a victim to perform oral sex on him at knifepoint in a car. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the testimony about the sexual act was ambiguous, and also objected to the admission of false identification cards found in his possession. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim's testimony describing "oral sex" was sufficient because the statutory definition of "sexual act" includes fellatio and the term reasonably refers to that act, with additional details confirming the conduct. The court further ruled that the identification cards were relevant to show the defendant used a false name consistent with the crime.

criminal law

The case concerned whether a criminal defendant's pre-trial silence could be used on cross-examination to impeach his trial testimony after he chose to take the stand. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that such questioning did not violate the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution. The court reasoned that the record showed no Miranda warnings had been given, so there was no implicit assurance that silence would carry no penalty, and that prior silence inconsistent with trial testimony may be used for impeachment under established precedent like Fletcher v. Weir. The opinion distinguished cases where Miranda warnings created a due process bar and affirmed the state's right to test credibility through cross-examination once the defendant testifies.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ford, the defendant, after pleading guilty to drug-related charges under G.S. 90-95, appealed both the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence and fine and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of a mobile home. The court held that the guilty plea precluded any appeal of the sentence as cruel and unusual punishment. It further ruled that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search warrant because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched, having asserted neither a possessory interest nor legitimate presence at the time. Even assuming standing, the court found the warrant valid, as probable cause existed based on the detection of marijuana odor by officers lawfully positioned in nearby woods, which qualified as open fields under the Fourth Amendment with no protected privacy interest.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the interpretation of a compulsory filing endorsement in a credit insurance policy issued by ACI to Akzona, with excess coverage from First State, arising from the insolvency of debtor Victoria Fabrics. The trial court granted partial summary judgment, holding that Akzona's failure to timely file its claim under the endorsement did not forfeit coverage but instead reinstated the primary policy's deduction for amounts received from the excess insurer. On appeal, the court affirmed, finding the policy provisions ambiguous due to their complexity and inconsistent language regarding optional versus compulsory filing, and thus construing the ambiguity against the insurer ACI. The court also rejected First State's arguments regarding coverage limits and the timing of claims against the excess insurer, ruling that the primary policy met retention requirements and that joinder and interest accrual were proper under the policy terms and procedural rules.

business & regulatoryprocedure